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Affective Politics, Media and Public Engagement in Contemporary Korea 
Summary 
This thesis aims to contribute to recent discussions in media and cultural studies and 
political communication about reconceptualising the relationships between politics, 
media and public engagement. It will do so by articulating the context and processes 
in which private citizens form political publics and the ways in which media genres 
beyond conventional news and public affairs encourage or enable civic engagement. 
It explores these issues in the context of the ongoing democratisation of South Korea 
since 1987, a nation with a particularly dynamic digital culture. 
The thesis critiques the conventional binaries between the private 
(emotion/entertainment/fans) and the public (reason/news/publics), and articulates the 
mediating contexts and processes in which the private shifts to the public. It seeks to 
situate affect and entertainment (popular culture) as key agents in mobilising and 
sustaining citizens’ political interest and participation.  
The key research questions are therefore: in what context do media offer a 
discursive space to connect people’s everyday lives to the public world as well as to 
recruit and sustain political interest?; how does affect play a critical part in making 
sense of the public world, and mobilising political participation?; and in what ways do 
private individuals come to shape the public?  
These questions are examined in the context of ICT-based media 
environments and in relation to three empirical studies: 1) OhmyNews - a global icon 
of citizen journalism - in which the ‘feminised’ news produced by citizens (re-
)contextualised private interests into public concerns, and allowed the public to make 
a real change in the 2002 Presidential election and the 2010 local elections; 2) online 
political satire, in which politics is situated in an entertainment mode through citizens’ 
creative reinterpretation, and which helped mobilise citizens’ political interest and 
action during the 2004 Presidential impeachment and general election; and 3) the 
politicisation of teen fandom, in which music fans were mobilised as political actors 
in the 2008 anti-US beef  protest.  
The thesis employs a wide range of research methods including participant 
observation, interpretive textual analysis, and semi-structured and in-depth interviews. 
In this way the thesis identifies a complex linkage of traditionally separated spheres, 
such as reason and affect, news and entertainment media, and expert and common 
knowledge.  
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1. Introduction 
Under the authoritarian regime that ruled South Korea in the 1980s, any political 
activities that could possibly be interpreted as dissident were prohibited1 in the name of 
“social justification”. Despite this, I often witnessed my parents talking about the news 
they read or viewed, criticising the state affairs with their friends in the living room or at 
the dinner table. During those times our home, like many others, was a relatively safe 
place to accommodate the kind of political discussion that could be too dangerous to be 
spoken in public. That early eavesdropping on my parents’ discussions and later 
conversations with them in my early youth formed a large part of my developing 
political interest and sustained passion for democratic society.  
As I pursued my academic career, I came to ponder these questions: Where 
would those passionate talks that my parents shared with friends and family at home be 
theoretically placed? And could that discursive situation be seen as the political? While 
I was observing recent pivotal events where civic participation in the new online media 
environment was helping to reshape the Korean political landscape, my questioning 
became intersected with a curiosity about the communicative mode of ICT-based media 
in which differing genres converged. In short, in what context do hybrid media connect 
private individuals to the public world, and allow them to act as citizens?   
Such questions can be encapsulated into one key theme which is central to my 
thesis – how to conceptualise the relationships between media, public engagement and 
politics for enhancing democracy. In pursuit of inclusive, participatory democracy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 South Korea had been under military dictatorship for nearly 3 decades until the 1987 democratisation. 
The political climate during that time was unimaginably oppressive. For example, the former President 
Kim Dae-jung, who was the leading opposition politician at the time, was sentenced to death for an 
alleged rebellion conspiracy and later was exiled to the USA for 2 years. After he returned in 1985, he 
was put under house arrest. More details of the authoritarian rule are charted with a focus on the 
relationship between the state and the media in Chapter Three ‘Mapping Out the South Korean Media 
Landscape’.  
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where diverse forms of mass participation in a political realm are encouraged, what 
matters is to identify the conditions (contexts) in which everyday communicative 
practices by means of media use enable civic engagement and participation in the public 
world. Many scholars stress the democratic potential of talk in enabling an inter-
subjective communication as an essential component for a public sphere, in setting 
political interest into motion and thus drawing political interest from apathetic 
participants in the course of conversation (Bohman, 1996, p.145;Calhoun, 
1992;Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2007b, p.170;Dahlgren, 2006, pp.267-
286;Gamson & Katz, 1992, cited in Dayan, 2001;Habermas, 1974, p.49; 1996).  
Habermas’s historical concept of the liberal public sphere has been perhaps one 
of the most frequently applied within South Korean media studies and in English-
speaking counterparts by and large as Livingstone and Lunt (2013, p.87) termed ‘the 
rise and rise of the concept’ despite entailing many critiques and new public spheres 
advanced by globalisation and Internet use recently. The notion of Habermas’s 
historical public sphere, in which private citizens come to form a public through 
critical-rational debates of the common concern mediated by the media, reaching a 
reasoned consensus, has been extensively acclaimed as contributing to theorising the 
relationship between the (mass) media and democratic politics (Bang, 1984, 
1995;Buckingham, 2000;Calhoun, 1992;Curran, 1991;Dahlgren, 1995;Garnham, 
1992;Livingstone and Lunt, 2013;McKee, 2004;McNair, 2000;Moon, 1996;Park, 1996).   
Going back to my early ponderings, the discursive situation of my parents with 
friends and family at home can hardly fit in the public sphere manifested in Habermas’s 
historical account, leaving that speech situation as only an occasion of a private, 
intimate sphere and thereby the pre-political, although he acknowledges how an interest, 
and ability to question and debate political and cultural questions is founded in the 
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private sphere. Under the repressive authoritarian rule in which public discussions 
and/or assemblages critical of the state were prohibited, the home acted as a public 
sphere because it was the only space (in conceptual sense) to have political 
communication and, contrary to European modernity which discredits emotion over 
reason as the secondary component of politics, passion significantly stimulated 
involvement in the public sphere.  
Responding to many criticisms that his original public sphere attracted, 
Habermas revised it to be more applicable in the complex late capitalism – embracing 
plural public spheres, various forms and channels of deliberation in everyday 
conversation, and focusing less on the nature of place and more on the nature of 
communication (Habermas, 1996;Livingstone and Lunt, 2013, p.92). However, his 
deliberative democracy model, in which he continues to place rationality as the most 
important element, unavoidably limits alternative forms of democratic participation 
involving affective dimensions (Dahlgren, 2009, p.8;McGuigan, 2005).  
I do not intend to put too much theoretical weight on Habermas’s public sphere. 
Rather, in an attempt to critique the Enlightenment dichotomy, I would position him as 
one of those scholars maintaining the Enlightenment rationality along with Robert 
Putnam and Neil Postman. In this tradition, news and current affairs media have been 
conceived as the most important genre of political discourse to facilitate rational 
deliberation, degrading entertainment (popular culture) media as harmful to democracy. 
Moreover, dispassionate rationality and reasoned action are presupposed as a 
prerequisite qualification of a citizen (Ciarrochi, Forgas and Mayer, 2006;Mayer and 
Ciarrochi, 2006;van Zoonen, 2005). In reality, politics is often practiced around 
emotion. Especially during election periods, candidates endeavour to appeal to the 
electorate for emotional sympathy or solidarity in opposition to competing candidates 
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by making claims that appeal to the public sentiment rather than rationality. In a similar 
way, citizen’s direct political participation, particularly of young people, in the form of 
protests and social movements is mobilised by emotional engagements (Gamson, 
1992;Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001, p.3;Gould, 2010;Hoggett and Thompson, 
2012;Richards, 2007).  
However, the dichotomy between the public (reason/news/publics) and the 
private (emotion/entertainment and popular culture/audiences), discrediting the private 
over the public, is still powerfully operative. The distinction, grounded in the 
Enlightenment rationality, was established not only as a supposedly universal 
foundation for such key concepts of political theory and social sciences as citizenship, 
public sphere and public/private dichotomy ‘in both Europe and outside’ (Chakrabarty, 
2007, p.4;Wallerstein, 1997) in the rise of the capitalist economy (Duncan, 2007, 
p.39;Gal, 2002, pp.77-78) but also as a vehicle to constitute Eurocentrism with the 
proliferation of capitalist economy (Wallerstein, 1997, 2004). In addition, the 
distinction has been a foundational category in republican and liberal thought as well 
(Gal, 2005, p.24).   
More significantly, the private/public boundary is an ideological, rather than 
empirical distinction as the dichotomy works as a normative and practical notion to rule 
our everyday routines of thinking and practice as well as in social and political 
scholarships. For example, in South Korea, Confucianism, introduced by the emperor of 
Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910) as an ideology to better control a newly unified state, is 
still strongly operating as a norm to govern every aspect of society such as human 
relationships and social behaviours. What underlies Confucianism is an “altered” yin  
(陰) – yang (陽) theory as Wang (2005, pp.209-231) argues. Unlike the accusation of 
the reason for gender inequality that many scholars make, yin-yang theory as an ancient 
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Chinese cosmology views ‘yin and yang as natural forces that confer life and cause 
things through a process and movement’ (Wang, 2005, p.211) and therefore through 
their interchangeable interactions everything in the universe comes into being. Thus it 
stresses the complimentary harmony of each part2and their relationship is in constant 
flux and dynamic. However, it was reconstructed as a definite dichotomy with 
hierarchical categories to place yang (man/husband/human nature and benevolence/the 
good/public) over yin (women/wife/emotion/the bad/private) when integrated into 
Confucianism (136 B.C.E.) as ‘the orthodoxy of the Han state at the expense of other 
schools of Confucius thought’ (Wang, 2005, pp.209-231). 
In this light, it is of importance to note that feminist studies scholarship has 
persistently contested this distinction. They have shown that the ‘supposedly 
incompatible’ (Gal, 2002, 2005) boundaries between public and private are always in 
flux and thus continue to be negotiated (Landes, 2003), not static. The questions that 
Nancy Fraser (1992, p.597) poses illuminate that the ideological nature of the 
private/public dichotomy is interest- and power-laden.    
Underlying all these questions are two more general problems that are 
centred on power and inequality: Who has the power to decide where 
to draw the line between public and private?  What structures of 
inequality underline the hegemonic understandings of these categories 
as well as the struggles that contest them?  
Similarly, yet distinctively, Susan Gal (2002; 2005, pp.24-30) approaches the 
private/public dichotomy from a semiotic perspective. In short, the divide, 
contextualised in language that we use in everyday routines, operates as an ideology 
that selects and identifies ‘what will count as public or private’. The content and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The original principle of yin-yang theory still remains effective in oriental medicine. It views everything 
in universe including a human body as having yin (cold) or yang (hot/warm) trait and the balance of the 
two characters should be kept, otherwise disease or illness would occur. Therefore, if somebody’s body 
has a surplus of yang quality, she/he is prescribed medicine having yin to balance the overall yin-yang 
property in the body (OrientalMedicine.com).        
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relations ascribed to the descriptions ‘public’ and ‘private’ can be recalibrated based on 
an actor’s interpretation that is largely laden by power and ideology in a given society 
and culture. Yet, ‘the underlying distinction between the public (any issue that requires 
common resolution) and the purely private remains important’ (Couldry, Livingstone 
and Markham, 2007b, p.6). 
Despite the sustained critiques from feminist and media and cultural studies 
scholars, the mainstream scholarship continues to support the conventional separation 
and, more importantly, the supposed dichotomy remains powerful enough to necessitate 
ongoing critique. In this light, the thesis attempts to contest the gendered, hierarchical, 
fixed normative distinction between the public and the private in respect of the 
relationships between affect, entertainment and politics.  
For this, this thesis attempts to build upon the recent work of feminist, and 
media and cultural studies, and political communication and psychology that have 
suggested reconceptualising the supposedly hierarchical distinction between the private 
and the public (Carter, Branston and Allan, 1998;Connell, 1992;Dahlgren, 1991, 1992, 
2003, 2006, 2009;Gray, Jones and Thompson, 2009;Gripsrud, 2000;Holland, 
1998;Jones, 2010;Livingstone, 2005a, 2005b, 2005d;Livingstone and Lunt, 
1994;Macdonald, 1998, 2000;Pantti and van Zoonen, 2006;Street, 1997, 2001;van 
Zoonen, 1991, 1998, 2004, 2005). These critiques offer theoretical and methodological 
frameworks to identify the relation between the supposedly differentiated categories 
complicated and negotiated in everyday politics in regard to affect, hybrid media and 
publics, which are central to the thesis. The detailed discussions of the rationale that 
underpins the thesis are charted in the literature review chapter Two ‘Affect, 
Entertainment and Publics in Everyday Politics: Internationalising theory within a 
Korean perspective’. Reflecting on the criticism of Euro-centrism in humanities and 
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social sciences, I will carefully employ Western theories by discerning their possibilities 
and limitations in examining South Korean cases. 
Therefore, the thesis endeavours to articulate the mediating contexts and 
processes in which the private shifts to the public. It seeks to situate affect and 
entertainment (popular culture) as key agents in mobilising and sustaining citizens’ 
political interest and participation. In other words, this work attempts to articulate the 
complex context and processes in which private citizens form political publics and the 
ways in which media genres beyond conventional news and public affairs encourage or 
enable civic engagement. The thesis explores these issues in the context of the ongoing 
democratisation of South Korea in which dynamic digital culture is thriving. Hence, the 
key research questions comprise three parts: 
First, in what context do media offer a discursive space to connect people’s 
everyday lives to the public world as well as to recruit and sustain political interest?   
Second, how does affect play a critical part in making sense of the public world 
and mobilising political participation? 
Last, in what ways do private individuals come to shape publics? 
Chapter Two ‘Affect, Entertainment and Publics in Everyday Politics: Internationalising 
theory within a Korean perspective’ begins by raising an important question of whether 
Western theory is adequate to examine and explicate non-Western context such as the 
South Korean context. In an attempt to avoid the uncritical ‘academic relevancy’ 
(Khiabany, 2011, p.207) and ‘avatars of Eurocentrism’ (Wallerstein, 1997) that were 
prevalent in humanities and social sciences, it is argued that de-Westernising should be 
conducted carefully in respect of the ways in which Western theories are to be applied. 
These pages then go on reviewing the literature relevant to how the terms public and 
private have been deployed in media and political debates; the place of emotion in 
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political involvement, particular fandom and its relation to political participation; and a 
literature review of hybrid media forms, with a focus on those forms that are central to 
my thesis, like online satire and ‘feminised’ news of citizen journalism.  
In order to provide contextual backgrounds for choosing three empirical cases, 
Chapter Three ‘Mapping out the South Korean Media Landscape: In relation to the role 
of the state’ comprises three parts of a different time span. The first part deals with the 
period from the Independence from Japanese colonisation in 1945 to the 1987 
democratisation. Particular focus is given on the media policies of the authoritarian 
regimes (1961-1987), which structured the foundation of South Korean media landscape 
in a particular way, especially the heightened monopoly of information control and 
ownership by a handful of conservative media, namely Chosun, Joong Ang and Dong-
A, whose gigantic influence and power has continued to be operative in Korean society. 
This imbalanced media landscape and the subsequent public aspirations for media 
reforms offered a rationale for the rise of OhmyNews (OMN hereafter) and alternative 
ICT-based media to contest the conservative discourse manufactured by those dominant 
media. The second part is concerned with the new media landscape shaped by the media 
deregulation in the wake of the 1987 democratisation. On the one hand, it considers the 
emergence of the institutionalised alternative newspaper Hankyoreh and its impact on 
the establishment of small-scale alternative media. On the other hand, it deals with the 
aggravating concentration of the media monopoly and the intensifying market-driven 
journalism. The final part examines the state’s ICT-boosting policy that founded the 
nationwide ICT infrastructure enabling universal access and availability of high speed 
Internet at low cost, allowing the abundance of small-scale online alternative media 
(spaces) such as OMN, DC Inside and fan communities.  
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Chapter Four ‘Methodology’ is concerned with overall research designs and 
methods with particular emphasis on a qualitative approach. This chapter contextualises 
the key research questions with sub-questions posed in each empirical chapter. And 
these pages explicate multiple research methods employed to examine sub-questions in 
each chapter. They include interpretative textual analysis, semi-structured and in-depth 
interviews, and participant observation. The concluding part of this chapter considers 
ethical aspects that occurred in the research process.   
Chapter Five ‘Ordinary People and OhmyNews: Reshaping the news in 
between the private and the public’ investigates OMN, a global icon of citizen 
journalism, in which the ‘feminised’ news produced by citizens (re-)contextualised 
private interests into public concerns and (re-)mediated private citizens to the political 
world so as to allow the public to make a real change in the 2002 Presidential election 
and the 2010 local elections. Moreover, these pages will discuss similarities and 
differences between tabloidization and OMN’s citizen journalism, both of which are 
alternatives to traditional standard journalism. 
In so doing, the chapter aims to critique the challenges and the implications that 
OMN’s citizen journalism poses to the traditional normative values of what counts as 
news/journalism and who counts as journalists, as well as its challenge to the 
theoretically conventional divide between the private and the public, which sit at the 
centre of the tabloidization debate that is consistent even though the content and the 
players change over time.  
Chapter Six ‘Online Political Satire: Placing politics in affect and 
entertainment’ critiques the modern dichotomy between news and entertainment, 
emotion and reason, through examining online political satire, in which politics is 
situated in an entertainment mode through citizens’ creative reinterpretation, and which 
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helped mobilise citizens’ political interest and action during the 2004 Presidential 
impeachment and general election.  
In doing so, these pages will rework the conventionally theorised relations of 
entertainment/affect/lay thinking and news/reason/expert’s knowledge in terms of 
politics. Consequently, I will suggest that political satire, as a converged genre of the 
traditionally separated domains of news and entertainment, generates such emotionality 
as humour that inspires a “real”, accidental conversation among the audience and 
contributes to connecting politics to the everyday.  
Chapter Seven ‘The Paradox of Fandom: The politicising of teen fans of the 
pop band TVXQ’ attempts to reconceptualise the relationships between fandom and 
politics, and audiences and publics. I will critique the normative political theorising that 
has charged popular culture with undermining the public sphere needed for a 
functioning democracy, leading to the conclusion of the death of democracy or publics. 
Instead of denouncing entertainment and popular culture for dumbing down the 
citizenry and denigrating audiences in negative terms, I would suggest that there is a 
need to seek not only a mediating domain in which popular culture offers a recurring 
opportunity for a conversation to activate audiences to engage in politics, but also to 
identify the context and process of the audience’s shift to form a political public. 
In this light, this chapter examines the politicisation of teenaged fans of popular 
music, particularly boy bands, focusing on how and in what context fandom provides a 
platform to contemplate current politics and to practice political citizenship. These 
pages investigate the 2008 vigil rally, which was organised against the government’s 
hastily agreed US beef import deal and amidst fears of mad cow disease. The rally 
evolved into a significant and expansive space for political action. Interestingly, 
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teenaged students, especially teen girls, led those rallies to a large extent, and at the 
centre of these teen girls’ activism were various teen fan groups of K-pop stars.   
Therefore, this chapter aims to identify the contextual and processional 
dimensions of the fan-based politics in which teen fans’ cultural and affective 
engagement transforms into political citizenship. For this, these pages will explore the 
ways in which the teen fans related to their pop stars in their everyday lives and within 
this political activism; which emotions play what kinds of roles in the process of teen 
fans’ politicisation; and thereby what this fandom implies to the relationship between 
fans and publics, and popular culture and politics. Consequently, I hope I will locate the 
legitimate place of entertainment, fans and emotions in democratic politics. 
The concluding part of the thesis, Chapter Eight ‘Locating the Public in the 
Private’, attempts to provide reflexive discussions of the key aspects of the empirical 
findings of the research in relation to the existing works and authors that were utilised 
in the thesis. In addition, these pages endeavour to discuss whether there are similarities 
and differences between the three case studies that could give more insight in the wider 
conditions under which entertainment or affect does become relevant in a political 
context. Consequently, the thesis will contribute to recent discussions in feminist, and 
media and cultural studies about reconceptualising the relationships between politics, 
media and public engagement by identifying the context and the process by which the 
private translates into the public.    
	   21 
2. Affect, Entertainment and Publics in Everyday 
Politics: Internationalising theory within a Korean 
perspective 
My thesis is concerned with a particular instance of the way in which the public and the 
private are being renegotiated in a particular time and place, and this needs to be 
situated within a much longer history of how these terms have played out in political, 
media and social movement theory, all of which are rooted in European3 experience. 
This raises a significant question of whether Western theories are applicable to examine 
and explicate non-Western contexts like South Korea. The question is central to the 
increasingly growing concern of Eurocentrism, or ‘Western bias’ and thereby the call 
for ‘de-Westernising’ in media and communication research and social sciences in the 
recent decade (Chakrabarty, 2007;Cumings, 2007;Gunaratne, 2010;Khiabany, 
2011;Park and Curran, 2000;Wang, 2011). The consciousness of ‘academic relevancy’4 
is also expressed by Korean scholarship in humanities and social sciences as the most 
problematic according to the recent survey (Kyosu Shinmun, cited in Kim, 2010b, p.vi). 
In this regard, Kim (2010b) calls for the need of ‘indigenisation’ of media and 
communication theory, questioning the firmly established US-centric theory largely 
focused on media effect and function which is still powerfully operative as mainstream 
even after more than 50 years of its academic foundation in Korea. It is, as many critics 
(Chakrabarty, 2007;Khiabany, 2011;Kim, 2010b;Lee, 2011b;Wallerstein, 1997) pointed 
out, grounded in the fact that Eurocentrism residing in science and social sciences were 
institutionalised and expanded after World War II through university education by 
native intellectuals trained in Western Europe but mostly in the USA.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Here ‘Europe’ primarily refers to Western Europe and North America (Wallerstein, 1997, p.93), 
specifically the USA and the connoted meaning of unique, superior, ‘eternal West’ in opposition to an 
artificial construct of ‘the Other (the Orient)’ (Amin, 1989, p.89).  
4 It refers to ‘the relevance and academic dependency’ of Western theories in the social sciences in the 
global south (Khiabany, 2011, p.207).  
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Then, what matters is how to proceed indigenisation, ‘a loose category’ dealing 
with ‘the problem of irrelevancy and the generation of alternative scientific traditions’ 
(Wang, 2011, p.3). Certain attempts unveiled their limitations: a ‘culture-general 
approach’ exposes the problem of an impetuous generalisation without consideration 
and examination of the particular of local contexts and ‘nativism’ overly emphasises 
‘the unique, the different, and often the traditional’ (Wang, 2011, p.6). Consequently, it 
suggests the need of greater and more critical attention to locating the particular and/or 
the general of non-Western experience, in particular when selecting which Western 
theories to be applied for analysis and how. Because there are varying theoretical 
frameworks deployed in the name of Western theories, such as the positivist-scientific 
paradigm and the interpretative paradigm, de-Westernising should be carried out in a 
selective way best suited to a particular context in a particular time. In the sense that the 
Western critiques offer not only theoretical and methodological frameworks to identify 
the relation between the presumably differentiated categories complicated and 
renegotiated in everyday politics in respect of emotions, hybrid media and publics, but 
also that there has not been much developed discussions of those relations in Korean 
academia, the Western critiques are unquestionably the most useful way to approach the 
Korean material and experience. Therefore, in order to go beyond as ‘testing grounds’ 
(Miike, cited in Wang, 2011, p.1) for and ‘avatars of Eurocentrism’ (Wallerstein, 1997), 
and toward internationalising theories in the field of media, culture and politics, my 
thesis will aim to identify the particular in Korean contexts and its implications to 
Western theories that I will employ and critique.  
In this light, here I will review the literature relevant to how the terms public 
and private have been deployed in media and political debates, including a discussion of 
how Western theories are relevant to the Korean context; the place of emotion in 
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political mobilisation, in particular fandom and its relation to political action; and a 
review of literature about hybrid media forms, concentrating on those forms that are 
central to my thesis, like satire and ‘feminised’ news of citizen journalism. 
2.1. The Public/Private Dichotomy: A fractal opposition 
In envisioning a normative democratic society model, the Habermasian notion of the 
public sphere has profoundly contributed to theorising the relationship between the 
mass media and democratic politics (Bang, 1984, 1995;Buckingham, 2000;Calhoun, 
1992;Curran, 1991;Dahlgren, 1995;Garnham, 1992;Kim, 1993;Livingstone and Lunt, 
2013;McKee, 2004;McNair, 2000;Moon, 1996;Park, 1996). In his book The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society 
(STPS, 1989[1962]), Jürgen Habermas described the rise and decline of a bourgeois 
public sphere as a new discursive social space mediating between state and society from 
the nation state in the seventeenth century to the social welfare state in the mid-
twentieth century in Western Europe, specifically Britain, France and Germany. The 
nucleus of this notion is a (political) public sphere in which private citizens come to 
form a public through critical-rational debates of the common concern (mediated by the 
media), reaching a reasoned consensus. Its ultimate end, therefore, is to make the state 
accountable to the informed and critical citizenry and to enhance democratic 
participation. Unarguably, this concept has been largely acclaimed as providing a sound 
critical theory not only of historical developments in the media and politics (Fraser, 
1990;Garnham, 1992) but also of ‘political action necessary to rebuild systems of both 
communication and representative democracy’ (Garnham, 1992, pp.361-364). By the 
same token, drawing on the public/private dichotomy that separates the system (state 
and market economy) and the lifeworld (public sphere and private sphere), the concept 
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of the public sphere makes it possible to differentiate between state apparatuses, the 
official-economy, and the public sphere of discursive interaction that is essential to a 
working democracy as Fraser (1990, pp.56-57) acknowledges.  
However, if an inclusive democratic society – in which diverse forms of mass 
participation in a political realm are encouraged – is pursued, this universalising concept 
of the bourgeois public sphere is problematic. By categorising certain normative 
specifications of social settings, qualities and activities, and modes of communication to 
construct the liberal public sphere, the public/private distinction deployed in 
Habermas’s historical account as ‘bourgeois masculinist ideology’ (Fraser, 1990, p.77) 
de-legitimises some other alternatives as private. This has drawn many criticisms that 
will be charted in detail in the later sections. For example, it is assumed that a 
precondition of political subjectivity is economic independence that guarantees not only 
political consciousness based on class interests but also private autonomy un-subverted 
by power. Thereby, the non-bourgeoisie, such subordinate groups as women, servants, 
the propertyless and the uneducated, are inevitably disqualified to be a citizen to form a 
political public, and thus their voices are marginalised. Importantly however, Habermas 
has moved away from this singular conception of the idealised bourgeois public sphere 
as he admitted in his later works (1992, 1996). In a recent study, Livingstone and Lunt 
(2013) pointed to three main changes in Habermas’s account of the historical public 
sphere in particular relevance to media and communication studies. Firstly, Habermas 
now accepts a plurality of public spheres whose legitimacy resides less in the nature of 
the physical place where communication takes place but more in the quality of 
communication itself, which enables a democratic, ‘discursive formation of opinion and 
will on the part of a public’ (Habermas, 1992, p.446). Secondly, with deliberation 
ideally orienting to mutual understanding instead of consensus and a sovereign public, 
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he adopts ‘the contested nature of public life, the importance of recognition of diverse 
identities and, therefore, the legitimacy of multiple forms and sites of deliberation’ 
(Livingstone and Lunt, 2013, p.92). Thirdly, he rather focuses on the conditions under 
which institutions can play a crucial role in generating and sustaining processes of 
deliberation and public engagement. Therefore, Habermas rather argues that the 
language of inclusion, which was developed to serve particular class interests in a 
particular historical moment as described in his historical account of the public sphere, 
contains within it a self-transformative potential.  
In this light, it is of importance that we review Susan Gal’s argument of what 
the public/private distinction is and how to reconceptualise it.  In short, the binary 
separation, established as a social analytical concept in the rise of the capitalist 
economy in modern Western society (Duncan, 2007, p.39;Gal, 2002, pp.77-78), has 
been a foundational category in republican and liberal thought as well (Gal, 2005). Gal 
(2002; 2005, p.24) approaches the private/public dichotomy from a semiotic 
perspective. In other words, the divide, contextualised in language that we use in 
everyday routines, operates as an ideology that selects and identifies what will count as 
public or private. She (2005, pp.26-30) explicates the way an “object” is categorised 
either as public or as private in communicative practices through the logic of ‘fractal 
recursions’ and ‘erasures’. That is to say, ‘fractal recursions’ means the repeated 
recalibrations by using the same distinction onto different scales of comparison and 
‘erasures’ is the process of forgetting, denying or forcibly eliminating ‘the nested 
distinctions’ at different scales and thus simplifying into a single dichotomy that fits 
into an actor5’s perspective that is primarily shaped by an ideology in a particular 
society and culture. In this way, Gal offers a better understanding that the public/private 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Here an actor can be a speaker – although Gal did not mention it, “researcher” could be categorised as a 
speaker in terms of Mikhail Bakhtin’s ‘voicing’ – naming and semanticising (see Gal, 2002, p.81) or a 
participant in any form of communicative practices.   
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distinction is a fractal one, rather than a stable binary opposition, appearing in different 
guises in different times and places. Consequently, the relation is meaningful, even 
when the content ascribed to the descriptions ‘public’ and ‘private’ changes.  
2.2. The Public Sphere and the Communicative Mode	  
In the sense that the public sphere is where interests of various social groups of private 
citizens are presented and (re-)negotiated in the process of intersubjective 
communication, the question is what kinds of communicative mode or media form 
enable the intersubjective interaction among people in a given society. In this light, my 
point is that it is meaningless to discuss the democratic role of media on the grounds of 
the hierarchical news/entertainment opposition. Rather, it needs sustained attempts to 
identify which particular mode of communication materialises the public sphere in a 
particular context. This corresponds to one of my research questions: In what context do 
media offer a discursive space to connect people’s everyday lives to the public world as 
well as to recruit and sustain political interest? This will be answered by examining 
varying media genres throughout the thesis such as citizen journalism OhmyNews, satire 
and fandom. In order to open up democratic possibilities of differing media, therefore, 
in this section I will critique the debates of democratic media based on the fixed 
opposition between news (information) and entertainment (popular culture) with focus 
on the arguments of Habermas, Postman and Putnam.  
‘Talk’6 – conceiving potential to enable an intersubjective interaction as an 
essential component for a public sphere – has long been underscored as central in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 At the joint keynote speech with Nick Couldry (The Transforming Audiences 2.0 Conference at the 
University of Westminster in 2009), Natalie Fenton replaced conversation with ‘communication’, 
underscoring its democratic role in forming a discursive space. However, in my thesis the term ‘talk’ will 
be flexibly used together with ‘conversation’, ‘communication’ and ‘speech’ in the sense that all of these 
entail democratic potential of creating a discursive sphere in the process of intersubjective 
communication.   
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enhancing citizens’ political engagement and action, and sustaining a working 
democracy (Bohman, 1996;Calhoun, 1992;Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 
2007a;Dahlgren, 2003, 2006, 2009;Habermas, 1974, 1989[1962];Livingstone, 
1999;Livingstone and Lunt, 1994). Indisputably, the notion of Habermas’s public 
sphere has enormously contributed to cementing the significant political role of 
conversation (Schudson, 2008, p.94).  
Despite this broadly agreed conception of the democratic role of talk, there 
exists discrepancy about what kind of communicative mode is better suited to 
actualising the public sphere. Conventionally, news and current affairs media – 
specifically the newspaper press, which presumably deal with explicitly state-related 
concerns – have been conceived as the most important genre of political discourse 
(Delli Carpini, 2009;Delli Carpini and Williams, 2001, pp.160-161;Schudson, 1998; 
2008, p.103;Sparks, 1991, p.58; 1992b, p.278). On the contrary, other forms of media 
genres, especially those mixed with or focused on entertainment, have been regarded as 
inherently harmful to a healthy democracy. This binary distinction is historically 
grounded in Enlightenment thought. With a firm emphasis on reason and science as a 
core impetus of historical progress and enlightenment, and with discredit placed upon 
emotion (Marcus and Mackuen, 2001, p.41;Mayer and Ciarrochi, 2006, p.xv), 
Enlightenment rationality was established as a supposedly universal foundation for such 
key concepts of political theory and social sciences as the individual, scientific 
rationality, citizenship, public sphere and the public/private distinction ‘in both Europe 
and outside’ (Chakrabarty, 2007, p.4). 
Habermas’s notion of the bourgeois public sphere epitomises the ideal of belief 
in the Enlightenment project. In respect of which communicative mode or genre is best 
suited to enable a political public sphere, Habermas’s main arguments can be delineated 
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in two points: the newspaper press and the clear separation of a political public sphere 
from a literary public sphere; and an intimate private sphere. Firstly, he acknowledges 
that the political public sphere originated in an intimate sphere of the conjugal family – 
the home – and a literary public sphere in apolitical form. However, he clearly separated 
those spheres from the political public sphere as its precursor. Unlike the coffee houses 
in Britain and the salons in France, in which rational-critical debates of works of art and 
literature between the aristocracy and bourgeois intellectuals ‘extended to include 
economic and political disputes’ (Habermas, 1989[1962], pp.32-33), the bourgeois 
home ‘had lost its connection with’ the public sphere of noble society’ (Habermas, 
1989[1962], pp.45-46). Therefore the home, the sphere of the family, is categorised as 
the intimate sphere as the core of the private sphere.  
Likewise, the literary public sphere, constituted by a customary reading of 
novels in the broader strata of the bourgeoisie in the mid-18th century when the first 
public library was established and the sales of the press increased, is secondary to the 
political public sphere.  
The privatized individuals coming together to form a public also 
reflected critically and in public on what they had read, thus 
contributing to the process of enlightenment which they together 
promoted (Habermas, 1989[1962], p.51).  
As such, many qualities of the literary public sphere meet the requirements for the 
bourgeois public sphere, mainly the enabling of the formation of critical publics to 
contribute to the enlightenment process.  
However, what counts as “the political” is a decisive factor to determine if a 
discursive space can be classified as a political public sphere. For Habermas, the 
conception of ‘publicity’ or ‘publicness’ in contrast to ‘privacy’ is central to what 
constitutes to be “the political”. Fraser (1990, pp.70-72) untangled his notion of 
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‘publicity’ in four different ways, which I would synthesize into two points largely 
constituting my research themes: (i) the precondition of a political public and (ii) the 
nature of common concern or the subject of a conversation. The first point will be 
discussed in more detail in respect to current debates around the relationship between 
audiences and publics, and then how to define the qualities and requirements of citizens 
to form a political public. In this section, I would rather focus on the notion of an ideal 
public in his historical bourgeois public sphere and its problems in the light of inclusive 
democracy. 
Firstly, although his ‘publicity’ still retained in the normative model means 
open and accessible to all, the prerequisite of citizens to form a political public in his 
historical public sphere is clearly defined as economic independence that secures private 
autonomy (Habermas, 1992, p.434). Thereby, his “everyone” is limited to middle-class, 
property-owning, educated and literate men, which is an exclusionary category 
demarcating from other publics such as women, servants and apprentices who were 
active participants in the literary public sphere but not having capacity to act like 
property-owners to influence the administrative power of a state in their common 
interest (Habermas, 1989[1962], pp.55-56). As such, he manifested his class and gender 
bias (Dahlgren, 1991, p.6) by regarding bourgeois men as a ‘universal class’ (Fraser, 
1990, p.60), succumbing to ‘the problem of universalism’ (Dahlgren, 1991, p.3). He 
largely ignored the importance of alternative or multiple public spheres such as 
‘counterpublics’ (Fraser, 1990, p.61), ‘proletarian’ (Negt and Kluge, 1993[1972]), and 
‘popular or informal’ public spheres (Dahlgren, 1991, p.6). In addition, following 
Chakrabarty (2007, pp.9-16), I would critique Habermas’s historical exclusivity of non-
bourgeois classes such as propertyless, ‘unlettered masses’ (Chakrabarty, 2007, p.xv) 
and women, which are firmly confined within the category of ‘pre-political’. By the 
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same token, his historical accounts also demarcate a literary public sphere – in which 
the non-bourgeoisie can participate through the medium of the written word and out of 
audience-oriented subjectivity (Habermas, 1989[1962], p.51) – as ‘pre-political’ on the 
grounds not only that its function is not ‘in the context of political emancipation’ 
through ‘the principle of publicity against the established authorities’ (p.56) but also its 
participants are understood as ‘pre-bourgeois’ (Chakrabarty, 2007). However, it is 
noteworthy that in his later work, Habermas (1992, p.434, 445) revised his view of ‘the 
propertyless masses’ as retaining the capacity of citizens to form a public opinion in a 
social-welfare state. 
Secondly, the nature of common concern, manifested in the Habermasian 
public sphere, needs to be reconsidered in the light of democratic mode of the (mass) 
media. That is to say, what counts as the common concern and its relation to private 
interests? Whose concern comes to be presented as the public matter in what kinds of 
media genres? Is it something explicitly political or implicitly political and/or 
something personal? These questions, in short, bring back to one encapsulating question 
“what counts as the political?” Habermas (1989[1962], pp.159-175; 1999) argues that 
the common concern is what private persons deal with through critical-rational 
discussion so as to form public opinion, which has political functions of ‘criticism and 
control of organized state authority’.  
In his view as illustrated particularly in the original public sphere, the 
newspaper press is of utmost importance as a crucial vehicle to provide explicitly state-
related information to facilitate rational-critical discussions so as to form public opinion 
on the common concern. Accordingly, he lamented that the rise of the mass press (such 
as the penny press and yellow journalism in England, France and the United States 
since 1830s) and the further advance of the mass electronic media (representatively 
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television in the latter half of 20th century) had ‘re-feudalised’ the bourgeois public 
sphere. In other words, the press, as a political domain supposedly separate from 
literature and art, now became integrated together with concentration on entertainment 
and human interest for the purpose of promoting ‘a commercially fostered consumer 
attitude’ (Habermas, 1989[1962], p.169). Therefore, the expansion of a public sphere 
enabled by the mass media is ‘in appearance only’ and, what’s more, the critical 
discussion of a culture-debating public was replaced with ‘exchanges about tastes and 
preferences’ among the culture-consuming public (Habermas, 1989[1962], p.171).  
The common concern is discursively constructed not through eliminating 
private interests to reach a presumed consensus, but through contestations among 
variously different private interests. In the later works, despite embracing such an idea 
of contested, multiple public spheres with focus on the democratic procedure of public 
communication, Habermas (1992, 1996) still maintains the emphasis on rational 
deliberation as a normative condition of communication. Inevitably, it leads to the 
limitation not only of possible or appropriate modes of communication and/or public 
engagement in the political realm (e.g. affective dimension) but also of participants as 
potential-citizens. Moreover, his seeming displeasure of the administrative intervention 
into the private sphere is in contrast to feminists’ perspectives. Feminists’ sustained 
challenges to subvert a conventional category of domestic violence as personal- or 
domestic-matters, for example, resulted in legitimating the personal as political (Fraser, 
1990, pp.71-74;van Zoonen, 1991). In this sense, the distinction between the personal 
and the political is neither fixed nor firm, as shown in the Habermas’s historical 
category of the political that is something explicitly state-related and exclusively 
dominant. Therefore, what matters is the ways in which the media (re-)mediate between 
private interests and public concerns, and the people and the public world. As shown in 
	   32 
Habermas’s historical account, the press, which facilitated the growth in print culture 
and literacy and thereby the emergence of a public sphere of informal discussion and 
debate, was assumed to best enable an informed and critical citizenry essential for a 
working democracy. This indicates an underlying assumption of an Enlightenment 
epistemology that places print-based reading as a prerequisite of critical-rational public 
debate (Habermas, 1989[1962], p.163, 172) and on the contrary television viewing as 
narcotizing and stupefying (Habermas, 1989[1962], p.170).  
Habermas’s pessimistic, elitist7 view of the mass media and mass audiences 
manifested in his original public sphere, especially his overly simplistic analysis of the 
changed behaviour of the audience-publics from a culture-debating to a culture-
consuming public, was greatly influenced by two others. One was his thesis supervisor 
Theodor Adorno whose elitist theory of mass culture (Habermas, 1992) views art not as 
a universal human capacity but rather as associated with the rise of the bourgeoisie in 
the 18th century.  He argues that working-class culture, always mediated by the culture 
industry, cannot offer enlightenment – art with reflection resulting in freedom 
(Thomson, 2006, pp.70-76).  The other main influence was by the research tradition of 
the linear mass media effect led by Lazarsfeld in the United States (Habermas, 1992).  
Surprisingly, the Enlightenment distinction has survived so far into the 20th 
century and beyond that the deprecating view of entertainment media – with television 
at the fore – and particularly infotainment Internet media today, remains (Delli Carpini, 
2009). The scholars following this tradition underscored the harmful roles of such 
entertainment-centred media to diminish the sense of political citizenship among 
citizens and undermine the public sphere. In Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985), Neil 
Postman censured television as offering an epistemology that is ‘inferior’, ‘dangerous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Following McGuigan’s (1992, p.2) use of the term ‘elitist’, in my thesis, it is applied ‘as convenient 
shorthand for ideological positions that are disrespectful of ordinary people’s tastes’ and opinions. 
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and absurdist’ (p.27) in comparison with a print-based one that generates a coherent, ‘serious and rational public conversation’ (p.43). In a similar vein to Habermas’s 
historical account, he idealised the print-dominant culture of the Enlightenment Age as 
promoting ‘the objective, rational use of the mind and a public discourse with serious, 
logically ordered content’ of facts and ideas (pp.51-52). He argues, on the contrary, that 
television news as entertainment offers only ‘disinformation’ that is ‘misplaced, 
irrelevant, fragmented or superficial information’ and thus forms emotions rather than 
opinions (p.107). Postman’s conception of the media epistemology is firmly grounded 
on the rigid dichotomy between serious and non-serious (‘amusing’ and entertaining), 
rational and irrational, and the firm belief in news as a serious, rational and objective 
sphere separated from entertainment (Jensen, 1990, p.50). 
In similar fashion, Robert D. Putnam illustrates, in Bowling Alone (2000, 
pp.216-246), the correlation of media consumption with social capital and civic 
engagement. Aligning with traditional scholars mentioned earlier, his argument is 
rooted in the print-based Enlightenment epistemology that “pure” reading (either book 
or newspaper) of information secures critical rationality as a guarantee of a public 
sphere in comparison with the visual media, television at the fore, in the irrational, 
depoliticized entertainment arena. Firstly, Putnam argues that newspaper reading better 
enables civic engagement and knowledge acquirement about the world than news 
consumption through television or the Internet. He insists that the rapid decline of 
newspaper readership in recent decades substantiates the decrease of civic engagement 
and social capital. Therefore, he argues that the differentiated news consumption 
appears generationally. That is to say, older generations whose main medium for 
information is the newspaper are more likely to engage in collective social, political 
associations than young people whose news consumption is conducted mainly through 
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visual media or the Internet.  Secondly, entertainment media such as television is 
detrimental to civic engagement and social connections that are crucial element of 
political citizenship. This view is manifested as such.  
Americans at the end of the twentieth century were watching more TV, 
watching it more habitually, more pervasively, and more often alone, 
and watching more programs that were associated specifically with 
civic disengagement (entertainment, as distinct from news). The onset 
of these trends coincided exactly with the national decline in social 
connectedness, and the trends were most marked among the younger 
generations that are distinctively disengaged. Moreover, it is precisely 
those Americans most marked by this dependence on televised 
entertainment who were most likely to have dropped out of civic and 
social life (Putnam, 2000, p.246). 
 
Correspondingly, he maintains a pessimistic view of audiences of the entertainment 
media, as ‘isolated, passive, and detached from their communities’ (Putnam, 2000, 
p.246), which is consistent with Habermas and Postman’s conception of audiences of 
non-news, entertainment media.  
2.2.1. Tabloidization within the News Genre 
This section aims to offer much information of the supposedly underlying rationale for 
the tabloidization debate in the late 1990s and 2000s, which is presumably paralleled to 
the recent debate of citizen journalism to be expounded in the Chapter Five “Ordinary 
People and OhmyNews: Reshaping the News in between the Private and the Public”.   
The normative view of democratic media grounded on the hierarchical 
news/entertainment dichotomy was revisited in the 1990s and the 2000s by media and 
cultural studies, and media feminist scholarship. The issues can be encapsulated in two 
points. On the one hand, the issue is concerned with the synthesis of news and 
entertainment within journalism (news media), which is called by various labels – 
infotainment, tabloidization, feminisation, personalisation or popular journalism. On the 
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other hand, it is about the political potential of non-news modes in a broader definition 
that includes popular culture and entertainment genres such as talk show, satire, fandom, 
etc.  
In regard to the tabloidization within journalism8, tabloidization means overall 
changes both in the format and content of the news media including the “quality” press. 
The main features of tabloids are: (a) ‘easy-to-consume formats’ (Rooney, 2000, p.91) 
such as big, bold headlines; an extensive use of photographs and graphics in colours; 
and vivid, emotive language; and (b) concentration on human interest in private lives 
and personalities (personalization); and on soft news on scandal, sports and 
entertainment (trivialization), instead of hard (serious) news on public life such as 
politics, economics and society (Sparks, 2000, pp.2-12). The debate on tabloidization is 
polarized. For those who maintain the traditional notion of news media, separate from 
entertainment and restricted to directly political matters as the public concern, the 
tabloidization is conceived mainly as the declining of established journalistic standards 
(Gripsrud, 2000, p.285;Sparks, 2000, p.2). Therefore, it results in the 
‘disenfranchisement’ of people (Todd, cited in Sparks, 1992b, p.279) from 
consideration of serious, political matters, and the aggravating of ‘political apathy’ 
(Connell, 1991, p.237) and cynicism. In comparing the quality press with the popular 
one, Sparks (1988) argues that by giving priority to ‘the immediate issues of daily life’ 
over the traditional concerns assigned to the public sphere, the popular press or tabloids 
is ‘systematically depoliticized’. He further concludes that as the essential difference 
between the quality press and popular journalism, ‘the popular conception of the 
personal as an immediate and unmediated explanatory framework of the social totality’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Colin Sparks (2000) illuminates the definition of the term “tabloid” in three different senses, which are 
specific to (a) ‘newspapers and the journalistic output of brodcasting’, (b) ‘a shift in the priorities’ in the 
radio and television broadcasting, and (c) ‘the shifting boundaries of taste within different media forms’. 
However, his classification seems unclear and rather confusing since the categories (a) and (b), and then 
(b) and (c) are conflated.  
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provided by the popular press is not ‘the intellectual material for self-liberation’ but 
rather ‘politically reactionary’ (Sparks, 1992a).  
As a reply to these criticisms, some media and cultural studies scholars view 
this tendency as having positive implications for the democratic role of the media. In the 
first place, contrary to the conventional assumption, the popular press is ‘not unserious’ 
(Connell, 1991, p.242) and ‘indeed stuffed with politics’ (Seaton and Pimlott, cited in 
Sparks, 1992b, pp.283-284). It is argued that the denunciation of the tabloids’ lacking of 
political information results from the narrowly defined conception of what counts as the 
serious and thus the political. That is to say, if the notion of politics is expanded to 
include a wide range of life experiences beyond the overtly state-related, or/and 
parliamentary politics, the supposedly non-serious media has political potential by 
‘establishing or modifying acceptable values’ (Seaton and Pimlott, cited in Sparks, 
1992b, p.284). In particular, the tabloid revelations of personalities not only serve to 
rupture their presumed ‘aura of respectability and authority’ (Connell, 1991, p.241; 
1992, p.82) but also offer pleasure to see those in power brought down (Connell, 1991, 
p.252). Consequently, the debate of tabloidization is consistent even though the content 
and the players change over time.  
Moreover, the trivialisation of the press has a long history, dating back to the 
‘Yellow Journalism’ with the introduction of the penny press the New York Sun in the 
United States in 1833 (Franklin, Hamer, Hanna, Kinsey and Richardson, 2005, p.279) 
and the New Journalism in London in 1887 (Sparks, 2000, p.18). In a highly market-
driven media environment intensified by the advanced technologies existing today, it is 
a necessarily ‘economic response to journalism’s difficulties’ (Dahlgren, 2009, p.45) in 
order to increase accessibility to larger audiences and thus secure advertising revenues 
(Sparks, 2000, p.3). More intriguingly, Bird (2003), in her study of audience perspective 
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on news, suggests that a growing trend of personalisation is also audience-driven. In the 
sense that news stories engage audiences most effectively when speaking about issues 
directly relevant to their personal concerns and experience – through ‘personalisation’ – 
the tabloid style news offers greater proximity to audiences’ everyday lives so as to 
engage audiences.  
Some feminist media scholars persuasively explicate this overall shift as a 
‘feminisation’ of news. The increasing female audience demographic owing to the rapid 
growth of women’s economic independence has partly contributed to the popularisation 
of the more intimate and personal mode of address and the lifestyle contents including 
the domestic concern (Carter, Branston and Allan, 1998;Holland, 1998) in news and 
current affairs genres. In addition, van Zoonen (1998) points out that the key features of 
the tabloids or popular journalism – ‘human interest, audience needs and desires, and 
emotional investment’ – have been conceived as the archetype of female journalists’ 
‘role-conception’9 (p.41), which has been despised by most traditional news journalists. 
The condemnatory view, she argues, should be seen as part of a ‘general patriarchal 
scheme’ that ‘most things women do and like are not valued very highly’ (p.46). Not 
surprisingly, it reconstructs the gendered category of the public sphere as described by 
Haberams, in which men are conceived as ‘properly political’ (Landes, 1988, p.4) 
dealing with ‘analytical and detached’ discourse in the public sphere (van Zoonen, 1991, 
p.228) and women as ‘naturally domestic’ (Landes, 1988, p.4) dealing with ‘emotional 
and involved’ discourse in the private sphere (van Zoonen, 1991, p.228). Notably, this 
gendered distinction has been challenged by sustained efforts of feminist critics and 
activists to realise the slogan ‘the personal is the political’ (van Zoonen, 1991, p.230). 
As a result, some of the previously assumed private concerns and values such as family 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In the study of the Dutch television news, van Zoonen (1991) suggests that the feminisation of news did 
not result from the growing number of female journalists but rather the former affected the latter. 
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violence and sexual relations became legitimised as the public concern appropriate for 
political discourse.  
In similar fashion, the media and cultural studies scholarship has questioned the 
public/private distinction in relation to media and democracy. As illustrated earlier, the 
tabloidization or the personalisation of news is seen as a blurring or collapse of the 
boundaries between ‘hard (serious, fact-based) and soft (light, interpretation-based) 
news’ (Carter, Branston and Allan, 1998, p.7), and thereby news/information and 
entertainment (Buckingham, 2000;Dahlgren, 1992, p.12;Rooney, 2000), ‘journalism 
and non-journalism’ (Dahlgren, 1991, p.14) and the public sphere values (‘abstraction 
and rationality’) and the private sphere values (‘instantiation and affectivity’) (Connell, 
1991, p.251;Macdonald, 2000, p.251;van Zoonen, 1991, 1998). The question of the 
dichotomy should be ultimately extended to the democratic role of differing media not 
only within journalism but also beyond the news media genre. And this matter is not 
limited to communicative mode but intersected with the imminent issues that are also 
the themes in my thesis – who counts as publics and where is the “appropriate” place of 
emotions in politics. In the following section, I will review recent debates in media and 
cultural studies alternative to the traditional distinction in which news is placed in the 
centre of the political public sphere as a rational, normative, expert knowledge to be 
constituted by authoritative, objective, professional sources, deprecating the other media 
genres represented by tabloids or popular culture.  
2.2.2. Beyond the News: Everyday Politics and Popular Culture 
In this section, I attempt to explore democratic possibilities for hybrid media forms 
beyond news and current affairs media to connect the public world to the people’s 
private lives. The review of literature in this section focuses on political satire and 
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popular culture, specifically fandom, which direct the Chapter Six “Online Political 
Satire” and the Chapter Seven “The Paradox of Fandom: The politicising of teen fans of 
the pop band TVXQ”.   
There has been increasing scepticism about the fulfilment of the democratising 
role of news and current affairs media. Recent research suggests that news and current 
affairs media are largely failing to connect politics to people’s everyday lives (Baym, 
2010;Buckingham, 2000, p.27;Gray, Jones and Thompson, 2009;Jones, 2005, 2010) by 
allowing no role for the people to play in the public conversation ‘except as an 
audience’10 (Carey, 1993, pp.14-15). In the study of the television news portrayals of 
citizens in politics, Barnett (1998) argues that the news media usually circumscribe the 
world of politics as the realm of politicians and experts, rather than of the ordinary 
citizens who are represented as ‘passive observers’ (p.135) or reactionary, ‘apolitical 
and disengaged’ consumers (p.138). It is claimed that this is because the conventional 
news reporting of citizens’ views or political participation largely relies on journalists’ 
limited assumptions and biases or/and the traditional news organisation’s ‘reportorial 
shortcuts’11 (p.11), not on empirical evidence. In particular, young people tend to feel 
alienated and excluded from the official discourse of politics12 (Buckingham, 2000, p.25, 
27, 29) in which conventional news outlets reside at its centre, and thus they turn to 
alternative news sources such as infotainment television programmes (Baym, 2010, p.2).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This might be seen to imply a negative conception of an audience in the opposite sense of a public. 
However, what James Carey attempts to mean by this is the critique of journalism’s practice in which 
news no longer enables a conversation or debate among the public by simply conveying the expert’s 
judgements as “scientific” knowledge to be accepted. In this way, he argues, the journalism reduced the 
citizen’s role to ‘a receptacle to be informed by experts and an excuse for the practice of publicity’.   
11 This is what news organisations have developed in order to make it easier and quicker to gather the 
information they need. Therefore the traditional news is inescapably inclined towards the statements, 
opinions and interpretations of the already privileged in the society as news sources.  
12 David Buckingham argues that young people’s stance of ‘boredom and deliberate ignorance’ of the 
conventional political debate presents ‘a strategic response’ to ‘a more general perception of their own 
powerlessness’.  
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In a broader sense, Curran (2011) argues for the necessity of reconceptualising 
the democratic role of the media. He suggests that entertainment media containing 
something inexplicitly political should be reconsidered to have democratic potential 
since it enables a discursive space especially about four main elements underpinning 
politics – values, social identities, cognitions (sense-making) and public norms, some of 
which might often intersect. He argues that entertainment can offer a more flexible way 
of engaging with the elements ‘informing politics than the official discourse of politics’ 
(p.67). 
Peter Dahlgren has called into question the traditional distinction between the 
political, public world and the previously supposed private domains, on the grounds of 
‘the empirical permeability’ (1995, p.95; 2006, p.276) in particular between politics and 
entertainment and other forms of popular culture. He suggests the notion of ‘civic 
culture’ as an analytic framework to focus on the processional and contextual dimension 
in which people develop into ‘the citizen-agent’ through diverse ‘modes and intensities 
of engagement’ in their everyday media use (Dahlgren, 2003, pp.152-153). Civic 
culture comprises six dimensions of identities, knowledge, practices (discussion or 
talk), trust (affinity), spaces and values, each of which can affect the others in various 
ways (Dahlgren, 2003, pp.156-160; 2009, pp.108-123). Identities, as a foundational 
dimension of civic culture for democracy, are to be based in the concept of ‘civic 
agency’ (2009, p.102), in which the people see themselves as meaningful participants 
and become motivated ‘via the interplay of reason and passion’. As Dahlgren indicated 
(2009, p.108), there are some similar dimensions between his civic culture frame and 
social movement theory, especially William Gamson’s (1992) collective action frame 
comprising injustice, agency and identity, which is carefully expounded in the later 
section “The Place of Emotions in Politics”. Here the key element of Dahlgren’s 
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identities is in the same line with Gamson’s ‘agency’, in which ‘working people’ are 
seen or/and see themselves as acting agents to bring about social change for a better 
society. Gamson’s identity component rather focuses on the process of identification. 
Highlighted as a key element for mobilising political participation, particularly in the 
protest, the injustice component can be incorporated into Dahlgren’s value dimension13. 
The knowledge dimension entails the process of active ‘appropriation of information’ 
(2009, p.109), which is closely related to the dimension of practices that require specific 
skills, especially communicative competencies including literacy and education. Among 
practices, talk or discussion (that was dealt with as a separate dimension in 2003 but 
now incorporated in the practice dimension) is of importance, through which the other 
dimensions become substantiated. For example, knowledge-related skills enable the 
creation of spaces but ‘communicative spaces’ (Dahlgren, 2009, pp.114-116) can be 
actualised in various forms of differing media facilitating talk, especially informal, 
open-ended, ‘meandering and unpredictable’ everyday talk that bridges between the 
personal and the political (Dahlgren, 2006, pp.278-279; 2009, p.90). This approach 
much informs the thesis in that it inclusively broadens the scope of the form of 
democratic media and talks that anchor in everyday practices of lifeworlds of citizens, 
along with Livingstone and van Zoonen. The last civic culture dimension is trust among 
citizens, instead of which Dahlgren proposed ‘affinity’ in 2003. Employing Putnam’s 
(2000, p.136) concept of ‘thick trust’ grounded in established personal relationships and ‘thin trust’ based on honest and reciprocal relationships with people whom we don’t 
know personally but with whom we feel we can have satisfactory exchange, he 
underscores ‘thin trust’ as a more relevant and useful mode enabling ‘the loose bonds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Dahlgren  distinguishes the value dimension into ‘substantive values’ (such as equality, liberty, justice, 
solidarity and tolerance) and ‘procedural ones’ (such as openness, reciprocity, discussion and 
responsibility/accountability) but this dividing category is not useful for the analysis of the thesis.     
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and networking relationships of civic participation’ in late modern society, rather than ‘thick trust’. With Gamson’s collective action frame, these frameworks were utilised for 
the analysis of teen fans’ political mobilisation in the Chapter Seven ‘The Paradox of 
Fandom: The politicising of teen fans of the pop band TVXQ’.  
In similar attempts to overcome the limits of deliberative democracy 
represented by Habermas’s historical account of the political public sphere, Jim 
McGuigan (1996, 2005, 2010) suggests reworking the notion of a literary public sphere 
in a broader sense of a cultural public sphere. He points to Habermas’s negligence of 
‘the rhetorical and playful aspects of communicative action’ and its consequence of a 
clear-cut distinction between information and entertainment. This criticism can be 
somewhat resolved as Habermas admitted in his revised work (1992) that he was 
inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin’s work and came to recognise the democratic potential of 
popular cultural subversion of hierarchical power relations. Nonetheless, he clarifies his 
maintenance of the normative notion of the political public sphere with focus on 
communicative rationality elucidated in his early work. Through the notion of the 
cultural public sphere, McGuigan (2005, p.435; 2010, p.26) suggests expanding the 
Habermasian literary public sphere to include ‘the various circuits and channels of 
popular culture and entertainment’ as a source of ‘emotional and aesthetic reflections on 
how we live and imagine the good life’. Consequently, in the sense that this conception 
proposes the democratic possibility of the supposedly apolitical genres, it is analogous 
to what Dahlgren means by the term ‘civic culture’ as addressed early on and to Sonia 
Livingstone’s (2005c, 2005d) ‘arational mode’ or ‘a mediating domain’.  
Through the analysis of television audience participation programmes in Talk 
on Television, Livingstone and Lunt (1994) illuminate how the genre challenges the 
traditional distinction reproduced in the media as ‘representations and legitimations of 
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the social order’. In the first place, they argue that the mixing genre of current affairs 
and game shows dismantles the binary opposition between information and 
entertainment. They point to the separation of the research concern in media studies by 
referring to John Corner’s (1991, p.268) concepts of the ‘public knowledge project’ and 
the ‘popular culture project’. In other words, on the one hand, the ‘public knowledge 
project’ is predominantly concerned with news and current affairs media and the 
politics of information, and the viewer as citizens. On the other hand, the ‘popular 
culture project’ focuses on ‘the implications for social consciousness of the media as a 
source of entertainment’ and the question of ‘taste and pleasure within industrialized 
popular culture’, and thereby the audience is seen as consumers. This echoes Dahlgren’s 
(1995) critique of ‘the labour of division’ in media research between cognitive 
communications relating to the public sphere and affective communications of the 
pleasure of popular culture. According to Livingstone and Lunt, however, in 
infotainment or ‘arational’ mode, the audience discussion programme offers a 
connection between ‘the cognitive and the emotional realms of the public sphere’. In 
addition, the genre suggests the repositioning of the relationship between experts and 
ordinary audiences by altering the formal arrangements of the seats of experts, which 
used to be staged on a raised podium, to one among audience participants. Also, by the 
host’s mediation, the audience participant’s ‘ordinary, anecdotal account of everyday 
life’ is emphasised over the expert’s ‘scientific, abstracted account’. In my view, 
nevertheless, it can raise a question whether giving a voice to audience participants 
through these new formal devices in the programme can make a real impact on the 
assumed hierarchical relationship between experts and ordinary people. According to 
Hart (1999, p.113), this sense of participation may only be the apparent effect of 
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‘remote control politics’, and thereby might lead to quiescence in real change of power 
relations in society.   
In an examination of the way in which a mixed genre, namely political satire, 
presents and constitutes politics as a central concern in an entertaining mode, John 
Street (1997, 2001) contends that the conception of the political should be extended into 
something dealing with the implicitly political in diverse popular culture contexts. In 
satire, he argues that institutional politics, including politicians who are usually treated 
with greater respect as ‘legitimate and influential political actors’ in traditional news 
and current affairs media, is redefined to be despicable and ridiculous and becomes a 
part of pleasure. In this way, satire in general categorises society into two groups: 
‘greedy, corrupt individuals’, who are typically ‘vain, stupid and corrupt’ politicians, 
and ‘honourable, ordinary people’ (Street, 2001, pp.63-73). Accordingly, this 
characteristic of the genre often leads to the most common criticism of political satire 
that it generates ‘a cynical superiority complex’ (Gray, Jones and Thompson, 2009, p.7) 
in audiences, which distances people from politics (Baumgatner, 2007, p.320). 
In response, through the analysis of the post-network, multichannel television 
satire in the US, some critics (Baym, 2010;Gray, Jones and Thompson, 2009;Jones, 
2010) contend that many such criticisms are built on false assumptions of the nature of 
politics, audiences, satire, humour and parody, and more generally entertainment. In 
particular, satire is traditionally conceived as ‘a subgenre of comedy’, and comedy and 
humour are typically portrayed as ‘the opposite of seriousness and rational deliberation’ 
(Gray, Jones and Thompson, 2009, p.8). In a broad sense, they attempt to confront this 
distinction between news (the serious and the rational) and entertainment (the non-
serious and the emotional), which Enlightenment thought assumed and is still so 
powerfully operative. Following media and cultural studies scholars (Delli Carpini and 
	   45 
Williams, 2001;Livingstone, 2005d;van Zoonen, 2005), they argue that the supposedly 
hierarchical fixed distinction is increasingly breaking down. Firstly, they argue that the 
divide is arbitrary and artificial in its origin and in the process of its reification. In 
addition to this, by following Susan Gal’s (2002, 2005) idea of the distinction, I would 
argue that the divide is in flux, being recalibrated dependent upon a particular context, 
rather than dissolving or disappearing. Therefore, it should be underscored that ‘the 
underlying distinction between the public (any issue that requires common resolution) 
and the purely private remains important’ (Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2007b, 
p.6) and clearly meaningful. Secondly, the ‘hybridization’ of information and 
entertainment, in political satire talk shows and other forms of popular culture, has been 
widely seen in the wake of convergence of advanced communication technology. Jones 
(2010, p.13) underlines that such a binary categorisation necessarily makes us blind to 
the possibility of citizens’ interactions and engagements with blended political 
television programmes. More significantly, in the comparative analysis of the lay 
people-based television show Politically Incorrect with Bill Maher and the pundit show 
This Week with Sam Donaldson and Cronkite Roberts focused around president Bill 
Clinton’s sex scandal in 1998, Jones (2010, pp.93-109) argues that ‘the language of 
common sense’ constituted by lay people on the Bill Maher show offers a wider range 
of explorations and alternative ways through which publics can make sense of politics 
in their everyday lives.   
In respect to the humour that is a critical element in political satire, Simon 
Critchley (2002) conceptualises it as critical practices that enable a ‘profoundly 
cognitive relation to oneself and to the world’ and to produce ‘anti-rites’ that reveal the 
nucleus of the situation and suggests how that situation can be reshaped. In other words, 
unlike the traditional conception, humour is considered to link to rational thinking. 
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Morreall (2005, p.68) also argues that as ‘our ability to enjoy the violations of our 
expectations and our conceptual schemes’ grows, humour has evolved ‘as part of human 
rationality and it involves thinking’.  
By the same token, it is of importance to illuminate how Mikhail Bakhtin 
(1984[1965], 1998) theorises humour (laughter)14. Although the historical background is 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the political function that Bakhtin lays on ‘the 
folk humour’ has a meaningful implication to the question of how to define the 
emotional popular culture and “the people” in relation to politics, which is examined in 
Chapter Six ‘Online Political Satire’. In the first place, ‘carnivalistic laughter’ (Bakhtin, 
1998, p.254) has democratic potential that is temporary but powerfully emancipatory 
and subversive. The existing hierarchy of class and political structure is maintained in 
the official feasts, placing people in unequal positions. On the contrary, ‘the people’s 
laughter’, as a basis to form the carnival15 folk culture, embraces all the people as active 
participants without a division of performers and spectators, liberating them from ‘all 
hierarchical precedence’ (Bakhtin, 1984[1965], pp.4-10) that ‘determines the structure 
and order of ordinary life’ (Bakhtin, 1998, p.251). As Holquist (1984[1965], p.xviii) 
points out, Bakhtin’s remarkable book Rabelais and His World is a paean to the 
common people, in which Bakhtin conceptualises the people as ‘social agents’ 
(Dahlgren, 2009) to act as meaningful and active participants in the struggle for 
renewing power relations.  
A primarily used modality for political satire, including Bakhtin’s carnival 
laughter, is parody. Parody is a vital and powerful vehicle for critiques of the vices or 
follies of mankind, and ‘unmasking the duplicities of modern society’ (Hariman, 
2008;Hutcheon, 2000, p.xiv). In her detailed book A Theory of Parody, Hutcheon (2000, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Bathkin uses the terms humour and laughter together alternatively without differentiation.  
15 The celebration of carnivals took place in large medieval cities for three months of a year on average 
and thereby represented a substantial part of medieval life. 
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pp.xiv-32) defines parody as a form of ‘repetition with critical difference’ in ‘its ironic 
“trans-contextualization” and inversion’ and/or as contrast of one text to another with 
the intent of mocking or ridiculing it. She classifies the inseparably intersected and 
confusing relationship between parody and satire into satiric parody and parodic satire. 
Satiric parody, in my understanding, is close to the second meaning of parody, in which 
its main ridiculing target is conventions of another media form. Parodic satire, 
apparently common in modern satire, is the interactive mixture of ‘parodic forms and 
satiric intent’. In other words, it directs at something outside the text, not the text or 
genre itself, and utilises parody as a means of attaining satiric or corrective end 
(Hutcheon, 2000, pp.49-62). Therefore, by transposing political figures’ personae into 
the parodied texts or genres in a defamiliarised, ironic context, for example, political 
parodic satire offers audiences a playful means to question, examine and play with 
politics.  
2.3. The Formation of Publics: (Ordinary) people, audiences and 
citizens 
Who can be categorised as citizens to form a political public? What are the qualities and 
requirements? What are the relationships between audiences and publics, and common 
(ordinary) people and experts? And whose knowledge plays out as legitimised 
authority? All these questions are encapsulated into one main theme of my thesis – the 
(working, ordinary, common) people are social (acting) agents – and accordingly direct 
the third research question: In what ways do private individuals come to shape publics? 
This conceptual position is a starting point of my journey to locate “the political 
(public)” in everyday communicative practices of the people’s private lives in the 
Korean context. Because how to view the people substantively affects how to 
conceptualise audiences (fans) and their practices of knowledge production grounded in 
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their reflection of the lived experience, thereby whether this knowledge gains 
legitimacy or is depreciated as unauthorised or ungrounded knowing. In this light, the 
concern of the legitimacy of common knowledge and its relation to expert knowledge 
will be investigated in detail in Chapter Five ‘Ordinary People and OhmyNews’. And 
the concept of fans will be re-examined from this perspective in Chapter Seven ‘The 
Paradox of Fandom’.  
Raymond Williams (1976, pp.158-163) usefully expounds complicated 
meanings and uses of the keyword ‘masses’ that are in practice often intersected with 
audiences and ordinary or common people and other social groupings, although he does 
not address its direct relation to the audience. The term ‘masses’ is ambivalent. As 
Williams puts it, ‘a temporarily dominant group may try to enforce its own uses as 
‘correct’’ (1976, p.9). In other words, in much conservative thought, the masses is ‘a 
term of contempt’ but ‘a positive term in much socialist thought’. Its negative senses 
from the former perspective are concerned with ‘something amorphous and 
indistinguishable’, which connotes base or low, ignorant and unstable, and parallels 
plebeian, mob and multitude as unstable common people or as the vulgar and the rabble. 
On the contrary, its positive senses are with ‘a dense aggregate’ paralleled to the people 
or common people, working people, ordinary people, who are seen as ‘a positive or 
potentially positive social force’ to act together and change their condition effectively.  
The ‘audience’ or ordinary people can be seen to retain radically different 
qualities combined with the masses depending on traditions of academic disciplines. 
Whether audiences use news or entertainment media determines the quality of the 
audience either as a citizen to constitute publics or a consumer, the easily manipulated 
mass as some critics (Corner, 1991;Sparks, 2000) point out. In this tradition, the 
audience and common (ordinary) people are understood in the negative meaning of the 
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masses. In Habermas’s historical account of the public sphere, a political public was 
limited to a male bourgeoisie who maintained economic independence, which secures 
access to a means of information acquisition – typographic materials such as books and 
newspapers, and education and literacy – and to a discursive space in which critical, 
rational public reflection on common concern takes place. This rigid analytic concept 
leaves many subordinate groups within the category of the ‘pre-political’ or under-
citizens. In particular, his elitist and negatively stereotyped notion of audiences and 
common people as part of an uneducated, disqualified, reactionary mass is problematic. 
He grieved that the entry of many uneducated citizens into the political realm led to the 
deterioration of the exclusivity of the public and thereby the quality of the public sphere 
in which the bourgeoisie formulated. Despite his delayed recognition of propertyless, 
unlettered masses as maintaining the capacity of citizens to constitute a public, his view 
of audiences is pessimistic by regarding them as the consuming-public or ‘a deferred 
“public” self’ (Chakrabarty, 2007, p.35) whose reflection is not beyond the private 
experience of a novel reading.  
To further Chakrabarty’s (2007) incisive critique of Habermas’s historical 
category of the “bourgeois-citizen”, he posits the ‘peasant-as-citizen’ which 
incorporates the non-bourgeois, women, subaltern, plebeian social groups as part of the 
political to make their own fate in Indian history. This notion corresponds closely to the 
positive view of masses as acting agents in history as Williams explicated. Following 
Ranajit Guha, the founder of the Subaltern Studies group, Chakrabarty attempts to 
legitimise life-world everyday practices and body politics actualised by the “peasant” 
through emotional participation in modern India, and to bring these histories into the 
centre of the discourse of political history. For instance, through an analysis of various 
literatures with the background of 19th century Bengal, Chakrabarty (2007, pp.214-236) 
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elucidates how Habermas’s historical account of the public/private category does not fit, 
specifically in regard to the home and affects. Under the European colonial domination 
of public life and civil society, the home acted as a public sphere for Bengali 
nationalists: on the one hand, ‘the only (conceptual) space’ for Bengali men to act with 
autonomy; and, on the other hand, ‘a space for reforms, where an educated and 
reformed mother was expected to prepare the Bengali Indian child to be the proper 
subject of nationalism’. Moreover, contrary to European modernity with reason as the 
essential impetus to form political-civil society, the development of “natural” 
sentiments of love of the family significantly contributed to mobilising political unity. 
Yet, the elitist conception of ordinary people as the pre-political or under-
citizens has been strongly maintained in political science scholarship. As Delli Carpini 
and Williams (2001) point out, in the first half of the 20th century in Europe and the US, 
growing concerns about the appropriate role for both the media and citizens to secure 
the stability of democratic systems and competent citizenship led to greater emphasis on 
the role of and reliance on experts to identify and solve problems. The debate of publics 
between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey in the 1920s in the US is symptomatic of 
this concern. In Public Opinion, Lippmann (1922) pointed to the incapability of 
ordinary people to judge their own interests and make important decisions. And they 
were seen to perceive the world only through a media-created ‘pseudo-environment’. In 
this way, ordinary people are conceived as an emotional, ungrounded, inchoate, 
disengaged, easily manipulated mass and therefore they need experts – professional 
elites such as media professionals and policy experts – who are regarded as indifferent 
in their own interests and informing citizens responsibly with their scientific, rational 
knowledge. Dewey (1927), in The Public and Its Problems, seemed to agree with 
Lippmann in seeing a public composed of ordinary people lacking of understanding and 
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interest in the political world. However, his conception of experts was not as romantic 
and idealised as Lippmann’s: he recognised the nature of experts is oriented toward 
their own private interests, rather than for the public interest. Rather, he emphasised the 
necessity of effective communication between experts and the people for the making of 
informed citizenry and for informing the experts of the people’s demands.  
Daniel Dayan (2001, pp.744-761; 2005, pp.47-48) registers the stringent notion 
of Habermasian publics distinctively separated from audiences and/or fans. In other 
words, Dayan explicates the features of ‘fully fledged publics’ reflecting a set of 
normative standards: publics should embody rationality; retain certain values of a 
perceived common good or a shared symbolic world-view and a feeling of 
belongingness; commit to the practice of internal debates; engage in collective 
performance which is presented to themselves and others and display a collective 
autonomy, sociability and stability. In the relationship to the media, Dayan posits 
publics separated from viewers and fans, whose subjectivities take shape around a 
medium, specifically televised events. Despite the possible transformation of these 
audiences to publics, he argues, the shift results in the constitution of ‘elusive’ publics, 
who meet all the required qualities except stability to form ‘real’ publics, for the 
ephemerality of televised events. By the same token, fans meet nearly all the 
requirements for being a public – ‘stable, self-aware, ready to confront other publics 
over matters of taste, capable of performance in public and possessive of an undeniable 
sociability’ – but lack one essential element for a true public, that is, seriousness. 
Therefore, fans turn out to create only a ‘make-believe’ public.  
As such, the normative binary opposition maintains radically different social 
formations and qualities between publics and audiences (van Zoonen, 2004, pp.41-42). 
In this distinction audiences are generally denigrated as private, emotional, biased, 
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trivial, passive, individualised, withdrawn and hidden, while publics are valued as 
rational, disinterested, active, shared, visible, participatory and engaged in rational-
critical discussion in order to build consensus and legitimate democratic government 
(Livingstone, 2005c, p.11; 2005d, p.17). In short, these associations of audience versus 
public are ascribed to the valorisation of public over private, for instance, 
rational/emotional, visible/hidden, shared/individualised, and participatory/withdrawn 
(Livingstone, 2005c, p.2).  
However, as examined earlier on, since the late 1980s and especially in the last 
decade, media and cultural studies, feminism studies, political communication and 
psychology scholarships have attempted to contest the rigid public/private 
categorisation institutionalising dominant values in trajectories of media, publics and 
politics, that is in the relationships between news and entertainment, audiences and 
publics, and reason and emotion16. In particular in respect to the audience/public 
relationship, media and cultural studies has made substantial efforts to establish a new 
perspective that ‘audiences are active, critically aware and discriminating’ (Jenkins, 
2006b, p.135).    
Sonia Livingstone’s and William Gamson’s studies challenge the disparaging 
view of audiences composed of ordinary people in opposition to experts. Particularly, 
these studies endeavour to legitimise people’s common experiential knowledge as 
significant resource in the sense-making and the connecting of the public world to their 
private lives. In the analysis of the audience participation programme, Livingstone and 
Lunt (1994) argue that the traditionally oppositional qualities assigned to laity versus 
expert – emotional, ungrounded, subjective versus rational, scientific, objective – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In respect of particular attempts to reconsider the supposedly normative distinction between reason and 
emotion in enhancing civic interest and participation in the public world, I will investigate in more detail 
in the following section ‘The Place of Emotions in Politics’. My special focus will be on the research 
outcomes from the scholarship of politicial communication and psychology as well as media and cultural 
studies.  
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became overturned. That is to say, common people’s knowledge is revalidated as 
authentic, relevant, grounded in experience, meaningful and useful. On the contrary, 
expert knowledge is reconsidered as alienated, irrelevant, ungrounded, and empty of 
meaning. In Talking Politics (1992)17, Gamson, in an attempt to connect the study of 
social movements and media, seeks the way in which people use resources such as 
media-generated knowledge and their experiential knowledge acquired directly or 
indirectly through social networks in understanding of public issues, and how three 
components of the collective action frame – injustice, agency and identity – are 
presented in media discourse and the focus group’s conversation. Throughout his study, 
he observes ‘working people’ as an acting agent for social change, not merely as objects 
of history, which is a quite different story from social and political science scholarships. 
In relation to mediated knowledge, people are neither passive nor so dumb. Therefore 
they negotiate with media messages in complex ways in which they utilise alternative 
resources like experiential knowledge, despite the media’s important role in their 
framing of the issue. In a word, the people are regarded as acting agents or ‘social 
agents’ (Dahlgren, 2009, p.102) to see themselves as meaningful participants for social 
change.  
In an attempt to redefine who counts as publics in highly complex, ambiguous 
communicative situations, especially in the recent ICT-based circumstance, Livingstone 
(2005a, 2005b, 2005c) proposes a more practical, inclusive sense of publics, which 
demands to satisfy only one of the various requirements for the public and thereby 
includes diverse forms of social activity that are public. In other words, the private 
space of our everyday life such as the home is ever more pervaded by new, diversified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The following section deals with more details of how the study directs my research, especially of teen 
fans’ politics, methodologically and theoretically. In particular, three components of the collective action 
frame  that supports political consciousness and thereby mobilisation for collective participation – 
injustice, agency and identity – will be closely examined.  
	   54 
forms of mediation, by which ‘the diffused audience’18 (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 
1998) constitutes self-mobilising, imagined collective publics. Here, what determines 
the quality of a mediated public is activities that are sustained and resourced by 
performance of audiences. Therefore, Livingstone (2005c, pp.11-12, p.16) and Dahlgren 
(2003, 2006, 2009) advocate for recognition of the particular yet everyday ways of 
actual practice of political citizenship. In other words, it is necessary to seek the 
procedural and contextual dimension of a mediating domain in which a specific 
performance of particular, located audiences in the everyday matters for the public 
sphere (Livingstone, 2005c, p.33), and their cultural, affective involvement transforms 
into a public activity.  
In a similar manner to the way in which audiences were treated as part of an 
undifferentiated, easily manipulated mass in early mass communication scholarships, 
fans often suffer from negatively stereotypical images as mindless followers of their 
heroes without criticism; as emotion-oriented rather than rationality-based (Jenkins, 
1992), or ‘make-believe’ publics (Dayan, 2001, pp.752-761), especially when they have 
to do with politics. In sharp contrast, Liesbet van Zoonen (2004, 2005) has inspiringly 
illuminated the positive relevant connections between fandom and politics, which much 
informs my study of teen fans’ politicisation in Chapter Seven. She points to three 
resemblances between fandom and political citizenship. Firstly, both fan communities 
and political constituencies have similar structural formations and come into being as a 
result of various appeals and performances. Secondly fan activities are equivalent to 
political practices: a vast array of fan activities – a passionate individual investment (in 
the text), active engagement in public discussions and deliberations (about the qualities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Abercrombie and Longhurst identify three phases of the audience: the simple co-located face-to-face 
audience, the mass audience and the diffused audience. The diffused audience is no longer containable in 
certain times and places but rather part and parcel of all aspects of daily life in industrialised nations and 
increasingly globally.  
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of the text), proposal and discussion of alternatives – are paralleled to all civic virtues as 
essential for democratic politics. Thirdly fan and civic participation are both maintained 
by emotional investment. Although emotions are ritually manifested in political 
practices, affect has not been assigned to a deserved place in politics as ‘indispensable, 
desirable, and commendable components of political involvement’ (van Zoonen, 2005, 
pp.64-65) yet in spite of an indication of some endeavours in the recent decade. 
Therefore, my focus will be on current debates of the possible linkage between emotion 
and politics in the following section.  
2.4. The Place of Emotions in Politics 
This section deals with the second research question of the thesis: How does affect play 
a critical part in making sense of the public world, and mobilising political 
participation? A particular focus is given on the literature review of the significant role 
of varying emotions in political mobilisation and thereby its indispensable linkage with 
rationality in the process of political involvement. This will be explored through an 
analysis of teen fans’ politicisation in Chapter Seven ‘The Paradox of Fandom’.  
Some scholars (Hoggett and Thompson, 2012, pp.2-3;Kuklinski, 2001, p.7) 
venture to differentiate affect and emotion. Yet, there seems no consensus in 
conceptualisation. It is understandable since the study of emotion is in its infancy 
despite the rapid growth of emotion research in various areas in the recent decade. In 
my thesis it would be meaningless to distinguish these two terms. Therefore, I will use 
affect and emotion interchangeably in order to mean “mediated” feelings elicited largely 
by differing media genres and communications. 
Emotions have long been theorised as secondary to reason in politics. 
Habermas (1989[1962], 1999) acknowledges the plausible role of emotions in 
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motivating ‘novel’ readers’ engagement in a literary public sphere. He describes how 
activity in the literary public sphere, involving discussions of taste and manners and the 
pleasurable enjoyment of conversation among equals, spilled over into the political 
public sphere as it became a forum for the discussion of social, economic and political 
questions. Nonetheless, his main argument is centred on the firm emphasis of reason 
and the suppression of emotion. Accordingly media research, concerned with the notion 
of a public sphere extensively following Habermas, ‘excessively’ focuses on the 
cognitive and rationalistic aspects of news and neglects affective communications as 
McGuigan (2010, p.25) critiques. This also reflects ‘the division of labour’ in media 
research as Corner (1991, p.268) and Dahlgren (1995) have underscored.  
Likewise, the study of emotions had been marginalised in political scholarships 
in which the rationalistic, structural, and organisational models dominate as Goodwin, 
Jasper and Polletta (2001) elaborated in Passionate Politics. According to them, Max 
Weber paved the way to associate emotions with irrationality although he appreciated 
passion as an important element for political commitment. In general, he believed 
emotional actions could not be rational and vice versa, which has a bearing on social 
and political science traditions. In these traditions, whereas emotions were considered as 
crucial for understanding all political action outside institutional politics, political 
participants in protests were pathologically stereotyped as a mob or a crowd easily 
driven by anxiety and fear, anger and violence and spurred by rumours and 
demagogues, all of which were regarded as irrational and immature. This negatively 
stereotyped image of protesters is still often presented in the Korean conservative 
media, which is charted in the analysis of the dominant media discourse of teen activism 
in Chapter Seven.  
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In the recent decade, however, robust research in various fields including media 
and cultural studies has re-focused on emotion as an essential and/or rational constituent 
of politics. Distinctively, some political psychologists (Marcus and Mackuen, 
2001;Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Stevens, 2005) have attempted to 
reconceptualise affect as inescapably linked to rationality through the concept of ‘affective intelligence’ (Marcus and Mackuen, 2001, p.41) in which affect maintains our 
capability to use reason ‘in precisely those circumstances when the benefits of reason 
are most required and most wanted’. They argue emotions – representatively anxiety 
and enthusiasm – can play positive roles in democratic decision-making and 
participation. In other words, anxiety of present or possible threat or danger facilitates ‘reflective, deliberative’ (re)consideration of contemporary information and ‘standing 
decisions (i.e. predispositions)’ (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and Stevens, 2005, 
p.961) and enhances political learning for new information in order to respond to the 
threat. And enthusiasm promotes active engagement in the democratic process.  
In respect to the role of emotions in political mobilisation, Gamson’s (1992) 
study has much significance in my thesis. Through the analysis of mass media and 
focus groups composed of working people, he articulates how the components of 
collective action – injustice, agency and identity – are manifested and how people use 
resources such as media discourse, experiential knowledge and public wisdom in order 
to understand an issue. Particularly the collective action frame impinges on the analysis 
of the process of teenaged fans’ politicisation in the Chapter Seven. Injustice, as a 
powerful constituent of political consciousness supporting collective action, is a ‘hot 
cognition’ he argues. In other words, injustice is laden with ‘the righteous anger’ (or 
moral indignation, rage, resentment, grief) toward a concrete target of human actors 
(such as corporations, government agencies or specific groups rather than individuals) 
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who cause harm and suffering. As Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (2001, pp.16-17) 
explains, in the process of transformation of such emotions as anger, indignation, hatred 
or fear into cognitive beliefs of unfairness, ‘demonization’ is needed. That is to say, it 
needs typifying an adversary’s action completely negatively, assigning immoral motives 
to the opponent, and augmenting the enemy’s power. As such, the experience of anger 
motivates people to engage in political action in order to overcome perceived injustice 
(Thompson, 2006).  
In addition, agency is also an essential consciousness that people, as ‘potential 
agents of their own history’ (Gamson, 1992, p.7), can change existing conditions and 
terms of their daily lives through collective action. In contrast, a huge obstacle to 
collective agency is the sense of ‘collective helplessness’, which social structure and 
political culture combine to produce (Gamson, 1992, pp.59-83). In centralised, 
hierarchical national political and economic structures in which working people can 
hardly find opportunity to participate in any of the institutions setting the conditions of 
their daily lives, they unavoidably come to feel helpless. And a political culture 
engendering passivity and inaction exacerbates this pessimism. For example, the news 
production culture hugely dependent on a small group of power elites serves to establish 
their ‘self-serving’ announcements filling the news pages. It is noteworthy that he 
acknowledges collective significance of individual actions having no organised plan, 
which can be found as a characteristic of many online political actions.    
The process of becoming a collective agent necessitates identification, ‘the 
process of defining “we”, typically in opposition to some “they” who have different 
interests or values’ (Gamson, 1992, p.84). The injustice element facilitates personal 
identification as well. In the identification process, this “they” should be demonized as a 
concrete target as explained above. With respect to the strategy of how working people 
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use media, experiential knowledge and public wisdom for their sense-making and their 
political engagement, Gamson stresses the concept of issue proximity – the degree to 
which an issue has ‘direct and immediate consequences for one’s personal life’ – as an 
important factor along with an interest to encourage issue involvement. The issue 
proximity brings out people’s existing anger, which they experience over the hardships 
and pains in their everyday lives, within the injustice frame. Consequently, he concludes 
that experiential knowledge contributes to concretising injustice with the emotion of 
moral indignation, and media discourse offers a tool for the framing of an issue in a 
broader picture as well as for the shared understanding.  
As such, emotions, as the motivational ground for political action or/and as ‘feeling rules’ (Hochschild, 2012) that determine the extent and time of publicity of a 
particular emotion, are culturally and socially constructed and (re-)negotiated through 
contesting discourse framed enormously by the media. As Richards (2007, p.5) 
underscores, in media studies, news, conventionally regarded as the traditional, rational 
public sphere of political process and debates, should be also examined in the aspect of 
an emotional public sphere as ‘a discrete object of study’. Through an analysis of the 
construction of the British people’s response to Princess Diana’s death in 1997 and 
public debate about the fate of the British monarchy that followed, McGuigan (2005, 
2010) also argues for situating affect at the centre of communication and democratic 
participation. In this light, Pantti and van Zoonen’s study (2006) calls for greater 
attention. Through a qualitative content analysis of four Dutch newspaper articles 
around recent political assassinations, they attempted to unveil ‘the implicit rules of 
feeling’, that is to say, how, which and whose emotions were reported as appropriate to 
which contexts. In their conclusion, they argue that the different and contradictory 
emotions they identified in their analysis imply that public emotions do not necessarily 
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have ‘a unifying effect’ by pointing to this diversity as a cause for the disruption of 
inclusive political, cultural citizenship and lamenting the temporality of citizens’ 
emotional participation.  
Pantti (2010) examines how compassion and anger have been constructed and 
managed as a vehicle to construct social solidarity and to express criticism toward 
political authorities in the British disaster news coverage. Pantti employs a cultural 
approach, Sarah Ahmed’s (2004) model of the ‘sociality’ of emotions, in which 
emotions become ‘constitutive of subjectivity and of boundaries between ‘we’ and ‘them’ 
and function to both move us and hold us in place’. This is consistent with the collective 
identity frame that Gamson (1992) stresses as a crucial component of political 
mobilisation. In her findings, she highlights that the compassion discourse enhances a 
sense of moral national community and works to rebuild collective identity and promote 
cultural values, and stories of heroes and ordinary people’s altruistic actions build moral 
solidarity. The anger discourse shows ‘mediated disasters can be less consensual’ yet 
offers an occasional space in which ordinary people (and journalists) hold those in 
authority accountable for their actions.  
2.5. Recalibrating the Distinction 
Thus far, I have striven to examine current debates of the trajectories of communicative 
mode, publics and emotions in enhancing democratic politics. On the one hand, I 
explored the normative dichotomy between the public and the private sustainably 
maintained by the notion of Habermasian public sphere and his followers. On the other 
hand, extensively yet not exhaustively, I endeavoured to critique the traditional 
distinction by investigating rigorous research in various scholarships including media 
and cultural studies and political communication and psychology in recent years. Some 
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of these studies are indispensably valuable and meaningful with empirical evidence, 
which have provided models or frameworks for me to pursue in my research. Although 
there has been academic abundance of well-developed critique of the relationship 
between media, public engagement and politics in respect of this dichotomy, empirical 
studies to scrutinise the concerned matter are insufficient. In reply to urgent academic 
calls (Kuklinski, 2001, p.13;van Zoonen, 2005, p.56) for empirical studies, my thesis, 
especially from a perspective of the distinction as a fractal rather than a binary 
opposition, aims to contribute to recalibrating the distinction assigned to the main 
themes of my research – communicative modes, the composition of publics and the 
place of emotions in politics – by identifying the context and process in which the 
private translates into the public, or/and the public is constructed in the private. 
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3. Mapping Out the South Korean Media Landscape: 
In relation to the role of the state 
This chapter attempts to foreground historical contexts of the Korean media landscape 
that has been, by and large, structured by the media policies of the state. The chapter is 
divided into three parts around the following periods: the authoritarian era (1961-1987), 
the market-driven journalism (1987-1998), and the online media (1998 up to present). A 
particular focus is given on the authoritarian era for two reasons. Firstly, because a 
handful of conservative media conglomerates have continued to impinge on the 
formation of public opinion to a great extent and this has gravely resulted from the 
media policies executed during the authoritarian era. Secondly, after the 1987 
democratisation, the firmly structured media power of those conservative media offers a 
rationale for the people’s aspirations and sustained efforts to seek alternative media 
spaces that are now afforded by the Internet Communication Technology (ICT) to some 
extent.  
For a better understanding of the relationship between the state and the media 
that will be charted in the chapter, it is useful to note that from 1948 – the First Republic 
after Independence from the Japanese colonial rule – to 1987, the political and legal 
system had been maneuvered by the authoritarian rulers’ ambitions to perpetuate their 
power and to justify its unlawful legitimacy, and thereby media and communication 
policies had been operated to those ends. It was in the wake of the 1987 democratisation 
that the current single-term five-year presidential system, in which the president is 
elected directly by the people, was established. 
Therefore, by illustrating that the democratisation was achieved by an alliance 
among various civic forces such as students, religious groups and ordinary citizens, and 
reinforced by the global move toward democratic states in such places as the USSR, 
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Eastern Europe and East Asia in the 1980s, this chapter attempts to elucidate the Korean 
particulars underlying the historical relationship between politics, media and citizens.    
3.1.Korean Transition in the Wave of Global Move toward 
Democratisation 
A final factor working in favor of Korean democratization is that the 
people took direct action in a revolutionary situation and forced 
political reform. It was not something bestowed by a foreign conqueror 
(as in Japan) or from above by a liberalizing but still dominant elite (as 
in Taiwan)…The best thing going for democracy in Korea is that the 
people themselves were involved in its creation and have a stake in its 
survival (Johnson, 1993, p.107). 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the world witnessed a grand political transition from 
authoritarian to liberal democratic regimes in a number of regions such as East Asia, the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and Latin America. In the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR), Mikhail Gorbachev pushed forward economic and political reforms 
– the so-called perestroika (economic restructuring) and glasnost (political openness) – 
during 1986 to 1991. The main goal of the reforms was to recover from a long 
economic stagnation. However, glasnost, entailing freedom of speech (albeit the limited 
freedom to the extent that criticism of Gorbachev and his inner circle was banned), 
abolition of censorship of art, and adoption of plural candidacy in a local communist 
party with secret voting, contributed to expanding the degree of freedom and democracy 
in Russia. Moreover, the failure of perestroika resulted in the weakening influence of 
Russia on the satellite Soviet Republics and eventually the dissolution of the USSR 
through secession of the Soviet Republics. In the later months of 1989 in Eastern 
Europe (e.g. Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania), people overthrew 
communist party-states with demands for a free press, and political and other basic 
reforms through diverse means of communication (Wasko, 1993, p.163).  
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Similarly, there were comparable democratisations in East Asia. In 1986, 
popular protests toppled the Marcos dictatorship that had ruled the Philippines for over 
thirteen years (Fukuyama, 1992, p.14). Under President Corazon Aquino, the 
Philippines restored democracy and became a part of the ‘third wave’ 19  of 
democratisation. Taiwan had been under an authoritarian regime led by Kuomintang 
(KMT) that owned 2 national newspapers, controlled 5 military-owned newspapers and 
had close connection with the majority of national newspapers for forty years until 1987 
when martial law was lifted. This followed the 1986 political reform when the one-party 
state of KMT was ceased by the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). 
However, it took another ten years until the Taiwanese experienced full democratic 
transition for the first time in history through direct participation in elections for the 
President and Vice-President (Rawnsley and Rawnsley, 1998, pp.106-124).  
Enumerating a series of historical, political transitions in the 1980s, Fukuyama 
(1992, pp.8-16) argues that the innovations resulted from tremendous weakness and 
crisis within the core elites whose cohesion is essential for an authoritarian regime to 
hold a monopoly of coercive power. And he interprets these global moves in a broader 
sweep:  
Chief among the surprises that have occurred in the recent past was the 
totally unexpected collapse of communism throughout much of the 
world in the late 1980s… Authoritarian dictatorships of all kinds, both 
on the Right and on the Left, have been collapsing. In some cases, the 
collapse has led to the establishment of prosperous and stable liberal 
democracies. In others, authoritarianism has been followed by 
instability, or by yet another form of dictatorship. But whether 
successful democracy eventually emerged, authoritarians of all stripes 
have been undergoing a severe crisis in virtually every part of the globe 
(p. 12). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Samuel P. Huntington (1991) coined the ‘Third Wave’ to mean a global democratisation of over thirty 
countries between 1974 and 1990. 
65 	  
Arguably, in contrast to Fukuyama’s analytical point, South Korea has achieved 
democratisation not by a decline of core elites’ power, but by a coalition of pro-
democracy forces such as students, citizens, activists, religious groups and political 
opposition. Without the persistent, passionate mass participation in a series of protests 
in June of 1987, the ruling party leader Roh Tae-woo’s Declaration of 29th June 1987 
could not have been achieved. The main points of the declaration were: to allow press 
freedom; more significantly, to have a direct presidential election, which was a primary 
demand of mass protests; and to grant amnesty for lifelong political opposition	   leader 
Kim Dae-jung20	  and other political dissidents with the restoration of their civil rights. 
Hence, after about thirty years of military authoritarian rule, South Korea made the 
transition to a democratic political system that paved the way for full-fledged 
democracy and civil society.  
Some scholars explain the 1980s’ global transition by the notion of 
‘demonstration effects’ (Huntington, 1991, p.102;Diamond, cited in O'Neil, 1998, 
pp.12-13). The transferred information about the political transition in one state makes 
impacts on the minds of political and intellectual leaders as well as the minds of ruling 
elites in another. In other words, on the one hand, changes realised elsewhere convince 
societal actors of possibility and hope for change and inspires them to press for change 
at home. On the other hand, the ruling elites become ‘more conciliatory or reactionary, 
either of which may spark mass mobilization’ (O'Neil, 1998, p.12). For example, mass 
action in Chile or the Tiananmen Square movement of 1989 in China were influenced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Kim Dae-jung won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his lifetime contribution to Korean democracy 
and sunshine policy of North Korea during his presidency (1998-2003). The sunshine policy sought to 
build a peaceful relationship between the two Koreas through cultural exchange and economic trade 
programmes such as the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in North Korea, which is a collaborative venture in 
which South Korea invests capital and technology and North Korea provides cheap labour and land 
(KLHC). In April 2012, 123 South Korean companies are in operation, 51,518 North Koreans are 
employed and the cumulative production output is 1.66billion USD (Kong, Park and Lee, 2012, p.75). It 
is argued that the Complex offers superior competitiveness for South Korean companies in comparison 
with China and Vietnam (Lee, 2011a, 2013). 
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by the changes in the Philippines, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Huntington, 
1991, p.102;Calhoun, cited by O'Neil, 1998, p.12). Likewise, the collapse of Marcos’s 
authoritarian regime by the people’s power in the Philippines encouraged the opposition 
party and civic activists in the process of the 1987 democratisation in South Korea 
(Kim, 2007b, p.56).  
As such, the Korean transition to the democratic political system in the late 
1980s was part of a larger phenomenon of a global move towards liberal democracy in 
that period. In the later section, I will delineate the particular conditions of Korean 
democratisation with focus on the ways in which the people became informed of current 
socio-political events and collaborated to achieve the June 29th Declaration. The 
following sections are concerned with the relationship between the state and the media 
from 1945 to 1987, with focus on the period of the military authoritarian rule.  
3.2. The Role of the State and the Media Landscape before 
Democratisation (1945-1987) 
3.2.1. From Independence to the Administration under Prime Minister Chang 
Myun (1945-1961)  
The Republic of Korea was established under the Rhee Syngman government in 1948 in 
South Korea after the 3-year U.S. occupation following the Japanese colonial era (1910-
1945). Unlike North Korea, which had eradicated the influence of Japanese 
colonialism21, South Korea cleansed little of it (Cumings, 2007, p.22). During the U.S. 
occupation period from September 1945 after the U.S. decided to ‘make the 38th 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was formed under Kim Il Sung’s leadership in September 
1948 in North Korea. North Korea had a separate institution including a powerful political party since 
early 1946. In cooperation with the North Korean Workers’ Party which later merged with the Korean 
Communists’ Party, the Interim People’s Committee led by Kim Il Sung executed several reforms 
including redistribution of land, nationalisation of industries that were formerly owned by Japanese and a 
2-year economic development programme based on the Soviet’s central planning. Despite the Soviet 
Union’s wish to control North Korea, most of the Soviet occupation forces were withdrawn at the end of 
1948 (Savada, 1993).  
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parallel the dividing line between the Soviet and the U.S. zones in Korea’22, the United 
States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) concentrated on sustaining 
the status quo by repressing various radical movements23 that they interpreted as pro-
Soviet activities (Savada, 1993). Moreover, soon after a short period of granting press 
freedom through the registration system of periodical publications, USAMGIK 
reintroduced a permit system ‘Proclamation No. 88’ that revived the press control 
system utilised in the Japanese colonial era. Allowing USAMGIK to withhold and 
cancel permits to the media that were considered to be left wing or critical, and to arrest 
left-wing journalists (Chang, 1994, pp.250-251),  resulted in a sharp decrease of the 
dominant nationalist and socialist press (Kang, 2005, p.77). In regard to the broadcast 
media, Kyungsung Broadcasting System, which began radio broadcast from 1927 for 
the purpose of Japan’s efficient colonisation and attempted elimination of Korean 
national culture and identity, continued to serve the diffusion of U.S. capitalism and the 
Cold War ideology for the 3-year USAMGIK (Oh, 1995) under the name of KBS 
(KBS).     
The First Republic under Rhee Syngman (1948-1960) legislated the 
constitution that guaranteed freedom of the press, but the main policy was 
anticommunism. The Rhee government, based on former pro-Japanese collaborators 
(Byun, 2005, p.104;Kang, 2005), enacted the National Security Law in 1948 that 
prohibited ‘any sign of a leftist orientation’ under threat of a jail term or death24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 As a result, 25,000 U.S. soldiers occupied the Southern part of Korea. Unlike the U.S. in South Korea, 
however, the Soviet Union established neither a central administration nor an army in North Korea 
(Savada, 1993).  
23 Such movements were the establishment of an interim people’s republic and people’s committees by 
nationalist leaders or the cleansing of the Japanese colonial legacies through rebelling against the 
conservative landed factions blocking redistribution of land to peasants or through ousting landowners or 
police officers who were believed to work at the forefront of suppressing Korean people during the 
Japanese rule.  
24 The best well-known example was that the progressive nationalist Cho Pong-am was accused of being a 
North Korean spy and was executed in 1958 (Cumings, 2007, p.22). He had been elected as a Member of 
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(Cumings, 2007, p.22) in order to smokescreen the purpose of invalidating the law 
punishing Koreans who had collaborated with Japan during the colonial era (Byun, 
2005, p.85). Given the divided, antagonistic relations of two Koreas, the National 
Security Law provided a powerful ideology tool for the Rhee regime to repress critical 
anti-government voices and control the public opinion in an easy, efficient way so as to 
enable his long-term control of power. Byun (2005, p.111) described the then socio-
political climate as so restrained by the security law that opposition politicians and MPs 
themselves were very much cautious and anxious not to be accused of being Reds or 
communists, and thereby for the ruling party the law was regarded as a sort of the 
almighty instrument to silence opposition. Accordingly, no left-wing newspapers 
remained by 1949 (Chang, 1994, p.251) and a leading critical newspaper Kyunghyang 
was closed down in 195925 (Han, 2010b).  Intriguingly, the law has still continued to 
function as a political apparatus for the conservatives to control Korean society as 
examined in the Cheonan sinking section of Chapter Five ‘Ordinary People and 
OhmyNews’. 
In the meantime, KBS vested in the Ministry of Information (MOI) under the 
Rhee regime in 1948 so as to serve as a vehicle of propaganda of the state policy. In 
1954, the first private radio broadcaster Christian Broadcasting System (CBS) was 
launched and the first black and white television broadcast began by HLKZ-TV in 1956. 
HLKZ-TV was operated by KORCAD, the Korean division of the U.S. electronic 
manufacturer RCA, and was reshuffled to DBC (Daehan Broadcasting Corporation) 
owned by the general-circulated newspaper Hankook Ilbo in 1957 and closed down in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Parliament in 1948 and worked as the 2nd Agriculture Minister and Vice-Speaker in the 2nd Parliament. 
During his ministry, he implemented the land reform that dispossessed land from the owners and 
redistributed it to peasants but it did not last long. With 30 percent of the vote he gained in the 3rd 
presidential election in 1956, he emerged as a rival to President Rhee, which was widely believed to be 
the main reason for his execution (Kim, 2010d).       
25 Sometimes a newspaper was closed for several months for a minor error. In 1955, Dong-A was closed 
for several months due to typographic error of President Rhee’s title (Henderson, 1968, p.172). 
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1960 after a fire. Most staff was recruited for the launch of KBS (Korean Broadcasting 
System) in the following year.   
Consequently, the accumulated discontent with the Rhee government 
culminated in the election fraud of 15th March 196026. Infuriated as a result of a high 
school student’s death by a tear gas bomb during protest in the Masan area, a number of 
citizens’ protests, including university lecturers joining soon after, expanded into a 
nationwide protest against the fraudulent presidential election. Eventually the 19th of 
April 1960 Democratic Revolution brought down the Rhee regime and the cabinet 
government under Prime Minister Chang Myun (1960-1961) came into power. The 
‘first experiment with democratic life’ (Sohn, 1989, p.18) under Prime Minister Chang 
implemented economic and political reforms such as an economic development plan, 
transparent bureaucracy and the police’s political neutrality. In particular, the 
registration law replaced the permit law, allowing freedom of speech by means of the 
simplified provision for publication of a newspaper or journal, that is, only basic 
information such as the title, the location and the frequency of publication was needed. 
Therefore, by the end of 1960, the number of media reached 1,609 including 389 
dailies, 476 weeklies, 470 monthlies and 274 news agencies, all of which had increased 
over twofold from 600 (Kim, cited in Youm, 1998, p.173) and the number grew until 
April 1961. Cumings (2007, pp.22-23) illustrates that the capital city, Seoul, was one of 
the most intellectual and dynamic cities in the world at that time: ‘more college students 
per capita than England, more newspaper readers per capita than almost any country in 
the world, and a concentration of administrative, commercial, industrial, and 
educational energies’. As such, people enjoyed democratic values such as freedom of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In 1952 while the government retreated to Pusan during the Korean War (1950-1953), President Rhee 
threatened to dissolve the Parliament by using political hoodlums and put the opposition politicians under 
house arrest or imprisonment (KDFA).  
70 	  
speech and expression. However, the Revolution was foiled, and the short-lived 
parliamentary government under Prime Minister Chang Myun was overthrown by 
General Park Chung-hee’s military coup on 16th May 1961. 
3.2.2. Media Landscape under the Park Chung-hee Regime (1961-1979) 
With a strong push of economic growth and export-led development, the Park regime 
(1961-1979) is considered to have contributed to the fast achievement of modernisation 
and industrialisation in comparison with other countries (Bedeski, 1993, pp.61-63; 
1994, pp.121-123). However, many critics have argued that for the sake of the ‘forced-
pace’ (Cumings, 2007, p.23) economy priority policy, the development of democracy 
and other values or alternative voices of the civil society were severely clamped down 
(Cho, 2010;Kang, 2009). Within the goal of the industrial modernisation project, the 
main objective of the regime’s media policies was to enforce the media to be a key 
player not only in mobilising the entire nation for economic development (Kang, 2005, 
p.78;Yu, 1991, p.56) but also in manipulating ideology in order to legitimise and 
maintain unlawful power (Park, Kim and Sohn, 2000, p.112). Chang (1994, p.253) 
points out Park’s overall view of the press as such:   
His idea of the press … was that it should not be a critic, but a 
participant in the government program of rebuilding the nation… He 
had little tolerance for opposition party media, and was determined 
either to have the entire media on his side or to silence those not 
favorably inclined to the government. 
The first repressive measure to control the media was the forceful restructuring of media 
organisations by means of the Decree No.11 ‘Facility Standard for the Newspaper and 
News Agency’ (Chang, 1994;Youm, 1998), which was issued right after the coup. As a 
regulation for production machinery and facilities, its alleged cause was to wipe out 
quasi-journalists and media organisations misusing freedom of the press. In practice, 
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however, it served as a means to cease the publication of media unfavourable and 
critical of the government. It cancelled the licence of the media stating that it fell short 
of the required production machinery and facilities (Park, Kim and Sohn, 2000, p.113). 
Accordingly, 1,200 periodicals and news organisations were closed down and only 44 
dailies, 65 weeklies, 270 monthlies, 34 quarterlies and 72 miscellaneous publications 
survived (Chang, cited in Youm, 1998, p.173) which was less than one third of those 
during the Chang Myun regime. Considering that out of the 44 surviving dailies, 15 
were concentrated in the Seoul capital area and 29 were distributed among 7 provinces, 
the media could hardly deliver diverse voices and interests of various groups, nor of 
local people. In addition, 960 allegedly corrupt or pseudo-reporters were arrested ‘on 
charges of blackmail, fraud, menacing, and forgery of official documents’ (Chong, cited 
in Chang, 1994, p.254).  
In December 1961, KBS, having been placed under the MOI since 1948 of the 
Rhee regime, began television broadcast service, maintaining its propaganda role of 
disseminating and publicising government policies. In 1963, Dong-A Broadcasting 
System (DBS) launched radio service and Tongyang Broadcasting Company (TBC), 
owned by Joong Ang (owned by the Samsung Group), began radio and television 
broadcast service in the following year. In 1969, Munhwa Broadcasting Company 
(MBC, later renamed Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) started television broadcast 
service. The precursor of MBC television was Hankook Broadcasting Company that  
businessman Kim Ji-tae owned along with Pusan Daily and MBC radio in the Pusan 
region. In 1962, after the coup, the Park Chung-hee regime wrested Kim Ji Tae’s 
properties, including the above-named media along with the Pu-il Scholarship 
Foundation with the accusation of accumulation of wealth by illicit means.  Park 
ascribed them to the May 16 Scholarship Foundation which he chaired at that time and 
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later renamed the Chungsoo Foundation after Park Chung-hee and his wife Yuk Young-
soo in 1980 under the Chun regime (Bang, 2008;Hankyoreh, 2004;Han, cited in Park, 
2012b). As MBC’s finances worsened, Park forced 11 business companies, including 
Hyundai Engineering and Construction, Haitai Confectionary and Dong-A Construction, 
etc., to buy 70 percent of its shares under the condition that they could neither sell the 
stocks nor request dividends. The consortium lasted until 1980 when it was handed over 
to the Chun regime and was later owned by KBS in accordance with the 1980 Press 
Merger. Eventually, 70 percent of MBC ownership was maintained by the government-
controlled Foundation for Broadcast Culture from 1989, and the remaining 30 percent 
continued to be in the hands of the Chungsoo Foundation (Bang, 2008;Park, 1990). 
These commercial television broadcasters were kept under the control of the Park 
regime. For example, they were required to report summaries of their broadcasting 
activities on a monthly basis (Kwak, 2012, p.14).   
Interestingly, in 1964, KBS launched a long-lived television drama Nonfiction 
Theatre, which was co-produced with the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) 
for the purpose of anticommunist propaganda. Although the title of the drama changed 
over time, its key message of anticommunism was maintained until 1985, and it 
prompted a series of anticommunist television dramas in the 1970s such as TBC’s 
Chase and MBC’s 11327 Investigation Headquarter (Oh, 1995). According to the 
revision of Broadcasting Law in1973, KBS, separated from the Ministry of Culture and 
Information (MOCI, previously MOI) that had subsidized KBS, transformed to a public 
broadcaster. The main reason was to establish a rationale for the introduction of the 
license fee collected directly from the audience in order to resolve financial difficulties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The phone number 113 is for the report of North Korean spy.  
73 	  
and secure sufficient funding28. At the same time, the conservation of KBS as a public 
service provider guaranteed its previous role as the state apparatus of propaganda.  
The Park regime’s coercion of the media culminated when the Yushin 
Constitution [Revitalizing Reforms] was proclaimed in October 1972 in an attempt to 
prolong the reign of Park indefinitely. The key elements of the Yushin Constitution 
included: a change from the second term 4-year presidency to the unlimited term 6-year 
one, and from the direct presidential election to the indirect one by the Tong-Il-Chu-
Ch’e-Kook-Min-Hoi-Ui [People’s Unification Committee (PUC)] in which the 
president Park chaired; one third of the MPs were elected by PUC with the 
recommendation of the president; and the presidential right to dissolve the parliament 
and to appoint judicial officers at all levels. In order to repress any possible contestation 
against the Constitution, Park issued Martial Law Decree No.1 to outlaw all public 
speech and statements opposing the Yushin Constitution, and forced the parliament to 
dissolve immediately, banning all indoor and outdoor political assemblies and 
demonstrations, as well as censoring speeches, publications, press and broadcasts. 
Emergency Decree No.2 allowed the state power to put violators of Decree No.1 into 
custody without an arrest warrant and to be jailed for up to 15 years (Oh, 2013). 
Eventually, the constitutional amendment bill was passed in the Emergency State 
Council meeting in December 1972. Accordingly, the Yushin Constitution intensified 
the presidential authority and power by severely reducing parliamentary sessions and 
authority, and empowered the regime to establish ‘a generalissimo system’ (Kang, 
2005, p.78).  
Outside the regime, there had been a growing opposition and resistance to the 
Yushin system. Beginning with the Seoul National University students’ protests on 2nd 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The number of television sets reached nearly 1million by that time (KBC, 2002). 
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October 1973, a series of students’ anti-Yushin protests took place. Soon after, the 
People’s Association for Protection of Democracy, organised by a coalition of diverse 
pro-democracy forces, announced their opposition to the Yushin system. Moreover, the 
1 million people’s petition campaign for a revision of the current29 Constitution was 
initiated by Chang Joon-ha on 4th December 1973 and 30 intellectuals from diverse 
areas conducted the campaign with Chang. Within 10 days 0.3million people signed. 
This nationwide campaign reactivated debates on the constitutional amendment and 
focused people’s aspiration to democracy. In the following year, nonetheless, this 
struggle was foiled by the Presidential emergency measure to prohibit any addressing of 
the amendment issue (KDFA). 
Inside the official media, there was also a massive protest against the despotism 
and the suppression of press freedom under the Yushin system. On 24th October 1974, 
180 Dong-A and Chosun journalists carried out the Free Press Movement at the Dong-A 
newspaper’s headquarters, announcing their determination to practice ‘a free press’ as a 
substantive condition of the liberal democracy and to stand against every form of 
repression. And as more detailed action plan, they declared to stand together and oppose 
all external interference with the press including newspapers, broadcasting and 
magazines, and to reject the inspection of KCIA, as well as an unlawful arrest of 
journalists (Youm, 1998, p.179). Not surprisingly, the official media had been a target 
of public criticism and distrust for failing to fulfil their social responsibilities to inform 
citizens. The declaration was an expression of the journalists’ self-reflection on the 
situation, which was somewhat encouraged by the increasing demands of the restoration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 As it was illegal to raise a question of the Yushin in public at that time, the campaign was inevitably 
named “current” in order to mean “Yushin”. Moreover, despite the announcement of the campaigning by 
those intellectuals, they could not set up an official headquarter and so each person acted as a micro-
headquarter. Chang Joon-ha was killed under suspicious circumstances in August 1975 (KDFA). 
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of press freedom and the awakening of the journalists’ social responsibilities by the 
publics such as religious groups and college students.  
While Dong-A newspaper and Dong-A broadcast journalists successfully took 
the plan into action, the government attempted to put Dong-A under their control by 
threatening the main advertisers of Dong-A media group (i.e. Dong-A Ilbo, Dong-A 
broadcast, Shin-Dong-A monthly and Yu-Seong-Dong-A women’s monthly) to cancel 
their advertising contract with Dong-A. By January 1975, one month after the 
government’s economic sanction on the group, Dong-A Ilbo lost 98 percent of its 
product advertisement contracts (Youm, 1998, p.179); the broadcast wing lost 92 
percent of total advertisements; and in March 90 percent of Shin-Dong-A advertisement 
contract was cancelled. With strong criticism and detailed stories of the advertisers’ 
contract revocation revealed through Dong-A broadcasts and newspapers, the journalists 
appealed to all opposition groups to support their protest.  
Nonetheless, on the sixth morning of their sit-in protest, the Dong-A media 
group expelled 130 journalists including broadcast producers and presenters and 
reporters from the workplace (Park, Kim and Sohn, 2000, p.119) by hiring 200 
gangsters and distribution agents. The dismissed journalists’ protests in front of the 
Dong-A Ilbo headquarters lasted six months, distributing flyers of their criticism of the 
Dong-A Ilbo’s subjugation to the illegitimate, repressive regime and condemning its 
dismissal of journalists (Chung, 2008c). 
3.2.3. Media Landscape under the Chun Doo-hwan Regime (1980-1987) 
On 26th October 1979, the head of the KCIA, Kim Jae-kyu, assassinated President Park. 
The people’s hope for democracy revived and there were abundant discussions of how 
to proceed with the abolishment of the Yushin Constitution, how to realise the freedom 
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of speech and expression, and other democratic values restrained under the Park 
government. The parliament was undergoing discussion of amendment of the 
Constitution and the then acting President Choi Kyu-ha30 was also very supportive. 
However, on 12th December 1979, the head of the joint investigation into President 
Park’s homicide, General Chun Doo-Hwan seized military power by mutiny with the 
unlawful arrest of the chief emergency martial law administrator and the Army Chief of 
Staff, Chung Seung-hwa. On 13th December, without President Choi Kyu-ha’s approval, 
Chung was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on a charge of conspiracy to commit to 
the Park assassination.  
With the purpose of extending their illegitimate grip on power within the army 
to the entire nation, Chun and his conspirators forced the Choi government to approve 
the expanded martial law on a national level on 17th May 1980 by barricading the 
parliament with the army. The nucleus of the martial law was the Decree No.10 that 
entailed the prohibition of any political activities including of parties and politicians, the 
temporary closing of universities, the reinforced pre-censorship of the press, and the 
banning of any assembly or demonstrations. Thousands of army soldiers were 
dispatched into universities in order to quell students’ protests that had become intense 
and 2,699 pro-democracy students and politicians including Kim Dae-jung were 
arrested without a warrant. More dreadfully, in order to wipe out any potential defiance 
or resistance, on 18th May Chun dispatched armoured and airborne troops to Kwangju, 
where the opposition leader Kim Dae-jung was politically based and the active 
democratic movement took place. The Kwangju Democratic Movement ended on 27th 
May 1980 with over four thousand civilian casualties. At that time, the public did not 
know about this incident since all communications, including telephone and electricity, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Choi Kyu-ha was elected as President by the PUC and his presidency lasted from 21st December 1979 
to 15th August 1980. 
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were cut off and the army surrounded the entire city. Moreover, even before the 
incident, the Defence Security Command agents were stationed inside the press 
organisations, conducting prepublication censorship in order for any anti-Chun news or 
pro-democracy article to be unreported. Even after the tragedy, such mainstream, 
official media as Chosun, Dong-A, Joong Ang and broadcasters (public broadcaster 
KBS, apparently private-managed but practically state-own broadcasting company 
MBC, private-run broadcaster TBC) kept silent to the truth of the massacre for their own 
sake and security.  
3.2.3.1. Coercive media policy  
Chun Doo Hwan, who became President through the fraudulent election of the PUC, 
which had practically replaced the role of the parliament and had elected Park Chung-
hee President under the Yushin system, took several oppressive measures for the 
elimination of resistant groups within the media organisations to facilitate control of the 
media. Firstly, an immense dismissal of journalists was carried out. From July to 
August 1980, the Chun regime forced media organisations to sack 711 journalists from 
across the media spectrum (Won, 1998, p.95), including those who had waged a 
nationwide campaign for the withdrawal of the censorship and for the free press, and 
who appeared to maintain critical views of the Chun government. At the end of the year, 
the number of forcefully fired journalists reached 933 (Park, Kim and Sohn, 2000, 
p.113). Furthermore, on 31st July 1980, the government cancelled the registration of 172 
periodicals (12 percent of all titles). As a result, the most progressive and influential 
magazines in Korean intellectual society, such as Ssialui Sori [Voice of the People], 
Bburikipum Namu [Deep-rooted Tree], Changjakkwa Bipyong [Creation and Criticism] 
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and Wolgan Joong Ang [Monthly Joong Ang] were compelled to cease publishing. In 
four months, further 66 periodicals were forced to shut down.  
Secondly, newspaper and broadcasting companies, and news agencies were 
forcefully merged, allowing only one local newspaper for each province, except in the 
Seoul area (Park, Kim and Sohn, 2000, p.113). As a result, 64 media organisations 
reduced to 18 media. For the purpose of censorship and control of the flow of foreign 
news, the government repealed six news agencies including Tong-Yang and Hap-Dong, 
and let the Korean Association of Newspaper and the Korean Broadcasters Association 
set up a sole news agency, the Yonhap News Agency. The merger of broadcasters was 
more wide-ranging: TBC and DBS merged into KBS and were renamed KBS2 
television and KBS radio respectively, and CBS was banned from broadcasting news 
and current affairs programmes and instead had to focus on religious broadcasts only 
(Bang, 2008;Oh, 1995). Seventy percent of MBC’s shares were sold to KBS and in 
effect state-owned public broadcaster KBS controlled the overall programming of MBC 
broadcast. Eventually the broadcast industry was restructured into the binary 
broadcasting system, i.e. KBS and MBC. Moreover, the newscast of the two 
broadcasters was programmed exactly in the same way that the first five or ten minute 
coverage focused on President Chun’s activities of each day, making effect as a pro-
Chun propaganda (Youm, 1998, p.175).  
Thirdly, as a more efficient institutional device to minimise critical media 
coverage of the unlawful ruling, as well as of restricting the public access to information 
and therefore their right to know, the government passed the Basic Press Law in 
December 1980 (Chey, 1990, pp.100-103;Won, 1998, pp.100-103). On the surface, the 
law was to emphasise the social responsibility of the press but practically it served as 
the main means to control press freedom. At first, any periodicals were obliged to 
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register ensuring certain conditions of machinery and facilities were met, which 
required a fair amount of capital. In addition, the suspension and cancellation of the 
registration of periodicals were at the discretion of the Minister of MOCI. For example, 
if the purpose and the content of a publication were concerned with political affairs and 
if they were not favourable for the government, the registration was not issued. 
Moreover, for the purpose of lawful control of broadcasting and newspaper media, the 
government established several government-funded organisations such as the Korean 
Broadcasting Commission (KBC), Korean Communications Commission (KCC), Korea 
Press Research Institute (KPRI), Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corporation 
(KOBACO) and Press Arbitration Commission (PAC) in March 1981.  
Finally, the Media Policy Office of the MOCI issued the ‘Reporting Guidelines’ 
that sought systematic control of news reporting. The detailed daily guidelines directed 
what should be reported and what should not, as well as the priority of news stories 
through the size of headlines and news articles, pictures and reporting terminology. The 
news stories of university students’ protests and opposition party and leaders were most 
frequently regulated (Chey, 1990, pp.104-105;Kim, 1989, pp.207-208). For example, 
one of the guidelines was to order the press to label anti-government protesters as “pro-
communist” (Youm and Salwen, 1990, p.314). For this, the government kept KCIA 
officials to station inside the media organisations to monitor journalists, as well as the 
contents of the daily news.  
3.2.3.2. Appeasement media policy 
Along with the repressive measures, the Chun government executed a broad range of 
appeasement policies in order to tame the surviving media (Chey, 1990, pp.106-
107;Park, Kim and Sohn, 2000, pp.113-114;Yu, 1991). Firstly, the government 
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amended a provision of the Customs Law in 1981 to reduce the customs tax rate for the 
rotary press from 20 percent to 4 percent during the following year. With the tax 
exemption, a total of twelve newspaper companies bought around thirty up-to-date 
printing machines during that period. For the establishment media journalists, the 
government offered reduced income tax and even postponement of interest payment on 
loans (Kim and Shin, cited in Youm, 1998, p.178), and sometimes cash or gifts were 
given in return for writing news favourable to the government (Park, Kim and Sohn, 
2000, p.114).  
Secondly, KOBACO set up a public fund. The fund, formed with a part of the 
commissions KOBACO collected from broadcasting companies for arranging 
advertisements, was officially aimed at returning some of the profits of broadcasting 
companies to the society for their use of public airwaves. In practice, however, the fund 
was used to finance journalists’ training programmes (overseas trainings and 
observation trips) and promote their welfare (loans for housing and education of their 
children).  
Thirdly, the Chun government often offered journalists ministerial posts in the 
MOCI or other ministries, or posts as presidential secretaries, spokesmen, etc, as 
rewards for cooperating with the government. There were also quite a large number of 
former journalists among MPs. Such journalists appointed as politicians or government 
officials served to open channels of dialogue between the government and media 
companies, helping the media acquire highly confidential and exclusive information, 
and thus more chances to get the inside scoop. As such, journalists emerged as the 
privileged intellectual group with the highest wages, a variety of material rewards and 
easy access to information and power resources.  
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With such various benefits and financial support under the Chun government, a 
selective number of media voluntarily came to serve to justify and reinforce the 
authoritarian rule. Consequently, the coercion and appeasement policies of the Chun 
regime helped to establish a strong coalition between the authoritarian government and 
the media, leading the domestic media industry to be more monopolised, centralised and 
homogenised (Park, Kim and Sohn, 2000, pp.114-118). Under the protection of the 
state, in particular, the considerably increasing revenue following the fast growing 
Korean economy and the subsequent expansion of the domestic advertising industry 
aggravated the monopolistic-oligopolistic feature of media industry and ultimately 
created a handful of gigantic media conglomerates. For example, three national 
newspapers, namely Chosun, Joong Ang and Dong-A shared the market and secure 
advertising revenue, and made any newcomer’s entry into the market difficult. In this 
way, the Korean establishment media, that survived the crackdowns of the Park and 
Chun regimes with political cooperation and favour, had moved away from their 
‘watchdog role, choosing to form close ties with political power and thus limiting the 
degree of critical analysis within the news’ (O'Neil, 1998, p.2), as well as serving as a 
state apparatus to discipline people to become subordinates having a belief in the 
regime’s false legitimate authority. 
3.3.Alternative Media and Civic Action to Realise the 1987 
Democratisation 
South Korea has often been touted as a showcase of successful change from military 
dictatorship to civilian democracy (Chung, 1995;Youm, 1998, p.171). The 1987 
Democratisation was a genuine product of coalition by various oppositional forces such 
as students, white- and blue-collar workers, religious groups and radical journalists. Not 
only did citizens support journalists’ fight for press freedom and democracy but also 
82 	  
they were highly critical of the dominant media’s misleading role. There was a 
university students’ protest against the malfunctioning dominant media, which 
stimulated the 1974 Free Press Movement organised by around 180 journalists of the 
two major newspapers Chosun and Dong-A (Han, 2012). On 26th March 1971, 50 Seoul 
National University students made a bonfire in front of the Dong-A building, 
distributing the message of public distrust of the journalists serving the authoritarian 
government on the flyers and pamphlets that they distributed in the streets. Moreover, 
various forms of public support were shown during the Free Press Movement: 
university students, writers, lecturers and religious groups protested against the 
government’s coercion and the advertisers’ cancellation of contracts with Dong-A; 
numerous readers encouraged the movement by making supportive phone calls, placing 
personal advertisements in the affected newspapers, and fundraising for the campaign. 
However, the movement ended with the unprecedented mass dismissal of 163 
journalists (although 134 journalists sacked during the free press movement continue to 
protest today in the name of the Committee of Dong-A Free Press) (Chung, 2008c). As 
illustrated in detail in the previous sections, with various benefits for the media 
complacent to the government, the business of Dong-A media group expanded on a 
large scale.  
In addition to the movement for press freedom orchestrated by such social 
forces, there was another remarkable campaign demanding the democratic television 
broadcast media to deliver fair, diverse voices of the people, instead of serving as a 
mouthpiece of the authoritarian regime. In April 1984, the Catholic churches31 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The Catholic Church was founded by a small group of Shirak [Practical Science] scholars who tried to 
introduce the Western modern thought in 1784 under the Chosun Dynasty and had been persecuted for 
their beliefs for about 100 years. As of December 2011, the number of Korean Catholics reached 5 
million, about 10% of the whole population. Notably, the Catholic Priest Society for the Realisation of 
Justice (CPSRJ) founded in 1974 has contributed to enhancing justice and democracy in the Korean 
society, by unveiling truths especially under the authoritarian regimes (CPSRJ).  
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farmers’ council in Wanju county of Cholla-do province (rural, south-western part of 
South Korea) boycotted the license fee of the public service broadcaster KBS on the 
grounds of KBS not reporting the needs and demands of ten million farmers,and, more 
importantly, because of its propaganda of the Chun regime. They demanded the 
immediate suspension of distorted, biased news broadcasts, as well as the return of 
seized property due to KBS license fee arrears. The local community’s boycott 
campaign prompted the Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC) to expand the 
nationwide campaign in August 1985, and eventually in September 1986 a wide range 
of civic groups organised the ‘Joint Committee for the KBS Subscription Boycott and 
Free Press’, which gained extensive support from the public. Statistics show that 52 
percent of the households having a television set at home participated in the campaign. 
As a result, the government reduced the subscription defaulters’ penalty rate from 10 to 
5 percent and combined the subscription fee into the bills of water and electricity in the 
metropolitan area in November 1986. Whereas the campaign failed to establish the 
accountability and remit of KBS as a public service broadcaster, it contributed to the 
formation of a base of solidarity among grassroots democratic movements nationwide 
leading up to the 1987 democratisation (Byun, 2012).  
As Randall (1998, p.3) points out, ‘under repressive regimes it is in any case by 
definition extremely difficult for the media within a country to live up to the media’s 
ideal roles’. This rather offers the rationale for the need of alternative media critical of 
the illegitimate power and instead providing the possibility of the imagination of a 
democratic society in such a repressive society as South Korea under the military 
regimes. Unquestionably, the unregistered bimonthly Mahl [Speech] epitomises the 
alternative media during the Chun regime. The Association of Democratic Press 
Movement of a group of fired journalists during the 1980 journalists’ massive dismissal 
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launched Mahl in December 1984 (Choi, 2000). Mahl unveiled the ‘Reporting 
Guidelines’ in its special issue on 6th September 1986, which included almost 600 
reporting guidelines issued by the MOCI between 9th October 1985 and 8th August 1986 
(Mahl[Speech];Min, 2003;Youm, 1998, p.180). Park, Lee and Kim (1994, p.286) notes 
that:  
When the opposition parties, civic organizations, students and media 
critics loudly cried for restoration of press freedom, the [establishment] 
press as a whole acted like disinterested onlookers. Furthermore, 
curiously enough, the press did not complain of the government short-
and long-term guidelines for press reporting, the existence of which 
had long been an open secret. Thus, when an anti-establishment 
watchdog journal Mahl exposed such guidelines, the publication in 
effect was accusing the press of faithfully following the government’s 
directives for news management. 
Mahl’s detailed revelation of the Chun regime’s coercive control of the media on a daily 
basis fuelled the citizens’ democratic struggle in June 1987 (Choi, 2000). The magazine 
was officially “unregistered” yet maintained its distribution with the subscription among 
certain groups of like-minded people. As a phenomenal example of alternative media, 
Mahl magazine informed citizens of the otherwise-unreported truth of the relentless 
authoritarian control of press freedom and thereby allowed a formation of a public 
sphere in which citizens shared their critical, dissident views “publicly” in a certain 
circle of audiences. 
Among the various groups of pro-democracy forces, college students were at 
the forefront throughout the military authoritarianism (Choi, 2005, pp.96-97). They 
were the first to put into question the legitimacy of military regimes and to resist any 
forms of oppression. As a critical weapon of their struggle, clandestine, alternative 
media in a variety of forms were systematically produced and circulated by students. 
For example, there were illegal publications (e.g. forbidden books labelled as 
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encouraging ideas disturbing the social order), and underground production of booklets 
and videotapes (e.g. video footage of the 1980 Kwangju genocide taken by foreign 
photo-journalists which aroused widespread wrath against the Chun regime). 
Distribution systems for these products were often formed among student bodies, as 
well as progressive social groups, but the coverage of these kinds of media was not far-
reaching. Their reading and viewing was generally limited to those communities due to 
the government’s relentless surveillance and control.  
Moreover, students’ frequent street rallies for democracy offered an important 
channel for ordinary people to get information and knowledge to make sense of the 
political world, especially of wrongdoings of the regime. In addition, they served as a 
public sphere of critical, rational and passionate debates on socio-political affairs, 
focusing on the state’s oppressive policies. In this way, such alternative media as small 
pamphlets, flyers, rallying words and posters distributed in the process of the students’ 
democratisation movement extensively helped to inform many citizens of the 
illegitimacy of the ruling power and to unite for democratisation.  
It is broadly acknowledged that among a series of remarkable events in 1986 
and 1987 contributing to the rapid disintegration and the eventual collapse of the Chun 
regime in June 1987, the two most dramatic and critical blows to the political longevity 
of the Chun regime were the Sexual Interrogation Incident of July 1986 and the Park 
Jong-chol Torture Death incident of January 1987 (Bedeski, 1994;Dong, 1993). The 
first incident took place at the Puchon police station near Inchon, where a Seoul 
National University student named Kwon In-sook, who was disguising her identity32 as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 At that time there were mainly two branches within the students’ movement, one focusing on national 
democracy and unification, the other on class struggle; but there was a sole common consciousness of 
their aspiration for democracy. The students of the latter branch often took undercover work in factories, 
educating and helping labourers to organize trade unions and struggle for their interest and fair treatment. 
The Kwon incident ended in 1989 with the court’s sentence of a five-year imprisonment to the police 
interrogator and compensation for Kwon In-sook.  
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a factory worker, was sexually assaulted while undergoing police interrogation 
(KDFA). Following her courageous disclosure of the incident, a wide range of social 
movement rallies took place, criticising the sexual torture and harassment by the state.   
The second incident that helped cause the downfall of the Chun regime was 
another explosive case involving an extreme human rights violation. The death by 
torture, on 14th January 1987, of Seoul National University activist student Pak Jong-
chol, at the hands of several police interrogators, was revealed to the public by a 
Catholic priest in the middle of mass at Myungdong Cathedral in May 1987. This 
revelation was carried out following an investigation by the CPSRJ (Hwang, 2008). The 
revelation of these two brutal incidents executed by the state shocked the whole nation. 
Instantly, it became the instant ‘cause célèbre’ of the nationwide democratic movement 
which was mobilised by many members of the public, from students and intellectuals, to 
the urban poor, farmers and factory workers, until Roh Tae-woo, the leader of the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party and presidential successor hand-picked by Chun, accepted the 
citizens’ demands for democratic reforms, including direct presidential elections as well 
as press freedom (Dong, 1993, pp.87-88), and consequently initiated the Declaration of 
29 June 198733. Youm (1998, p.188) elucidates that:  
The people’s power revolution, in which the middle-class Koreans 
played a significant role in mid-1987, resulted in a series of concrete 
democratic reforms to bring Korea closer to recognizing a free press as 
being essential to its political openness. In particular, the alternative 
press were critical in challenging the government-dictated news 
reporting of the establishment media…. The “citizens’ press 
movement” of many Korean civic organizations during the 1980s 
epitomized the growing assertiveness of ordinary Koreans in forcing 
the often complacent Korean press to be aware of its supposed 
watchdog role.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For details of the Declaration, see the Appendix 1. 
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In this way, a wide range of democratic forces of all social strata – including student 
activists, dismissed journalists, and other progressive social groups – exchanged and 
shared their hopes and aspirations for democracy, and united to take them into action. 
Eventually they achieved the dramatic transition to procedural democracy in 1987 and a 
free press essential for the realisation of the full-fledged participatory democracy. In this 
process, any forms of publication in the category of ‘alternative media’, including some 
newspapers and periodicals, have been a major forum for voices from outside the ruling 
system, offering a channel for allowing dissident views on focal socio-political matters. 
Without these alternative public spheres, the 1987 democratisation may not have 
happened, since the institutional media served mainly as a faithful mouthpiece of the 
ruling power in an attempt to justify its legitimacy, while pursuing their own corporate 
interests.  
3.4. Media Landscape Reshaped in the wake of the 1987 
Democratisation (1987-1997)  
3.4.1. Institutionalised Alternative Media 
The 1987 democratisation, achieved with the people’s long-standing movement and 
sacrifice, brought about considerable changes, not least in communications such as 
extensive new freedom of speech, press, and in society more generally. In particular, it 
opened the way for the institutionalisation of alternative radical media, representatively 
Hankyoreh [One Nation] Shinmun [Daily] (Hankyoreh 34 hereafter), in which open 
criticism of state affairs took place. The 196 journalists, who had been dismissed by 
Dong-A and Chosun in 1975 and 1980, established Hankyoreh on 15th May 1988 with 
the slogan ‘the newspaper of the people, by the people’ in the name of 3,344 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  In 1996 Hankyoreh Shinmun changed its name to Hankyoreh that will be used throughout the thesis.   
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intellectuals. Hankyoreh aimed to not only realise a free and independent press from 
political and economic forces, but also enhance democratisation and the reunification of 
the two Koreas. To this end, Hankyoreh ran a nationwide fund-raising campaign that 
ordinary people could become a shareholder with 10,000KRW (10US$) at minimum 
and successfully collected the seed money of about 4.7 million US$ from 27,223 
shareholders. In order to secure editorial independence, the paper unprecedentedly 
institutionalised the election system of the editor-in-chief and the CEO by the staff, 
rather than appointment by the publisher. With a total circulation of 440,000 in June 
1989, Hankyoreh proved itself as a truly progressive, alternative newspaper to articulate 
diverse experiences and interests of citizens on a wide range of levels (e.g. urban 
labourers, farmers, students, the poor and various civic activist organizations) who had 
been systematically excluded from, and/or often misrepresented in, public spaces of 
institutional media. Moreover, Hankyoreh attempted an unprecedented news format of 
exclusively Korean characters and left-to-right printing, which made news reading 
much easier and accessible and thereby helped to increase the readership and more 
importantly contributed to democratising the public access to news information. The 
ways in which Hankyoreh facilitated news literacy as a crucial vehicle to enhance 
‘informed citizenry’ will be charted in detail in the Chapter Five ‘Ordinary People and 
OhmyNews: Reshaping the news in between the private and the public’.  
In addition, as Park, Kim and Sohn (2000, p.120) noted, Hankyoreh facilitated 
the emergence of a number of alternative media conveying progressive ideas and 
beliefs, which eventually broadened and diversified the media landscape. For example, 
a weekly current affairs magazine Sisa Journal was established in October 1989. 
Moreover, the Association of Media Labour Unions established in 1989 published the 
first issue of the Labour Unions’ Newspaper in the same year, and later renamed it 
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Media Today in 1995, which played an important role of media criticism, especially of 
the dominant media – Chosun, Joong Ang, Dong-A, KBS and MBC.   
3.4.2. Market-driven Journalism and Public Aspiration for Media Reform 
In the wake of the democratisation, in December 1987, the Periodical Registration Act 
and the Broadcasting Act replaced the 1980 Press Basic Act and therefore many 
regulatory measures were lifted to guarantee a free press. Correspondingly, the number 
of periodicals including newspapers increased rapidly and new broadcasters were set 
up: the Educational Broadcasting System (EBS) in 1990 and a new private-owned 
broadcaster Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) in 1991 (Won, 1998). Moreover, 
numerous cable television companies sprang up, including local television with the 
advance of new communication technologies like cable and satellite television.    
The surveys that the Korea Press Foundation (KPF) have conducted over the 
last 10 years in respect of the perception of audiences towards the media performance 
explicitly show the deep-rooted public disgust in the established media and politics. In 
general, most audiences considered politicians and journalists as the most influential but 
untrustworthy groups in the society. 46.0% of respondents observed journalists as 
unreliable (2002) and 79.1% pointed to politicians as untrustworthy (2008). Notably, 
the 1998 survey showed the strong public demand for media reform: 93.4% of 
respondents pointed to the back-scratching alliance between politicians and journalists 
as the most urgent area needing to be rectified.  
The public mistrust in the established press resulted from the heightened 
monopoly of information control and ownership by a handful of conservative media, 
namely Chosun, Joong Ang and Dong-A. The ‘big three’ players accounted for 75 to 80 
percent of the newspaper market share (Kim, 2002, p.10) and particularly Chosun took 
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up the largest share with nearly 2.5 million readers (2005)35. There are two sets of 
causes for the formation of this imbalanced media landscape – the media policy of the 
authoritarian governments and the market-driven media in late capitalism. As the 
authoritarian media policies were examined in detail in the previous sections, here I will 
focus on the market-driven journalism.  
After the 1987 democratisation, the surviving conservative media continued to 
expand the control of information and market share. In particular, the deregulation 
policy of civilian governments after 1993 and the fast expanding advertising industry 
alongside the growing Korean economy intensified the competition among media 
players to increase readership and subsequently advertising revenue as the main source 
of income. The year 1999 marked the fiercest competition among the three major 
newspapers. They executed various strategies to maximise advertising income. 
Representatively, they expanded the number of pages to enlarge the advertising space 
(44 to 52 pages) and solicited potential subscribers with luxurious free consumer 
products to raise the sales of newspapers. As the competition became relentless, and 
eventually resulted in a scandalous fight between sales agents of the rival newspapers, 
the Kim Dae-jung government introduced the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) 
system to make the newspaper market transparent and abate the heated competition. 
However, the government’s efforts resulted in no outcome since the three big players 
avoided providing the precise numbers of their circulation to ABC in order to make it 
easier to manipulate their circulation (2001, pp.11-12). Consequently, the increasing 
competition among the big three players reshaped the newspaper landscape toward 
more commercial-driven journalism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In general, Chosun, KBS and MBC are regarded as the leading players in the South Korean media 
industry.  
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Moreover, commercialisation and commodification of news media heightened 
by the market-driven journalism solidified the privileged position of professional 
journalists. In particular, the journalists of the mass-circulated conservative media not 
only secured high wages and access to restricted information sources such as politicians, 
high bureaucracy and Chaebols36 but also enjoyed a strong connection with those elites 
in power. Furthermore, these journalists themselves became powerful elites (Kang, 
2004b) with their own ‘self-assigned authority’ (McNair, 2000, p.79).  
Despite the Korean specificity of the structuring of the imbalanced news 
landscape between the conservative and the liberal factions, the public distrust in 
institutionalised media and politics is not Korean-specific but pandemic in most 
industrialised democracies37. In many countries, citizens are increasingly withdrawing 
from the official political arena, leaving its management to ‘the political class’, which 
Hobsbawm (1994) describes as ‘a special-interest group of professional politicians, 
journalists, lobbyists and others whose occupations ranked at the bottom of the scale of 
trustworthiness in sociological inquiries.’ Such depoliticization includes on the one hand 
the affluent, who have the private means and influence to pursue and satisfy their 
interests, and on the other, those among the majority who increasingly feel they have 
nothing to gain from participating in a game they view as rigged against them 
(Dahlgren, 1995, p.1). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Chaebol refers to the South Korean specific form of a conglomerate that is run by family members of 
the company owner. With the governmental policy for modernisation and economic development in Park 
regime (1961-1979), the Chaebol-led industrialisation accelerated the monopolistic and oligopolistic 
concentration of capital and economically profitable activities in the hands of a limited number of 
conglomerates - Chaebols. Eventually this resulted in a structural problem in the economy including non-
transparent business administration, corruption, etc.   
37 Many studies show this phenomenon as a global trend in most developed countries. For example, the 
Pew Center’s survey in the US shows American’s negative feelings about their political institutions and 
leaders (Gans, 2003, p.18). In addition, MORI opinion polls over the last 25 years demonstrate that 
journalists and politicians have been placed ‘at the bottom of professions that people trust’ (cited in Davis, 
2010, p.122). For more discussions, see David Buckingham (2000), British Social Attitude Survey (cited 
in Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2007b, p.148), Herbert Gans (2003) and Philip Meyer (1990, cited 
in Woo, 2000, p.22).  
92 	  
The Edelman firm’s recent survey (2008)38 shows that things are worsening; 
people trust their family and friends as the most credible source of information rather 
than traditional institutions and elites. In respect that the erosion of public trust in 
institutions is a universal phenomenon in the later stage of capitalism, Habermas’s 
notion of ‘legitimation crisis’39 is useful to understand this phenomenon in South Korea 
in the 1990s, although he was analysing the West in the 1970s. Habermas argues that 
the economic and political systems require legitimisation through communicative action 
– the discursive process of reaching a common understanding. In late capitalism, 
however, economic and political systems use administrative power – sanctions, money 
or power – to achieve their ends of ‘legitimation’. As a result, the communicative sphere 
(lifeworld) becomes colonized or disturbed by the market economy and political 
system, which results in the crisis of legitimacy in institutions.  
As a response to the ‘legitimation crisis’ in Korean news organisations, 
particularly in the conservative mainstream media that had been structured through 
Korean specific political backgrounds and intensified by the market-driven journalism, 
there were actual attempts from the civil society to disrupt the heavily conservative 
news landscape. In the late 1990s an abundance of civic groups were established by the 
so-called ‘386 generation40’ who had been at the forefront of the pro-democracy, anti-
government protests throughout the 1980s dictatorship. For instance, 47 civic groups 
and media-related professional associations founded the People’s Coalition for Media 
Reform on 27th August 1998 in pursuit of advancing fair, credible and balanced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The global PR firm Edelman carried out a survey among middle-class, college-educated and media-
savvy adults in 18 countries like Brazil, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the US 
(cited in Deuze, 2009, p.259).  
39  See Habermas’s discussions in his books ‘Legitimation Crisis (1975)’ and ‘The theory of 
Communicative Action, Vol I (1984)’. Also see ‘Legitimation Crisis in the Later Work of Jürgen 
Habermas’ (Heath). 
40 The term ‘386 generation’ began to be used as a journalism buzzword in the 2002 presidential election. 
It represented those who were then in their 30s, college-educated in the 1980s and born in the 1960s. 
They were also labelled the ‘1987 democratisation generation’. 
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journalism. At the practical level, the organisation conducted a wide range of activities 
– media watch projects, media education schemes in primary and secondary schools, 
promoting public access to broadcasting, and demands for the amendment of the 
Broadcasting Act and Periodical Act. Nonetheless, these efforts resulted in no definitive 
impact on the existing news media landscape.  
3.5. The ICT-boosting Policy and the Online Media Landscape (1998-
2010) 
Despite such sustained efforts, the unresolved and cumulated public distrust of 
politicians and particularly professional journalists, and the public aspiration for the 
breakdown of the imbalanced media landscape offered the socio-political rationale for 
such online alternative media as OMN to gain popularity and thrive in early 2000s. In 
addition, the easy access and availability of the advanced communication technology 
Web 1.0 and further 2.0 allowed ordinary citizens to make their voices heard publicly in 
various online public spheres. Therefore, in what follows, I will examine the role of the 
state in respect of communication technology policy, with focus on Kim Dae-jung 
government’s ICT-boosting policy which allowed the rise and prosperity of numerous 
online media such as the websites of my case studies – OMN, DC Inside, and online fan 
community.  
3.5.1. Early Adoption of the ICT and the Online Media Landscape (1998 to mid-
2000s) 
The state-led advancement of the ICT infrastructure and the nationwide spread of high 
speed Internet provided economic conditions to launch and operate online media with 
incredibly minimal budgets compared to offline media. Kim Dae-jung, who was elected 
as the first President (1998 - 2003) from the liberal democratic opposition party right 
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after the 1997 financial crisis41, strongly pushed forward a series of ICT-boosting 
projects such as Cyber Korea 21 (IPC, 1999) and Building Up e-Korea (MIC, 2001). 
The primary purposes were economic recovery and enhancement of national 
competitiveness by building up the ICT infrastructure and fostering ICT-based ventures 
(Choi and Kim, 2005;MIC, 2002). Those schemes aimed at an increase in Internet 
penetration and the speed of digital take-up at regional and socio-economic levels. With 
the launch of high-speed Internet service in 1998, the government focused on the 
nationwide supply of inexpensive personal computers, a low cost broadband 
subscription42 and narrowing the digital divide. With the budget tripled from 499.3 
billion to 1.6 trillion won (US$ 0.5billion to 1.6billion) during the period 1996 to 2002, 
the government funded ICT-based facilities and educational programmes at all levels 
from primary school to university. In addition, to reduce the digital gap between the 
haves and the have-nots, the government set up 4,937 free information centres in both 
rural and urban areas during the period 2000 to 2002, in which free Internet access and 
use, and free ICT-related courses were available (2003).  
As a result, by the time of OMN’s launch in 2000, 144 major cities nationwide 
were broadband networked and the Internet penetration rate rose to 33 percent of the 
population (13.93 million users), which was a sharp increase from 7.40 percent (3.10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The Asian financial crisis that started in Thailand in July 1997 affected many Asian countries and most 
gravely Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea. Most of the affected countries heavily relied on the export-
led industry that was largely affected by the foreign exchange rate of US dollars and foreigners’ capital 
investment in stock markets. In this light, the US Federal Reserve Bank’s raise of its currency’s interest 
rate in the early 1990s made the US a more attractive investment destination than Asian stock markets and 
eventually made Asian exports pricey thereby slowing growth down. In the wake of Asian markets’ 
downturn, moreover, Moody’s credit rating agency devalued the credit rating of South Korea from A1 to 
A3 in November 1997 and further to B2 in December. These contributed to the economic crisis 
manifested in the Korean Won’s devaluation (to 1,700 per US dollar from around 750), numerous 
companies’ bankruptcies, a credit crunch in the housing market, the falling of the stock market and the 
doubling of the national debt-to-GDP ratio (from 13% to 30%). Eventually, South Korea had to receive 
the IMF’s bailout on the condition of drastic economic reforms. These included the ‘structural adjustment 
package’ with a cutback of government spending to reduce deficits, bankruptcy of insolvent companies 
and banks and an aggressive raise of interest rates. 
42 According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Internet report of 2006, Korea’s 
Internet subscription fee per 100kbit/s was the second lowest at US$ 0.08 after Japan (ITU, 2006).  
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million) in December 1998 (MIC and NIDAK, 2005). By 2002, about 80 percent of 
households had a personal computer and the high-speed Internet penetration rate 
reached nearly 60 percent (KCC and KISA, 2010;KISA, 2002) (see table 1), which 
excluded numerous users at the Internet cafes. 
In addition to the government’s policy, there were some other factors contributing to the 
fast growth of Internet usage. Firstly, the socio-geographically dense population and 
housing had made it easier, quicker and more cost-effective to build the ICT 
infrastructure. At more than 470 people per sq km Korea is the third-most densely 
populated country in the world after Bangladesh and Taiwan. Moreover, about 42 
percent of the population lives in the Seoul metropolitan area including Gyeong-gi 
province and Incheon port. Secondly, Confucianism and the hierarchical army culture43, 
both of which give first priority of speech to a person of a higher social class and/or age, 
caused many young people to seek online space for free communication without such 
social barriers. 
The state-led growth of the Internet along with these socio-geographical and 
cultural factors accelerated the advance of online media in diverse forms. The first 
computerized news service dates back to 1986 when the financial daily Han-kook 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 This resulted from a complicated confluence of Korean history. When King Lee Sung-kye founded the 
Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910), he introduced Confucianism as a fundamental ideology to govern a newly 
unified state, which placed the king at the pinnacle of power and established a rigidly hierarchical social 
class system. In addition, the 36 years of Japanese colonization (1910-1945) and the military dictatorship 
of three decades (1961-1987) contributed to internalizing the hierarchy in the public and private spheres.  
Table 1.     
Number of Internet users and Internet penetration rate in Korea (1998-2010) 
Year 11998 
1
1999 
2
2000 
2
2001 
2
2002 
2
2003 
2
2004 
2
2005 
2
2006 
2
2007 
2
2008 
2
2009 
2
2010 
User 
(million) 
3
.1 
1
0.86 
1
9 
2
4.4 
2
6.3 
2
9.2 
3
1.6 
3
3 
3
4.9 
3
5.59 
3
6.19 
3
6.6 
3
7 
Rate (%) 7.4 
2
5.8 
4
4.7 
5
6.6 
5
9.4 
6
5.5 
7
0.2 
7
2.8 
7
4.1 
7
5.5 
7
6.5 
7
7.2 
7
7.8 
Source: The Survey of the Internet Use, 
KCC & KISA (2010) 
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Economy provided news by Personal Computer communication. However, the access 
and use of PC service was limited to a small number of early adopters. In the late 1990s, 
along with the fast implementation of high-speed Internet service, online news media 
grew rapidly. In March 1995, one of the three major newspapers Joong Ang initiated an 
Internet news service Joins.com. Soon thereafter Chosun (Digital Chosun, October 
1995), Hankyoreh (Internet Hankyoreh, April 1996), and Dong-A (Dong-A.com, June 
1996) launched their online news websites. In the following years, most national and 
local newspapers began online news services. Even so, most online news websites were 
merely the online version of the paper’s news content.  
Unlike the redundant edition of mainstream online news service, various unique 
forms of webzines and independent online newspapers flourished by the time of OMN’s 
launch. For example, Daejabo44 (www.jabo.co.kr) was established in January 1999 by a 
small number of ‘media reformists’ who used to write progressive opinions on the PC 
online forums like Hitel, Cheonlian, Nownuri, etc (Oh, 2005). In pursuit of facilitating 
media reform, the founding members wrote most of the news contents themselves. Later 
it became a prototype for a political website Seoprise (www.seoprise.com). It was 
launched on 15th October 2002 by seven columnists who had become famous by writing 
political critiques on the PC online forums (Kim, 2002). As a primary purpose, Seoprise 
announced their strong support for Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002 presidential election and 
therefore served as a public forum mainly for the Roh supporters, rather than embracing 
people having different political dispositions in a broader and more inclusive sense. In 
addition to such politically oriented dailies, online newspapers focusing on a specific 
topic like money and investment, ICT technology, etc were burgeoning, for example, 
Moneytoday (www.moneytoday.co.kr, January 2000), INews24 (www.inews24.com, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 In April 2003, it renamed to Breaknews (www.breaknews.com) and in October 2005, it began a daily 
news service.  
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March 2000), eDaily (www.edaily.co.kr, March 2000) and EBnews (www.ebn.co.kr, 
March 2000). Pressian, launched in September 2001, pursued in-depth and investigative 
news rather than breaking news. For this, professional journalists, who had many years 
working experience in mainstream media, wrote most articles and sometimes, 
depending on the nature of the topic, external experts provided the content. The 
readership was limited to a small number of target audiences such as journalists, 
bureaucrats, educationalists, scholars and entrepreneurs. Later, on 28th October 2002, 
Ewincom, Joseilbo, Dailypharm (www.dreamdrug.com), Pressian (www.pressian.com) 
and OMN set up the Korean Association for the Internet Newspapers (Cho, 2002).   
What stood out among a host of webzines launched during the early years of the 
ICT-based media was Ddanzi Ilbo (www.ddanzi.com). Its extraordinary way of 
skewering corrupt society, the pretentious reverence and seriousness of politicians and 
particularly the conservative journalism of Chosun Ilbo via its main weapon of 
blistering remarks, satire, vulgar and swearing language and twits drew enormous 
attention from young readers. In particular, office workers in their thirties consisted of 
two thirds of its rapidly growing readership (Lee, 1998). Within a month of its launch 
on 4th July 1998, it had recorded over 130,000 hits and within a year, this had reached 
over 10 million with a daily average of 50,000 hits. Unfortunately, Ddanzi Ilbo could 
not substantiate its popularity as a daily newspaper to fit its title ‘Ilbo’ [daily]. As the 
CEO Kim Uh-joon admitted, he did not have a long-term business plan to make 
sustainable revenues even after registering it as a corporation with 24 staff and 1.2 
billion won in 2000 (BizSeoul.net;Oh, 2005, p.88;Roh, 2000). Moreover, most of its 
content was parodied articles that demanded pre-reading of newspaper articles in order 
to understand the underlying twisted meaning. This eventually decreased its readership 
to a limited number of loyal readers.  
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Its novelty gradually waned but facilitated the boom of hybrid, entertainment-
based genres in online spaces. For instance, fake newspapers Mang-Chi Ilbo 
(http://www.hammer.co.kr) and Galdo Ilbo (http://www.galdo.co.kr), parody web-
casting sites like XNews (http://www.xnews.co.kr) that provided altered flash 
animations with satirical commentary on current affairs or flash games to hit corrupt 
politicians with a pair of slippers, and other spoofs that circulated on the Internet. With 
the availability and accessibility of advanced ICTs that made the creation of user-
generated content (UGC)45 much easier and virally spread across varying online spaces, 
there was a huge boom of political satire during the President Impeachment in 2004, 
particularly in such websites as DC Inside and Liveis.com. In particular, DC Inside 
needs more attention in that netizens not only posted their own parodied works relating 
to the political event but also formed online public spheres in the process of exchanging 
thoughts and feelings aligned with those political parodies, which offered me a rationale 
for choosing DC Inside as one of my case studies. There appeared infotainment media 
on the Internet, whose main focus was on fun and entertainment but still provided news 
and current affairs content at the same time. Representatively, the entertainment portal 
website Pullbbang.com (www.pullbbang.com) was launched in 2005 and Pandora.tv 
(www.pandora.tv) began its service from October 2004.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  The term is often used with the user-created or citizen-generated contents, which users can easily 
produce and upload by Web 2.0 technology. Web 2.0 Technology makes it much easier to interact and 
collaborate in producing and sharing information. In comparison with Web 1.0 as the information source, 
Web 2.0 is the platform for collaborative participation. 
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3.5.2. The Reshaping of the Online Media Landscape (mid-2000s to 2010) 
Along with the growing appeal of infotainment websites to netizens, particularly young 
people, the remarkable change in the online media landscape took place. OMN’s 
remarkable influence and readership heightened through the 2002 election have 
weakened since 2006. According to the Sisa Journal survey, its ranking dropped down 
to eighth in 2006 and 2007, ninth in 2008 and has remained outside the top ten since 
2009. This decline has resulted from several reasons, which tell a lot of stories of how 
the online news media landscape was reshaped. They are the waning of OMN’s novelty 
due to other media’s adoption, the rise of new forms of media having similar features, 
and the changing pattern of news production and consumption particularly among 
young people.  
Firstly, the emergence of portal websites as news outlet has significantly 
reshaped the news media landscape since 2006. In 2003, the major Internet portals 
Daum and Naver46 launched full-scale news services to offer around 7,000 news articles 
a day that were provided by over 70 news outlets and content providers. The news 
articles are placed according to the portals’ editorial teams. In addition, they provide 
online forums in which users are allowed to post life stories, photos or petitions and 
commentaries, all of which were regarded as the novelty of OMN’s distinctive 
features47. Notably, Daum’s online space Agora played an important role in raising 
public issues and mobilising protests in the 2008 anti-US beef protest. According to a 
Sisa Journal survey, these Internet portals entered the top ten of the most influential 
news media in 2006 and continued to sustain their influence. 2008 was a landmark year 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Statistics show that 76 percent of whole population over 7 years old use the Internet and 97 percent of 
them use those portal websites as of 2008 (JoongAng, 2008). 
47  The detailed examination of distinguishing features of OMN’s citizen journalism is charted in Chapter 
Five ‘Ordinary People and OMN’.  
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that the portals ruptured the rigid news landscape shaped by the five mainstream media 
(i.e. KBS, Chosun, MBC, Joong Ang and Dong A) with Naver taking fourth place and 
Daum the sixth (Ahn, 2009). This was when OMN was driven out to tenth place. The 
portals’ successful positioning as influential news media partially resulted from users’ 
changing pattern of news consumption due to the increased availability and convenience 
of the news services.  
Secondly, young people’s way of news consumption and production has 
shifted. In general, they tend to use news at the infotainment websites based on the 
UGC, rather than news media websites. Moreover, they prefer to take the full control of 
the content from production to distribution. Thus, they run self-organised/controlled 
media such as personal blogs, or post contents on blog-aggregation websites. These 
patterns were confirmed in my interviews about political interest and online news 
consumption with citizen journalists in their 20s who participated in the 2007 OMN 
International Citizen Journalist Forum. Their most visited websites were the UGC-
aggregated websites with focus on fun such as Pandora TV, Media Mob or Daum 
Bloggers. During times of few particularly volatile political events, news websites like 
OMN and Pressian were not as attractive to young people unless they were highly 
politically aware and interested. Interestingly, the interviewees pointed out that they had 
distrust and cynicism in traditional politics but it did not necessarily mean they were 
indifferent to the socio-political issues they emphasised. As evidence, they recalled their 
participation in the 2002 memorial vigil rally of two middle-school girls and the 2004 
anti-impeachment protest. Strikingly, this tendency was clearly reaffirmed in the 2008 
anti-US beef protest, in which a personal blogger’s UGC of the rally, webcasted at the 
newly emergent UGC-aggregated website Afreeca, played an important role in 
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mobilising protesters in a short time and served as ‘news source organisations for the 
dominant media’ (Dahlgren, 1991, p.14;Nip, 2009, p.97) such as MBC48. 
Thirdly, the re-emergence of SNS communication has also influenced the way 
of news consumption. Since 28th November 2009, when the smartphone was launched 
in Korea, the fast adoption 49  and the heightened immediacy and accessibility of 
interactive communication facilitated the use of SNS such as Twitter and Facebook50. 
Moreover, the government’s intensified crackdown51 of online political content since the 
2008 anti-US beef protest contributed to the increasing use of the foreign SNS which 
the domestic law, such as the Internet Real-name Act, is not subject to. The intensified 
real-name system was executed by the KCC from January 2009, extending the affected 
websites to the ones of over 100,000 users, requiring users to register with their real 
name matching their National ID number when posting contents on a bulletin board. 
Accordingly, the use of domestic Twitter has rapidly grown since 2009. The click rate 
per day was 780,000 in September 2009 and increased to 6.40million in October 2010 
(Lee, 2010, p.2). Thus, news is increasingly consumed and reproduced/recycled through 
tweeting and re-tweeting in social networks. In the process of news tweeting and re-
tweeting, a user’s social influence is indicated by the number of followers and plays a 
role in agenda setting of a particular issue. In this way, the user plays the role of 
gatekeeper by screening news values to some extent.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The anti-US beef protest and the role of new forms of media, specifically Afreeca, in its mobilisation is 
examined in the section ‘7.2.2. Candlelit Vigil Spreads Nationwide Like Wildfire’ of Chapter Seven ‘The 
Paradox of Fandom: The politicising of teen fans of the pop band TVXQ’.  
49 The number of early adopters was only 1% (47,000) of the South Korean population in 2009. However, 
the number of users grew rapidly: 10 million in March 2011 and 58% of the population within 3 years of 
its launch (Chung, 2011;Park, 2012a).  
50 The most visited domestic SNS Cyworld (http://www.cyworld.com) has been losing the popularity 
since 2001 and the adoption of the Internet portals’ SNS Yozm and Me2day has stagnated (Lee, 2010).   
51  The Lee Myung-bak government’s Internet censorship is detailed in the section ‘7.3. Revived 
Censorship’ in Chapter Seven.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
How the state implements various kinds of media policies has shaped the media 
landscape to a greater extent. In a strong government, especially of the military 
authoritarian rule, the degree of the freedom of speech and expression was largely 
limited and the media were forcibly and/or voluntarily mobilised to serve the ruling 
ideology of the sate. As shown by the effect of the strong coercive and appeasement 
media policies executed by the Park and Chun government, the surviving media from 
the relentless censorship received considerable financial rewards from the state in return 
for their cooperation. Democratic forces of the critical media repressed by the 
authoritarian state transformed into clandestine forms of alternative media like the 
underground magazine Mahl under the military rule. With greatly extended press 
freedom in the wake of the 1987 democratisation and the rapid growth of South Korean 
economy, the surviving conservative media expanded to the media conglomerates by 
increasing their market share in media and thereby the advertising industry. And those 
media, which had maintained strong connections with inner political circles of the 
conservative party under the authoritarian era through having their previous journalists 
in ministerial positions, had rendered strong influence on public opinion, especially in 
the elections, playing as king makers. In response to the dominant media’s 
concentration on market-driven journalism and the imbalanced media landscape, 
democratic forces such as dissident journalists, citizens, civic groups and intellectuals 
collaborated to generate various alternative media, representatively Hankyoreh. 
However, in such circumstances where the size of a media economy considerably 
impinges on its influence on the formation of public opinion, it was nearly 
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unimaginable for small-circulated media like Hankyoreh to rupture the imbalanced 
media landscape.  
In this regard, the general access and affordability of the ICTs facilitated by the 
civilian Kim Dae-jung government opened up great opportunities for democratic forces. 
On the one hand, it substantially enabled small-sized alternative media to set up at low 
cost. On the other hand, the sustained public demands and aspirations for alternative, 
diverse public spheres offered a rationale for the emergence and the prosperity of 
various forms of online media and communications such as OMN, DC Inside and online 
communities of personal tastes and concerns like fan community Yuaerubi. 
Consequently, in such hybrid media genres (spaces), afforded by these newly emergent 
and rapidly mature online media environments, the ways and contexts in which the 
private connects and translates to the public are central to the thesis.   
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4. Methodology 
This chapter begins by illustrating an overall approach to the study and research 
questions, and then moves on to a more detailed account of the main method and 
secondary sources that inform the analysis, if any, in accordance with each case study. 
Ethical issues that I encountered in the process of the research will be discussed in a 
reflexive account, especially in respect of the interviews of teenaged fans.  
4.1. Overall Research Design and Research Questions 
To reconceptualise the relationships between the private and the public through 
identifying complicated mediating contexts and processes in which the private shifts to 
the public, I posed research questions in alignment with three key themes – the 
communicative mode of hybrid media, affect (emotion) and politicisation (the formation 
of publics). The research questions comprise three parts:   
1. In what context do media offer a discursive space to connect people’s 
everyday lives to the public world as well as to recruit and sustain political 
interest?  
2. How does affect play a critical part in making sense of the public world and 
mobilising political participation? 
3. In what ways do private individuals come to shape publics? 
These questions are examined in the context of ICT-based media environments and in 
relation to three empirical studies. Firstly, I will examine OhmyNews – a global icon of 
citizen journalism – in which the “feminised” news produced by citizens re-
contextualised private interests into public concerns, and allowed the public to make a 
real change in the 2002 Presidential election and the 2010 local elections in South 
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Korea. Secondly, I will explore online political satire, in which politics is situated in an 
entertainment mode through citizens’ creative reinterpretation, and which helped 
mobilise citizens’ political interest and action during the 2004 Presidential impeachment 
and general election. Thirdly, I will analyse the politicisation of teen fandom, in which 
music fans were mobilised as political actors in the 2008 anti-US beef protest. I set out 
sub-research questions under each empirical study that will be discussed in alignment 
with research methods in the later section.     
In a broad sense, the epistemological position in this research is in the 
interpretative research tradition. Interpretative approach is ‘predicated upon the view 
that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of 
the natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective 
meaning of social action’ as Bryman (2008, p.13) explained.  
For the research, multiple methods were utilized. First, I used an ethnographic 
design and approach in order to articulate social acts in the context of the everyday 
through the people’s own narratives, although my approach lacked features of 
ethnography in the sense used in anthropology. This demands an ‘ethnographic gaze’ 
(Machin, 2002, p.3, 5, 129), which involves data collecting and presenting in a way that 
the relevant details are reassembled in a sense of the people’s culture and experience, 
e.g. teen fans’ politicization. This research is not intended to generalise but to offer a 
better understanding of and insight to the way of the people’s behaviour in a particular 
context (van Zoonen, 1994, pp.130-139).         
While having employed ethnographic approaches such as participant 
observation and interviews, I have also undertaken other multiple techniques such as 
interpretive textual analysis and basic content analysis to gather data for textual analysis.  
The textual analysis was carried out in order to identify media discourse and conduct an 
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examination of online communication of OMN and Daum Agora as well as teen fans’ 
online communication. In the sense that the (mass) media are ‘the site of a complex 
symbolic contest over which interpretation will prevail’ (Gamson, 1992, p.xii), the 
theme categorised by textual analysis presents useful information about how the media 
frame a particular issue, or/and of how netizens’ discourse was formed around the issue. 
In addition to the analysis of text as a central data, the study attempted to consider the 
socio-political contexts in which the texts have been produced. In the following section, 
I will delineate the details of the ways in which the sub-questions of each empirical 
study were examined.  
4.2. Research Questions and Method Designs Chapter by Chapter 
4.2.1. Chapter Five ‘Ordinary People and OhmyNews: Reshaping the news in 
between the private and the public’ 
This chapter aims to examine the ways in which OMN’s citizen journalism (re-) 
contextualised private interests to the public concern, and (re-)mediated private citizens 
to the political world so as to allow the public to make a real change in the 2002 
presidential election and the 2010 local election. Therefore, I posed sub-research 
questions as below:  
1. What are the distinguishing features of OMN’s citizen journalism? In what 
ways do these features challenge the existing norms of traditional 
journalism? And what implications do those challenges offer to the 
supposedly fixed relationship between the public (the serious/the political) 
and the private (non-serious/the personal)?  
2. In what ways did OMN mediate private individuals to the public concern and 
form the public sphere in the 2002 presidential election?  
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3. In what ways did new communicative possibilities afforded by new media 
such as OMN and Daum Agora contribute to the unexpected result of the 
Cheonan sinking and the 2010 local election, in comparison with the 
dominant traditional media Chosun?  
Multiple methods were utilised for the analysis of OMN’s citizen journalism. For a 
better understanding, the methods used in the chapter will be mapped out in accordance 
with the research question. First of all, extensive but not exhaustive review of domestic 
and overseas literature was carried out from both academia and newspapers with focus 
on the OMN citizen journalism. For the examination of the research questions 1 and 2 
as indicated above, the date for the data collection focused on the period of the launch 
of OMN to the OMN’s reasonably sustainable influence in the media market, that is 
22nd February 2000 to 31st December 2007. The reason for the chosen date was that the 
quantity of relevant articles to focus on OMN’s citizen journalism was rapidly 
decreasing and there was not much new information since. OMN’s remarkable 
influence52, that had maintained ranking sixth for 3 years from 2003, fast dwindled to 
ninth in 2008 and has remained outside the top ten since 2009. For the data collection of 
domestic newspaper articles, KINDS (Korea Integrated Newspaper Data System)53 was 
used with the search word “OhmyNews” for the 10 general-circulation newspaper 
articles. An initial full-text search yielded 2,041 articles. To collect more useful articles 
closely relevant to the OMN citizen journalism, I conducted a further search within the 
initial search result with the search word “citizen”, which produced 507 articles. After 
eliminating unrelated or duplicate items in particular respect of the content, 49 articles, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The OMN’s changing popularity and influence in terms of the public opinion formation and its factors 
are delineated in the sections ‘5.4.2.1. Entering the mainstream’ in Chapter Five ‘Ordinary People and 
OhmyNews’, and Chapter Three ‘Mapping out the South Korean Media Landscape: In relation to the role 
of the state’.  
53 The Korea Press Foundation (KPF) operates KINDS and its URL is http://www.kinds.or.kr. 
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which informed the analysis of the research questions 1 and 2, were eventually collected. 
A close reading of the full-text of the articles produced 4 main themes: operational 
system of the OMN citizen journalism; the emergence and success of OMN as news 
outlet; tension between OMN and the dominant media; and globalisation of OMN’s 
citizen journalism. Along with the close examination of the OMN website, this 
information was referred to the section ‘5.3 OMN’s Citizen Journalism’ which responds 
to the research question 1.  
Also regarding the research question 1, I conducted an email interview with the 
editor-in-chief Kim Hee-sun. The interview focused on the status of OMN’s readership, 
the demography of the citizen journalists, the standards and procedures of placing 
citizen journalists’ articles, the source of revenue, the citizen journalists’ editorial 
committee system, and voluntary subscription payment system. To ensure the 
information provided was sufficient, several follow-up email interviews were conducted 
from 27th to 30th April 2007. By and large, the interview outcome was referred to the 
section ‘5.3. OMN’s Citizen Journalism’. In addition, a face-to-face interview with the 
CEO and founder of OMN, Oh Yeon-ho, was carried out on 28th June 2007 during the 
2007 OMN’s International Citizen Journalists’ Forum. The interview questions focused 
on the key notion of operational philosophy, OMN’s further plan to sustain and improve 
citizen journalism and readership, and whether there was any strategic plan to deliver 
the 2007 Presidential election. The interview was taped and transcribed later for 
analysis. The interview result was referred to the section ‘5.3.1. Citizens’ News 
Production in Cooperation with Professional Journalists’ of the chapter. 
In particular respect of the ways in which OMN’s feminised news enables the 
public connection between the private (the personal and private concern of ordinary 
people) and the public (the political and public matter), I selected two articles of the 
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citizen journalist Kim Hye-won. There were two reasons for choosing Kim’s articles. 
Firstly, Kim has prominence as a citizen journalist – she was selected as one of the 68 
best citizen journalists who wrote over 100 main top stories or over 1,000 news stories 
from 22nd February 2000 up to 31st December 2013. Out of 6 female citizen journalists 
including 2 overseas correspondents who register as best citizen journalists, Kim 
received numerous awards for her news stories. For example, the article “I wished we 
could have lived like a wood-seller and a nymph in a fairy tale” received the highest 
manuscript fee from the readers in 2005, which reached 17million KRW (15,000US$). 
She was also chosen as one of the 15 important figures representing Time magazine’s 
People of the Year in 2006. Secondly, Kim’s prominence in news production of OMN’s 
citizen journalism has significance for this study because her biography, especially as 
the homemaker-Adjumma, substantially represents “ordinary people” whose opinions 
are typically depreciated or/and unreported in the traditional media in sharp contrast to 
“experts” and power elites. Since April 2003, she has written over 500 articles including 
over 100 main top stories from her lived perspectives as a homemaker and Adjumma, 
daughter or local community member. Her 100-plus articles in particular shed light on 
the redefinition of homemaker-Adjumma. In Korean context, homemakers, the staying-
home housewives in particular, are socially deprecated selves insofar as they are often 
called “so-and-so’s mother” or “so-and-so’s wife”, whereas their familial roles as caring 
wife or ‘professional mother’ – as ‘a systematically personalized, educational 
coordinator’ of their children, specifically in the case of educated middle-class mothers 
(Kim, 2006b) – are appreciated within the family relations. Moreover, Adjumma, as a 
particular collective of married women in their 20s to 60s including homemakers 
with/out work (Choi, Kim and Kim, 1999, p.56), carries a socially embedded, 
deprecating stereotype: “unwomanly” strong and aggressive, insensitive and thick-
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faced, inelegant and unfashionable, socially unconscious and shamelessly brave to the 
family ends (Choi, Kim and Kim, 1999, 2001;Kim Cho, 2012). In particular this 
negative image is usually concentrated on the middle-aged Adjumma, which has 
discrepancy from their own self-image (Kim, Sung and Kim, 1999). In this light, her 2 
articles were selected. The first article “Do not ignore the real power of Bundang city, 
the Apron Troops of Adjumma” was chosen for the analysis of how “feminised” news 
of OMN served to actualise democratic potential of the media, which was to contribute 
to the re-conceptualisation of marginalised social groups. The second article “I wished 
we could have lived like a wood-seller and a nymph in a fairy tale” was chosen in order 
to examine how a private matter can transform into the public concern through 
instantiated and affective personal stories. Along with Kim’s exemplary articles, Joo 
Kyung-shim’s article “I felt sorry for my middle-aged husband” was selected to explore 
how OMN’s distinctive writing style of self-storytelling, frank narrative grounded in the 
author’s lived experience engages readers to the news story.  
In order to investigate the research question 2, I conducted textual analysis to 
compare OMN and the largest-circulated traditional newspaper Chosun in respect of 
how the then political outsider Roh Moo-hyun, who became the president-elect in 2002, 
was portrayed. I chose two crucial events: the presidential candidate election of the 
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) through which Roh Moo-hyun was elected as the 
official candidate of MDP; and Chung Mong-jun’s (the presidential candidate of the 
People’s Uri 21 Party) cancellation of a single candidacy with Roh one day before the 
presidential election. In the case of the MDP primary, I analysed news articles that 
appeared on the last day of the primary and the following day (27th and 28th April). I 
chose the day as the significant moment for framing Roh’s image as the official MDP 
candidate, which would direct the later images of Roh. An initial search generated 12 
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articles of Chosun and 16 articles of OMN. After removing unrelated articles, the final 
sample for the analysis was 8 articles of Chosun and 11 articles of OMN. The textual 
analysis of the sample articles created these themes: impatient, political novice 
constructed by Chosun; and clean, progressive reformist and warm-hearted human 
rights activist by OMN.   
For the analysis of research question 3 – relating to the Cheonan sinking and 
alternative, emotion-charged response (yet layered with the ordinary citizens’ 
rationality) – the discourses of Chosun, OMN and Daum Agora were compared. I 
selected citizen journalist Hong Ji-deuk’s article and readers’ commentaries to examine 
how citizens contextualised the Cheonan sinking and the 2010 election from the view of 
ordinary people by means of news production, which formed a counter-discourse of the 
official discourse forged through the governmental authority and the mainstream media, 
representatively Chosun. The reason for the choice of Hong’s stories was that he had 
prominence in terms of the public presence of ordinary people’s viewpoints and feelings 
since his analysed article was on the main top and received 16,185 points from the 
readers as a good article, ranking 16th in 2010.  
4.2.1.1. Secondary sources that inform the analysis 
The participant observation of Nosamo54 [People who love Roh Moo-hyun] was carried 
out for the short period of May 2002. In mid-April 2002, I signed up for a Nosamo 
membership of the Seoul community at the website (http://www.nosamo.org) and I 
attended offline meetings several times. The meetings took place casually, often in a 
small pub. Normally the participants introduced one another as a member and often 
took his/her friends or new members along. The participants had dinner with some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 ‘No’ means Roh of Roh Moo-hyun, ‘sa’ means love and ‘mo’ is the first letter of ‘mo-im’ in Korean, 
meaning community. Nosamo should have been named Rohsamo but the community has used Nosamo in 
English and thus Nosamo will be used in the chapter. 
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drinks and talked freely on any subject including how to support Roh and his visions for 
the nation, as well as private matters. As a researcher, I strived to observe an objective 
perspective in the process of this participant observation of Nosamo.  
OMN held the International Citizen Journalists’ Forum from 2005 to 2008. I 
registered as a citizen reporter of OMN in 2004. I had already been a reader member 
from 2002. Therefore, it was a simple procedure to be entitled a citizen journalist by 
providing personal details such as real name, national ID number55 (if applicable), a 
telephone number, an email address, job position, home/office address and the like. I 
participated in the 2007 and 2008 OMN’s International Citizen Journalists’ Forums as a 
citizen journalist. The number of citizen journalist delegates at the Forum was 150 on 
average. To obtain the place as a delegate, citizen journalists sent applications with a 
statement of main motive for participation via email. Then the editorial team sent the 
notice of whether or not an applicantion was accepted. The standards for the selection 
were the extent of citizen journalists’ contribution and the reason for attendance.  
Participating in the forum as a citizen journalist helped to collect relevant 
materials for the discussion of citizen journalism of OMN and in general. Moreover, 
another benefit for participating in the Forum was that a round-table talk was conducted 
with 5 citizen journalists in their 20s who attended the Forum on 27th June 2007. The 
key question was about their pattern of news consumption – how and where they used 
news on- and off-line. The result of the open-ended form of interview refers to the 
section of changing online news landscape in Chapter Three of the South Korean media 
landscape.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This is obliged by the law ‘Internet Real-name Act’ that came into effect in July 2007 and has become 
more austere since January 2009 after the 2008 anti-US Beef protest. The law stipulates that any Internet 
organisations of over 100,000 members should ensure that any content in their sites should be posted after 
verifying the uploaders’ identification (i.e. the real names and national ID numbers) although the content 
can be shown with a user name. OhmyNews shows citizen reporters’ real names when they submit 
articles to ensure transparency.   
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4.2.2. Chapter Six ‘Online Political Satire: Placing affect and entertainment in 
politics’ 
Firstly, I examined the relationship between the freedom of speech and the development 
of Korean political satire in diverse forms of media from 1961 to the early 2000s. In so 
doing, I explored how political satire opens up a discursive space through facilitating 
various forms of talks – informal or formal – among participants and engaged people to 
the political world.  
To do this, I examined relevant articles ranging from newspaper archives and 
scholarly writings to internet-based articles through using KINDS with the keywords 
“political satire” or “political parody”.  
Secondly, I analysed online political satire focused around the 2004 President 
Impeachment bill and the 17th general election. For this, I chose the three most viewed 
online satire artworks: Tanhaek – Flying Ruinous National Flag, Memory of Tanhaek 
and Water is Self-served.   
On 12th March 2004, when the President Impeachment bill was passed in the 
parliament, the Internet was flooded with various forms of political communication. 
According to a survey conducted by the website analysis company Metrix 
(http://www.metrixcorp.com), the traffic frequency of the internet press OMN, Pressian 
and Ddanji Ilbo increased by 100% over the previous week. In addition, the page view 
of politics-related websites like the portal website Naver’s general election site 
increased by 1.8 times in March over  the previous month (Kang, 2004a). And the 17th 
general election was drawing nearer, the theme of online political satire was refocused 
from the Impeachment to the general election.  
During the anti-Impeachment protest, DC Inside (http://www.dcinside.com) 
was at the heart of the online political satire boom at that time. DC Inside is a laptop-
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related contents provider at the portal website Hitel, which was launched in July 1999. 
In 2000, Hitel’s CEO Kim Yu-shik launched Digital Inside which was renamed DC 
Inside later. At an early stage of its development, the majority of parodied artworks 
were dealing with popular film posters of celebrities or pictures of pet animals that were 
parodied, far from the political world (Lee, 2004). In late 2003, when the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office’s investigation of the GNP’s acceptance of illegal funds from 
business people became a heated public issue, DC Inside came to serve as a public 
space for political parody. Most politics-related parodied artworks were concentrated in 
DC Inside and distributed virally into a wider range of personal blogs, portal websites, 
online communities and the like. Moreover, in the period of the President Impeachment 
rally and the general election, its members launched an offline campaign for the 
promotion of voting. On 19th March 2004, the number of its daily users reached 
between 350,000 to 400,000 (Kim, 2004).  
Moreover, I examined the ways in which the recurring casual conversation 
stimulates political activities such as online communication to encourage voting in the 
17th general election. For this, I examined both the online communication and offline 
campaign actions of DC Inside members in terms of the Impeachment and the general 
election. 
 
4.2.3. Chapter Seven ‘The Paradox of Fandom: The politicising of teen fans of the 
pop band TVXQ’ 
In order to identify the context and the process of the TVXQ teen fans’ politicisation in 
the 2008 anti-US beef vigil rally, my research questions in the chapter focus on:   
1. The view of the teen fans’ political participation through which the concept of fans 
can be reconstructed:  
115 	  
1.1. How did the media shape the teen fans’ political involvement in the 2008 anti-
US beef candlelit vigil rally?  
1.2. How did the fans see themselves and their political activism?   
2. The way that the teen fans related to their pop stars in the everyday and within their 
political activism in particular:  
2.1. What did the stars mean in the fans’ everyday lives?  
2.2. Did the fans’ cultural, emotional engagement with the stars relate to their 
political participation? If so, how and in what context?  
3. The role of emotions in the process of the teen fans’ politicisation: 
3.1. What kinds of emotions were identified that would play out to mobilise teen 
fans’ political interest and action? And in what ways and roles?  
Methodologies used in this chapter will be detailed in relation to each research question. 
In order to investigate the research question 1.1, I examined 10 Korean general-
circulation newspaper articles published between 3rd and 23rd May 2008. 10 national 
newspapers include Chosun, Joong Ang, Dong-A, Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang, Hankook 
Ilbo, Kookmin Daily, Munhwa Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun and Sekye Times in order of 
circulation. The first three conservative newspapers have dominated 75% of the market 
share and still enormously affect the public opinion despite their weakened influence 
under the internet-based media environment. To identify items for analysis, I used the 
KINDS Korean newspapers database and the Chosun and Joong Ang websites since 
these two newspapers articles were not serviced by the KINDS. I selected this time 
frame because 3rd May was the day following the first anti-US beef candlelit vigil rally 
and 24th May was when protesters began occupying the road, the riot police cracked 
down and the teenaged student participants were apparently replaced with adults 
including university students, and thereby the number of articles related to ‘teen(-fan)s’ 
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political activism’ decreased noticeably. An initial full-text search using the key words 
‘candlelit vigil rally’ and ‘fan’ yielded 9 articles only with 0 article of Chosun, Joong 
Ang and Dong-A. Another search using the key words ‘mad cow disease’ and ‘fan’ 
yielded 19 articles. In order to obtain a fair number of articles for analysis, I used the 
extensive key words ‘mad cow disease’ and ‘adolescent’, which yielded 112 articles 
containing previous search results. However, the phrase was mentioned in ways 
unrelated to the teen(-fan) activism and the 112 articles contained duplicate items. To 
ensure that the articles in my sample represent a view of the teen participants in the 
candlelit vigil rally, I conducted a close reading of the full-text of the articles and 
eliminated the duplicate and irrelevant items from the study. Eventually I examined the 
final sample of 54 articles using interpretive textual analysis.  
A close reading of the news articles enabled me to identify 6 themes related to      
teen(-fan) participation in the anti-US beef protest.  
Table 2. Themes in teens’ anti-US beef protest news 
 
 
Theme 
Number of 
articles in 
which theme 
appears 
Teen protesters influenced by celebrities 
Reason for teens’ protest 
Teen protesters swayed by Internet rumours of mad cow disease 
Teen protesters instigated by leftists and anti-Americans 
Need of surveillance and guidance of teen participants 
Praise of teens’ political participation 
11 
11 
10 
8 
8 
6 
 
These thematic threads were woven together into two central discourses of teen(-fan) 
protesters as conveyed by 10 Korean national newspapers: (1) emotional crowds; and 
(2) rational political actors.   
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In order to examine whether, how, and in what context teen fans’ cultural, 
affective engagement with their stars shifted into political participation (as expounded 
in the research questions 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, and 3.1), I conducted interviews with the TVXQ 
teen fans of online fan community Yuaerubi (http://cafe.faum.net/soul48). The reason 
that I selected TVXQ over other K-pop bands such as Shinhwa, Super Junior, SS501, 
Wonder Girls and Big Bang, whose fan members were also known to participate 
actively in the protest, was that TVXQ had the largest number of fans at 800,000. In 
addition, I chose Yuaerubi among many TVXQ online fan communities including Dong 
Ne Bang Ne and Icadong because Yuaerubi, established in December 2003, had the 
biggest fan members estimated at 818,047 as of January 2009 and was known to retain 
the largest number of teenaged fan members. Dong Ne Bang Ne consisted of women in 
their 20s and 30s, and Icadong56 in their 20s mainly. In this light, the TVXQ online fan 
community Yuaerubi would offer a greater sample of teen fans that participated in the 
protest.   
To carry out interviews with the Yuaerubi teen members, I used an 
ethnographic design and approach. In spite of lacking features of ethnography in the 
sense used in anthropology, my ethnography with focus on the teen fans is best suited to 
articulate the teen fans’ politicisation in the context of their everyday lives through their 
own narratives, which calls for an ‘ethnographic gaze’ (Machin, 2002, p.3, 5, 129). The 
ethnographic gaze involves collecting and presenting data in a way that the relevant 
details are reassembled in a sense of the teen fans’ culture and experience. Moreover, 
this research is not intended to generalise but to offer a better understanding of and 
insight into the way that teen fandom relates to their political participation and that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Icadong (http://cafe.daum.net/20cassio) members raised £1,660 to provide protesters with food, drinks 
and other necessities in the course of the rallies.  
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specific emotion plays a particular role in the process of the teen fans’ politicisation in 
Korean context of the 2008 anti-US beef protest.  
To gain access to Yuaerubi, where I could get teen fans of TVXQ to 
communicate with me and get a sense of their online fan culture and communication, I 
applied to become a Yuaerubi member. In theory, Yuaerubi is an open community but 
in practice only a limited range of postings, mainly notifications or the publicised media 
news of TVXQ are available publicly. Only with a full membership is reading or 
writing a post or access to another member allowed. Therefore, in order to get a full 
membership, I had posted an application on the bulletin board, which was processed by 
the operating committee (usually done on the first day of each month). With the full 
membership, I first examined Yuaerubi online communication, which included the key 
words ‘candlelit vigil rally’ and ‘mad cow disease’ from 1st May to 31st December 2008 
in order to get a sense of the flow of communications related to the anti-US beef import 
and mad cow disease. The total number was 213 postings. From 1st to 6th May, at the 
early stage of the protest, there were around 10 to 15 postings per day on average and a 
few postings until late July and over 20 postings on the candlelit vigil rally of 31st 
December. Moreover, I selected the popular teen writer Canta’s fan fiction “Happy 
Days” in order to make sense of the way in which teen fans related TVXQ to the topical 
issue. I chose this fan-created artifact because it was posted on 1st May, one day before 
the beginning of the protest, and among relevant postings it recorded the largest number 
of page views (300) and positive comments from fellow fans (29) as of 31st December 
200857. 
In order to conduct interviews, firstly I consulted with the Yuaerubi operator by 
explaining the purpose and procedure of my research in detail and reassuring her of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 For the entire story of this fan fiction, follow the link http://cafe.daum.net/soul48/490835. 
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pure academic end. With her approval, I sent an email invitation to 250 members, whom 
I selected through the examination of online communication and whom I felt were 
actively engaged in discussions of the focal issue. From 23rd to 29th January 2009, I 
received only 5 useful responses out of 13. To the Yuaerubi moderator, I carefully 
addressed the importance of this research and sincerely requested her cooperation in my 
project. On my behalf, she posted an invitation on the ‘Tearoom Coffee’ bulletin board 
to recruit volunteer interviewees. In her invitation, she explained what my research was 
about, and asked members to send her an email addresses via messaging service or 
email within Yuaerubi if there was anyone interested in partaking in the interview. This 
time the moderator sent my ‘semi-structured interview’ (Mann and Stewart, 2000, p.65) 
sheets to 73 volunteers who had shown their interest. In the interview sheet, I requested 
participants to describe their experience and any thoughts and feelings freely in as much 
detail as possible, and to send it back to me. I did not designate any specific deadline for 
response in the hope of more responses. Eventually I received 44 email responses from 
1st to 17th February 2009. I excluded 19 responses because either the respondent’s age 
was over 19, they had participated in the protest neither on- nor off-line, or their 
response provided insufficient information for this study. Therefore, 30 interview 
subjects including the previous 5 respondents were identified for final analysis. To 
gather further data, I had several additional email exchanges. Then, I conducted one-to-
one in-depth interview with 10 volunteers who had been actively engaged in the rally 
offline, by using Korean online messaging software Nate On. As soon as I received 
consent from the active participants, I started carrying out in-depth interviews from 30th 
January to 20th February 2009. Each interview lasted about 30 minutes. I did one-to-one 
interviews because some interviewees had expressed discomfort and a lack of 
confidence in a group conversation. Also this form of interview using a chat programme, 
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offered the teen participants comfort and freedom in expressing their opinion by means 
of anonymity to some extent and a greater convenience in respect of time. The overall 
process of the in-depth interviews was unstructured and open-ended as the interview 
subjects were not all asked the same questions but were allowed to talk and develop 
their own views on the subject. The data collected through the in-depth interview was 
automatically recorded and saved in the programme. Later I stored the data in the form 
of printed materials.  
Interview themes and relevant questions are delineated as below.  
TVXQ 
• What does TVXQ mean to you? 
• How long have you been a TVXQ fan?  
• Is TVXQ related to your participation in the anti-US beef candlelit vigil rally? 
If yes, why and in what way?  
• In the beginning of the anti-US beef protest, a video clip of TVXQ teen fans, 
claiming that they took to streets to save beloved TVXQ from mad cow disease, 
was virally spread on the Internet. What do you think of them?  
Everyday media use and Yuaerubi 
• Where did you get information of the US beef import and/or the protest?  
• How often do you use Internet? What do usually you do?  
• How long have you been a Yuaerubi member?  
• How often do you log on Yuaerubi? What do you do then?  
• Have you talked with Yuaerubi members about the current event or participated 
in the protest with them? If yes, please describe the details of the conversation 
and the process of your participation. And how did you feel?  
Agency  
• The conservative mainstream media claimed that the teen(-fan)s participation in 
the protest was influenced by ‘mad cow disease rumour (e.g. mad cow disease 
can be infected via cosmetics or sanitary towels)’, ‘negative remarks of 
celebrities’ or ‘instigation of leftists or/and anti-Americans’. What do you think 
of them? Have they affected your participation in a way?  
Actions (on- and off-line) 
• Have you ever participated in the vigil rally offline? If yes, when and why?  
• If not, what was the reason?  
• What did you do to express your objection to the US beef import?  
• With whom did you talk about the US beef import?  
• Is there any other reason for your participation in the rally except the anti-US 
beef import? If yes, please describe as much in detail as possible. 
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• How did you feel while participating in the rally?  
• Please describe any on- or/and offline actions you took in opposition to the US 
beef import except a direct participation in the protest?  
After participating in the protest 
• Any feeling after experiencing the current event?  
• Through your experience of participation in the protest, is there any change in 
your thought or behaviour in respect of socio-political issues?  
 
Also for the analysis of the teen fans’ political action relating to the research questions 
2.2 and 3.1, I used Gamson’s (1992) collective action frame in which injustice, agency 
and identity play out to support political consciousness. And I also attempted to 
examine if any dimensions of Dahlgren’s ‘civic culture’ (2003, pp.153-160; 2009, 
pp.102-125) – knowledge, values, trust (affinity), spaces, practice (talk) and identities – 
are identified in the fan activism and what this means for the relation of popular culture 
to democratic politics. In so doing, I hope I will locate the legitimate place of 
entertainment, fans and emotions in democratic politics. 
4.3. Ethical Considerations  
From an ethical viewpoint, the procedure, that I took in order to research teen fandom 
and their politicisation examined in Chapter Seven, cannot be completely free from the 
criticism that I took advantage of a fan community and its members. However, in the 
course of my research of examining postings, interviewing the teen fans, reading and 
viewing TVXQ concert video clips, I became a TVXQ fan, that is a ‘scholar-fan’ in 
Matt Hills’ term (2002, pp.8-13). As a ‘scholar-fan’, academics take on fan identities. 
Hills underscores that the scholar-fan must observe the regulatory norms of academic 
performance and be cautious not to present too much of their enthusiasm. And, as Hills 
(2002, pp.6-8) criticises ‘moral dualism’ of academic discourse of fans or fandom, a 
‘scholar-fan’ researcher must try to avoid rationalising fandom within an ‘academic 
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intellectual value system’, which observes fandom as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ phenomena and 
gives high regard to fan culture fitting the ‘good’ phenomena in order to legitimise 
academic practice.  
Keeping these ethical norms as a researcher in mind, I endeavoured to observe 
teen fandom from a necessary distance to avoid overly enthusiastic involvement and 
instead to rationalise the fan narratives and action in alignment with academic norms 
and on the fans’ own terms.  	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5. Ordinary People and OhmyNews: Reshaping the 
news in between the private and the public 
 
5.1. Introduction 
As a global icon of citizen journalism, OhmyNews (OMN) has drawn enormous 
attention academically and otherwise over the last decade. There have been two key 
factors for this attention. On the one hand, OMN is widely believed to have played a 
critical role for the success of the then political outsider Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002 
presidential election. In a rigidly established mediascape, in which a handful of 
conservative newspapers, namely Chosun, Joong Ang and Dong-A had held around 80 
percent of the overall circulation and had acted as king makers, OMN positioned itself 
in an unprecedented way as a newly emergent online news site to compete with the 
mainstream media and de-marginalise Roh Moo-hyun’s candidacy. On the other hand, 
its actualisation of citizen’s participation in journalistic practice has shown a new 
democratic potential of ICT-based media. Since then, OMN’s citizen journalism has 
been widely adopted by traditional media and has inspired followers in the West. For 
example, global media such as BBC and CNN have allowed readers to post videos, 
photos and comments alongside news articles (Lee, 2007). In addition, The 
International Herald Tribune, which was owned by the New York Times, provided news 
stories of OhmyNews International (Johnson and Fitzpatrick, 2006). Moreover, like 
iTalkNews and Gotham Gazette in the US (Mattin, 2005), Japan’s JanJan (Japan 
Alternative News for Justices and New Cultures) and many similar online newspapers 
were launched adopting OMN’s citizen journalism model. As exemplary ‘contra-
flows’58, these phenomena have significance for the academic discourse on media 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58  The notion of ‘contra- or counter-flows’ was introduced to challenge the position of earlier 
communication theorists who argued that the flow (of media contents such as visual images, news, 
television programmes) was only one-way from the West to the rest of the world (Rantanen, 2007, p.146).   
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globalisation, which conventionally focused on the one-way flow of industrialised 
Western media content, more accurately the US-led media, to the rest of the world.  
More significantly, OMN’s success has brought up robust discussions of citizen 
journalism’s role for democracy. For instance, the staff of OhmyNews, including the 
founder and CEO Oh Yeon-ho were invited to many international conferences such as 
the World Editors Forum in Istanbul (2004), the Online Publishers Association in 
London (2006) and Lift in Geneva (2010) to deliver its citizen participation model. 
Besides, Oh gave a talk to 30 CEOs of Norwegian newspapers in Seoul (2004). Despite 
a general recognition of the citizen’s growing appearance as an actor in news media, 
opponents claim that citizen journalism undermines quality or standards of professional 
journalism by its lack of accuracy, objectivity and accountability. Moreover, they argue 
that citizen-generated content or commentaries are overly personalised, emotional or 
‘opinionated’59 and therefore distance citizens from serious news with focus on the 
broader public interest. In contrast, advocates argue that citizen journalism contributes 
to facilitating an engaged citizenry by opening up new opportunities for citizens to 
participate in the process of news production. Besides, it contributes to help 
professional journalism to be ‘more publicly responsive’ (Allan, 2006;Bird, 2009, 
p.295;Pavik 2001, cited in Davis, 2010, p.123;Fenton, 2010, p.10;Gillmor, 
2004;McNair, 2006) and accountable to readers.  
Those debates call for a rethinking of citizen journalism in relation to the 
tabloidization debate in the 1990s and early 2000s. In spite of a distinction between 
citizen journalism and tabloid newspapers in terms of the nature of their rise, some 
analogies underlie the debates. Firstly, the criticism that both receive from mainstream 
media as regards the role of the press for democracy is grounded on the divide between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Reagan (2003, cited in Nip, 2006, p.229) In a similar way, Silvia (2001, cited in Fenton, 2010, 
p.10) criticised blogosphere as ‘the floodgates to unverified, de-professionalized gossip’. 
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the serious/the public and the non-serious/the private. Secondly, as a consequence of the 
development of new communication technologies, competition deepens and 
accompanies the declining readership of the existing media. Therefore, I will critique 
these points through examining OMN’s citizen journalism.  
Meanwhile, there was another unforeseen event in Korean political history 
around the 2010 local elections. About 10 days before the election, the government 
announced that the sinking of the Cheonan patrol ship in March resulted from a North 
Korean torpedo attack. The government’s subsequent sanctions against North Korea and 
the following mainstream media discourse instantly overshadowed policy-based 
agendas of the election, and instead created a fear of a second Korean War. War 
discourse had significantly contributed to the conservative party’s victory in the past 
elections, given the uneasy truce between the two Koreas since 1953. However, this 
time it turned out to be the opposite resulting in the highest electoral turnout in 15 years 
- especially among new-media savvy young people - and the ruling conservative party’s 
failure to hold the majority.  
In this light, firstly, through exploring distinguishing features of OMN’s citizen 
journalism, I will analyse the ways in which OMN challenges the existing normative 
values of traditional journalism – what counts as news and who counts as journalists – 
and what those challenges imply to the binary opposition between the serious/the 
political /the rational and the non-serious/the personal/the emotional, which sit at the 
centre of the tabloidization debate. I will subsequently discuss similarities and 
differences between tabloidization and OMN’s citizen journalism, both of which are 
alternatives to traditional standard journalism. Secondly, as a remarkable turning point 
for OMN’s success as a news outlet, I will examine the 2002 presidential election with 
emphasis on OMN’s mediation between private citizens (the private) and the political 
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world (the public). Thirdly, with focus on the Cheonan sinking and the 2010 local 
election, I will explore the ways in which new communicative possibilities afforded by 
new media, such as social networking service (SNS), Agora a portal website online 
forum as well as OMN, contributed to the unexpected turn of events. In doing so, I aim 
not only to identify democratic possibilities to construct participatory citizens beyond 
being ‘informed’ through institutionalisation of citizens’ knowledge (re-)production 
within OMN’s citizen journalism, but also to critique the theoretically conventional 
distinction between the private and the public in respect of the news media genre.  
5.2. The Launch of OMN 
While the state-led advancement of the ICT infrastructure in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s and the subsequent nationwide popularisation of high speed Internet providing 
economic conditions to launch and operate online media with incredibly minimal 
budgets compared to offline media, people’s distrust in the existing dominant media and 
politics offered the rationale for the establishment of online progressive media such as 
OMN.  
On 22nd February 2000, Oh Yeon-ho launched OMN with three staff and a fund 
of 100 million Korean Won (approximately US$95,000). Until 1999, when he began 
preparing the launch of OMN, he had been working as a so-called ‘anti-Americanism 
journalist’60 for a progressive monthly magazine Mahl [Speech] for 12 years. In his 
book OhmyNews – Korea’s Unique Product (2004), Oh recalled two critical events that 
convinced him about OMN’s launch. In 1994 while working for Mahl, he reported on a 
massacre by US soldiers of over 300 innocent Korean civilians in 1950 in No Gun Ri, in 
the southern part of Korea, during the Korean War. It was an unreported event until he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 This nickname accounts for his 10-year career since 1988 investigating unreported atrocities by US 
soldiers during the Korean War.   
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disclosed it with in-depth interviews with survivors. Due to the marginalised readership 
of Mahl, the public barely knew his news at that time. However, in 1999, when the 
Associated Press won a Pulitzer Prize for their report on the same event that he had 
reported five years earlier, all the mainstream media welcomed it as if it were a 
completely novel story and took it seriously as public agenda (Lee, 2003). Following 
this experience, Oh became more determined to push forward his launching plan of 
OMN.  
Another incident was the great success of online parody newspaper Ddanzi 
Ilbo. Oh (2004, pp.36-38) recollected that its success not only gave him hope and the 
possibility to push forward his plan to set up OMN but also influenced much of the 
OMN model. By the autumn of 1999 when he was preparing to set up OMN, he and 
some staff visited Ddanzi Ilbo’s founder and CEO Kim Uh-joon to get some ideas and 
advice. To put it simply, his advice was to make a website produced not by costly 
advertising, but by netizens’ word of mouth, which would be a key to a successful 
website. His suggestion shed light on where to focus - the provision of unique and 
substantial content and the establishment of loyal readers with a sense of fellowship, all 
of which later took shape in OMN’s citizen journalism. 
Interestingly, it is notable that Ddanzi Ilbo initiated a citizen reporter system, 
which inspired OMN’s citizen journalism. Ddanzi Ilbo’s citizen reporter system was an 
unprecedented experiment that anyone could become a journalist only with a 
qualification proven by his/her own writing, not by institutional education or 
examination or titles. However, the opportunity was limited to a small number of 
appointed reporters61 who passed through the application process and who had a duty to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 As a response to a recruitment advertising of 6th July 1998, over 700 people applied – 684 applicants 
for a practice reporter, and 87 for an overseas correspondent. Eventually Ddanzi appointed 200 reporters 
including trainees . 
128 	  
write bi-weekly. Unlike Ddanzi, OMN leaves the door open to anyone who wants to 
become a journalist with a simple step of registration anytime and gives autonomy to 
citizen journalists as regards the subject and deadline, more details of which I will 
examine in the later sections.  
On 21st December 1999 when Oh Yeon-ho published the first issue of the pre-
launch newspaper, the number of professional staff was only three. Two staff were once 
his students of the course ‘Oh Yeon-ho’s making a journalist’ held at the civic group 
Citizens’ Association for Democratic Media Movement in 1999 (Oh, 2004, pp.21-23). 
On New Year’s Day of 2000, Oh and his staff published the second issue online and put 
in an advertisement to recruit citizen reporters with a slogan “Every citizen is a 
reporter”, which drew huge public attention quickly. Within a week of the first issue of 
pre-launch service, over 6,000 hits were recorded and in the month after the recruitment 
advertisement, over 700 people joined to become a citizen reporter. Eventually on 22nd 
February, OMN launched as an online daily with 727 citizen reporters and 4 staff 
including the founder and CEO Oh Yeon-ho.  
5.3. OMN’s Citizen Journalism 
IndyMedia and The Drudge Report have often been cited as Internet-based, 
participatory journalism in which the members’ input sits at the centre of the content. 
However, OMN is notably distinguished from them in respect of who constitutes the 
membership and how the websites operate. The Drudge Report62 is a news aggregation 
website founded in 1997 and provides links to the US and international news websites 
and columnists mainly of the mainstream. Occasionally, founder Matt Drudge and two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The website originated from the founder Matt Drudge’s personal weekly-email newsletter to the media 
industry insiders in 1996 and became famous by breaking the news of US President Bill Clinton’s sex 
scandal with the White House intern Monica Lewinsky in 1998. 
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other editors post headlines of news links. Similarly, IndyMedia, which was founded in 
November 1999 in order to deliver coverage of anti-WTO protests in Seattle in the US, 
is a collective news network of various anti-capitalist organisations in the world, 
operating by an open publishing system that allows anyone to post a story, which is 
published without filtering. As such, the participation of The Drudge Report and 
IndyMedia was limited mostly to professionals who belonged to institutional 
organisations whereas OMN materialised the inclusive notion of ordinary citizens’ 
direct participation in news production. In the following sections, I will examine 
distinguishing features of OMN’s citizen journalism in relation to the tabloidization 
debate and the traditional standard journalism. 
5.3.1. Citizens’ News Production in Cooperation with Professional Journalists 
The founder and CEO Oh unveiled his key notions of operational philosophy in an 
interview with the Associated Press (2003), which was emphasised in my personal 
interview with Oh at the 2007 OMN’s International Citizen Journalists’ Forum.  
With OhmyNews, we wanted to say goodbye to the 20th Century 
journalism where people only saw things through the eyes of the 
mainstream, conservative media (in Korea). As our main concept that 
every citizen can be a reporter suggests, we put everything out there 
and people judge the truth for themselves. 
OMN sought a departure from traditional journalism in two respects. On the one hand, 
OMN aimed at changing the existing news landscape in which the conservative media 
had played a dominant role in setting the socio-political agenda and manufacturing 
public opinion. As discussed previously, the imbalanced relations between the 
conservative and the progressive had been structured by the political economy of the 
Korean media industry. In pursuit of progressive journalism, OMN operates a small 
number of professional journalists who write 30 percent of the entire articles with focus 
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on two or three imminent, pressing issues, generally of politics, society or NGOs that 
require immediate access to credible sources. In particular, whenever focal events take 
place, OMN dispatches professional journalists to deliver prompt, on-the-spot and in-
depth coverage with real-time video footage, often lasting over five hours. For example, 
OMN aired the confrontation between the former president Kim Young-sam and the 
Korea university students on 13th October 2000 when the students protested his visit to 
lecture. OMN aired 14 hours of live coverage, which was an unprecedented media event 
and drew 35,000 views and 583 readers’ opinions on that day. This feature remained as 
OMN’s distinguishing strength until personal bloggers armed with Web 2.0 technology 
and hand-held cameras took hold of online news space during the 2008 anti-US beef 
protest. In addition, in respect to local-based issues or events, the professional 
journalists work in cooperation with citizen journalists as was seen in the Democratic 
Party’s Primary, which I will examine in a later section. 
More significantly, OMN challenged the normative notion of who should count 
as journalists through the citizen journalist system. In Korea, it is extremely competitive 
to become a professional journalist, particularly for the mainstream media, for two main 
reasons. Firstly, working for mainstream media guarantees higher wages and welfare 
benefits in comparison with the progressive media. Due to the market-driven nature of 
the industry most progressive media, such as Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang Shinmun, 
have marginalised circulation with low advertising revenues and therefore suffer 
economic deficits. Wages and benefits for journalists in those media are thus relatively 
poor. Secondly, in general, in order to become a professional journalist applicants spend 
years to prepare for a required exam, which is said to be like one of the hardest state-run 
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national exams63. However, with the slogan “Every citizen is a journalist”, OMN 
removed the existing high standard to become a journalist and to some degree rejected 
the privileged authority and power of professional journalists that had been 
conventionally taken for granted. Instead, anyone is allowed to be entitled as a journalist 
with no specific required qualification but only with a simple sign-up procedure to 
provide personal details such as real name, national ID number (if applicable), a 
telephone number, an email address, job position (if applicable), home and/or office 
addresses. OMN’s employment of a citizen journalist system was certainly not new in 
the sense that Dhanzi Ilbo initiated a limited citizen reporter system at its launch in 
1998. However, its approach to institutionalise a citizen journalist system fully within a 
media organisation and therefore to grant citizens a legitimate public presence in the 
media was a radical novelty that appealed to the mass public. Accordingly, the number 
of ‘news guerrillas’64 rapidly increased: from 727 at the time of its launch to 20,000 by 
September 2002 to 47,318 in April 2007 (Kim, 2007a), and to 67,481 in 2010. 
Meanwhile, in order to secure the accuracy and accountability of citizen 
journalists’ news articles, which have been criticised as deficient and debasing of the 
standards of journalism by critics and traditional professional media (Fenton, 2010, 
p.10;Singer and Ashman, 2009, pp.239-242), OMN operates several devices at different 
levels. At an individual level, a citizen journalist is required to observe the code of 
conduct and ethics. For example, high priority is given to the accuracy and originality of 
articles. To prevent plagiarism, when citing some part of other authors’ writings, 
sources should be disclosed and also whether the article is their own discovery or based 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The representative state-run exams include the bar examination to get qualified as a lawyer – a solicitor 
and a barrister, an attorney and a judge, and the examination to become a civil servant. In fact, the 
examination to become a journalist is not a state-run one but it is socially assigned as one of those exams: 
on the one hand, the exam is relentlessly hard to pass and on the other hand, a secure social position with 
economic comfort is guaranteed after passing.  
64 In the sense that citizen journalists should infiltrate their own community and therefore deliver 
eyewitness accounts on the spot instantly, Oh Yeon-ho named a citizen journalist a ‘news guerrilla’. 
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on publicised report material. In addition, if they deliver an inaccurate report, they 
should correct it immediately. At an organisational level, OMN operates a professional 
editorial team. Their main responsibilities are to screen, edit and place citizens’ articles, 
which are analogous to the roles of a gatekeeper in traditional journalism. However, in 
general, their authority is limited to the minimum level: fact- and libel-check for 
accuracy; and credibility and proofreading of grammar. Only when a citizen’s article 
has enough significance to be placed as a main top story does the editorial team actively 
intervene to revise the title or request the author to supplement the article with 
additional coverage if needed (Kim, 2007a). On average throughout OMN’s growth, 
citizen journalists upload 150 to 200 stories on a daily basis, which covers 70 percent of 
all articles (Kim, 2007a). Relying on the result of the editorial team’s screening, the 
submitted articles are classified into two: Ing-geol [the state that the firewood is burning 
in great flames], which has passed the screening process and Saeng-na-mu [green wood 
that is not ready to burn], which has failed the check or is still awaiting review. Saeng-
na-mu articles are shown on the site, but the responsibility for the articles remains solely 
on the author. As regards the editing procedures and decisions, OMN provides a bulletin 
board for citizen and professional journalists to exchange interactive communication. 
Finally at the educational level, OMN offers various training programmes about news 
gathering and writing for public and citizen journalists through OhmySchool, which 
comprehends OMN’s overall educational projects on- and off-line. Most of the training 
programmes for citizen journalists take place offline at the Ganghwa-do citizen 
journalist school, which opened on 24th November 2007 at the site of a closed primary 
school. The programmes are various: children and teenager’s programmes about how to 
interview and write news; Oh Yen-ho’s tour lecture about the making of journalists in 
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major cities; an editorial journalist’s talk about how to write to be selected as Ing-geol 
and the like.  
Arguably, the critical factor to determine the accountability and credibility of 
news is the reliability of sources journalists have access to. Traditionally, a limited 
number of press cards had been granted to journalists whose entrance to the press 
conference room of governmental offices was permitted only through agreement or 
voting among the related officers. This restricted press conference system 
institutionalised inequality of assemblage and dissemination of information, by which 
conservative mainstream journalists had taken prioritised positions in comparison with 
marginalised progressive media journalists. There was a landmark event on 28th March 
2001 during the opening ceremony of the Incheon international airport. Then citizen 
journalist Choi Kyung-joon, who now works as a professional65 journalist, was ousted 
from the press conference room on the grounds that he was not an accredited reporter 
with a press card. Immediately Choi filed for an injunction upon the airport to allow 
him access to the press conference room. The court ordered that the airport should not 
disturb the reporter’s entrance to and reporting in the related press conference room, 
which made a good precedent for access to other governmental offices. Soon after, in 
2003, President Roh Moo-hyun abolished the press card system as permission to the 
press conference room of the Blue House and opened it through a registration system. 
Correspondingly, in 2004, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism declared that every 
governmental office should run an open press conference room. Eventually, OMN’s 
achievement of allowing citizen journalists’ access to the press conference room in 
governmental offices and the following policy reform during the Roh government 
broadened the scope of the traditional notion of who can have access to credible sources 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 In this context, the term ‘professional’ means ‘employed and regularly paid’. After a few years working 
as a citizen journalist, Mr Choi succeeded in his application for a professional journalist position at OMN. 
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which overcame citizen journalists’ far limited access to ‘routine source-controlled 
exchanges’66 (Nip, 2009, p.102;Reich, 2008), enabling citizen journalist’s credibility to 
be secured. 
As such, OMN breaks down the rigid boundary between reader and writer of 
news by opening up the opportunity to anyone who wants to deliver ‘stories’. This 
deconstruction challenged the linear relationship between professional journalists and 
citizens, which had been institutionally set up as producers and consumers. In other 
words, by institutionalising citizens’ participation in news production, that was once 
regarded as ‘the exclusive domain of the professional’ (Allan, 2009, p.18), OMN’s 
citizen journalism not only expanded the role of citizens as consumers to ‘prosumers’67 
but also diminished the traditionally privileged position and authority of professional 
journalists. Moreover, through the cooperation with professional journalists and the 
previously mentioned strategies to enhance the accuracy and accountability of citizen 
journalism, OMN dismissed the doubts and accusations from professional media. Much 
of the criticism comes from ‘a perceived crisis in the ethos of traditional journalism’ 
among professional journalists as they take citizen’s direct participation in news 
production as a threat to their existing authority and profession to set the public agenda 
and shape public opinion (Bailey, 2009, p.134). In addition, the development of this 
collective psyche revolves around the rapid decline of newspaper subscriptions in 
changing media environments. In Korea, the readership of offline newspapers dropped 
from 69.3% in 1996 to 48.3% in 2004 (2005), which resulted mainly from the high 
competition with other media outlets that were thriving in accordance with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Examples are official sources such as press conferences, press releases, and updates of government-
controlled areas.  
67 The term indicates the hybrid nature of audiences/users promoted by new ICT technology, which means 
producers and consumers.  
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advancement of communications technology, i.e. the rise of the Internet and the 
expansion of cable and satellite television.  
Intriguingly, the criticism of citizen journalism by professional journalists and 
some scholars demands rethinking citizen journalism in the context of the tabloidization 
or feminisation debate in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the following section, through 
exploring OMN’s distinctive departures from traditional journalism, I will analyse the 
implications for the conventionally normative divide between the public (the serious/the 
political/the rational) and the private (the non-serious/the personal/the emotional) in 
relation to the tabloidization debate of news.  
5.3.2. Another Tabloid Tale? 
5.3.2.1. The everyday and the personal: (Re-)feminisation of news content  
The normative notion of traditional news values has been established as a set of criteria 
in journalists’ daily practice to assess the newsworthiness of events. In other words, the 
conventional news values are ‘in part de facto justifications of non-negotiable 
imperatives’ (Dahlgren, 1992, p.10) or grounded on ‘the passive exercise of routine and 
highly regulated procedures in the task of selecting from already limited supplies of 
information’ (Golding and Elliott, 1979, p.114), enabling journalists to perform their 
work with limited time and resources (Lewis, Inthorn and Wahl-Jorgensen, 2005, pp.5-
17). Moreover, the focus of ‘newsworthiness’ is typically on those in power and 
authority such as politicians or experts with institutional titles who are represented as 
key actors in the public world. Even if traditional journalists write people’s life stories 
in the newspaper feature section or magazines, they are likely to rely on their own 
stereotypical ideas and assumptions (see King and Schudson, 1995;Sumpter, 2000) that 
are close to the view of the power elites and distanced from people’s genuine feeling 
136 	  
and thinking. Or rather, they focus on human interest of weirdness or abnormality. Not 
surprisingly, ordinary people are often misrepresented or excluded from the main scene 
of the public world (Lewis, Inthorn and Wahl-Jorgensen, 2005, p.138;Turner, 2010).  
In sharp contrast, by allocating 50 percent of the space to citizen journalists’ life 
stories, OMN validated the everyday and the private that had been degraded as dumbed 
down or tabloidization. In a broad sense, the basic criteria to determine where to place 
citizens’ Ing-geol articles either as main top, main sub or section top stories or on the 
Ing-geol article list are not significantly different from the normative news values such 
as timeliness, clarity (un-ambiguity), continuity (follow-up stories) or relevance 
(meaningfulness)68 (Kim, 2007a). However, OMN’s notion of newsworthiness focuses 
on the events of heightened relevance or proximity to the lifeworld of ordinary people 
by placing the same weight on “soft” news of the everyday and the personal of the 
people as on “hard” news of the state affair and those in power. In this sense, OMN’s 
citizen journalism is parallel to tabloidization’s concentration on the people’s taste and 
concern as of great importance. However, OMN attempts to legitimise ordinary 
citizens’ common ‘experiential knowledge’ (Gamson, 1992;Livingstone and Lunt, 
1994) as a significant resource in making sense of the world. This is articulated through 
citizens’ own perception and lived experience on the ground, whereas those concerns 
are still selected and manufactured by professional journalists, often in the bubble 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 In 1965, Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge identified 12 news values based on their study of 
three international crises. The news values are ‘frequency (events favoured over processes), threshold 
(intensity)’, un-ambiguity, ‘meaningfulness (the relevance of a news story to the readers’ frame of 
reference), consonance (the build-up to an expected event), unexpectedness, continuity, composition (a 
balance of stories), reference to elite nations and people, personification and negativity (bad 
news)’(Franklin, Hamer, Hanna, Kinsey and Richardson, 2005, p.174;Niblock, 2005, p.76). Harcup and 
O’Neil (2001) re-tested Galtung and Ruge’s news values and suggested 10 news values: ‘reference to the 
power elites (individuals, organisations and nations), reference to celebrity, entertainment’ (e.g. human 
interest), ‘surprise, good news (e.g. personal triumph) and bad news, magnitude, relevance (cultural 
proximity and political importance), follow-up stories, and the newspaper’s agenda’. 
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newsroom, as is the case with hard news and tabloids that are easily inclined to political 
economy forces.  
In the gate-keeping process of traditional hard news, in which hierarchical, 
bureaucratic and male-dominated organisational customs and norms sit at the centre, 
these personalised stories, women’s stories in particular, easily slip through the net of 
newsworthiness as private, unimportant and trivial subjects. The binary separation 
between the public and the private, the serious and the non-serious, rationality and 
emotionality, which are grounded in Enlightenment values, evaluates the arena of the 
personal, the non-serious and the emotional as tabloidization or feminisation of news to 
undermine established journalistic standards (Gripsrud, 2000, p.285;Macdonald, 2000, 
p.251;Sparks, 2000, p.2) that is the core value of the serious media. According to 
Habermas’s notion of the public sphere, detached, objective hard news is crucial to 
enable informed and engaged citizenry whereas “feminised, soft” news, characterised 
by ‘more attention to ‘human interest’ news, a greater care for audience needs and 
desires, and a less detached and rational mode of reporting’ (van Zoonen, 1998, p.41), is 
detrimental to the formation of the public sphere which requires a rational, critical 
discussion to take place. However, human-interest stories are not symptomatic of 
tabloidization but rather ‘the central component of news’ (Bird, 2003, p.67) and 
personalisation of public affairs facilitate audiences to understand the possible effect of 
the event on their day-to-day lives and help to engage them with the issue (Bird, 2003, 
pp.68-69;Tomlinson, 1997, p.73) 
Moreover, the terms “detached, objective, hard versus feminised, soft” as 
ascribed to the quality of news are gendered, hierarchical associations (Holland, 
1998;Landes, 1988;Macdonald, 1998;van Zoonen, 1991, 1998). In other words, the 
disdaining view, of the characteristic of news that many female news journalists 
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conceive as their ‘role-conception’ (van Zoonen, 1998, p.41), should be understood as 
part of a ‘general patriarchal scheme’ (van Zoonen, 1998, p.46).  
In addition, it is questionable whether the journalistic standard of objectivity or 
detachment contributes to the enhancement of democracy as traditionally theorised. 
Unlike the alleged democratic role of objectivity, the origin of objectivity as journalistic 
ideology dates back to the mid-nineteenth century with the growing emphasis on 
scientific expertise and technology and, even more significantly, commercial reasons 
(McNair, 2005, pp.31-33;Steiner, 1998, pp.146-147). Market-driven journalism needed 
objectivity as a ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman, 1972) in order not to antagonise advertisers, 
who were providing the main source of revenues, and to fit into the ideology of middle-
class power elites pursuing objective science and technology. Moreover, the premise 
that news is characterised by disinterested truth on the ground of objective fact is no 
longer persuasive and sustainable. Firstly, journalism cannot avoid having ‘a certain 
degree of relativism and subjectivity’ (McNair, 2005, p.32). Secondly, the 
democratising news media have a role in connecting and engaging private individuals to 
the public world by providing a mediated sphere where the private and the public cannot 
be separated.  
In this light, a citizen journalist Kim Hye-won offers a good example of how 
“feminised” news of OMN serves to actualise democratic potential of the media. As a 
female citizen journalist herself, on the one hand, she provides a new, positive 
perspective of marginalised social groups such as the female elderly and “Adjumma” on 
the grounds of her day-to-day lived experience as Adjumma, daughter and local 
community member. She has written special feature life stories of the elderly, who had 
sacrificed their individual lives to meet the traditional expectations of ‘being there for 
others’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002), then found new joy of living their own life 
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and identity in their 70s by investing their resources of time and money in themselves 
such as learning written Korean and/or new hobbies or doing charity works.  
As an observer in the by-election of her local community in April 2011, Kim 
conveyed substantial interest in public policies and active voting of Adjummas in their 
30s and 40s in her article “Do not ignore the real power of Bundang city, the Apron 
Troops of Adjumma”, whose excerpt is illustrated as below:  
In most mainstream media the focus was on the contribution of white-
collar male office workers to the unexpected victory of the Democratic 
Party in Bundang area in which the conservative Grand National Party 
had been traditionally strong…But I observed a procession of apron 
troops of Adjumma to vote before their children came back from 
school…Bundang Adjumma is computer savvy, actively engaged in 
online discussions on various subjects including public policies 
particularly relating to the children’s education and home 
economics…I would argue, therefore, their rational choice resulted in 
the unpredicted turn of the by-election.       
In this way, she presented a new affirmative view of Adjummas as politically aware and 
‘informed’, ‘monitorial’ (Schudson, 1998; 2000, p.16) and engaged citizens who 
examine diverse information sources in a wider range of politics that is directly relating 
to their private matter of the day-to-day lives – the familial roles of childbearing and 
home management – and identify danger to the personal and public good and commit 
their time and energy to political participation.  
On the other hand, Kim’s article exemplifies the ways in which personalised, 
emotive stories engage readers with a broad scope of public matter and the subsequent 
public action. One article entitled, “I wished we could have lived like a wood-seller and 
a nymph in a fairy tale”, disclosed a heartbreaking story of a family man who had to 
send his cancer-suffering Philippine wife to the Philippines for care due to extreme 
poverty and no national health benefit for his wife. Readers’ responses varied from 
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affective sympathy to reasoned resentment of the current social welfare conditions of 
such deprived families and to discussion about amendment of the immigration law:  
“As a father of two children, I am so sad about the situation of this 
family (Father Bear).”  
“Thank you so much, Kim. I can feel we still live in a beautiful world 
in which this private story has high news value to the extent that it is 
shown as a main top. Owing to OMN, we can have hope for the future 
(New hope).” 
“The government should bring Seung-hyun’s mother back to Korea and 
provide medical treatment. Otherwise, we will provide her medical 
treatment. She must be given Korean citizenship as she was married to 
a Korean man and delivered two children (Lee Jung-hee).”  
“Our immigration law should be amended for foreign spouses to 
benefit from the national health care at least. In comparison with 
developed countries’ social welfare systems for immigrants, Korea is 
far behind (Nevy).”  
Subsequently, not only did the news mobilise readers’ emotional rapport so as to raise 
20 million KRW (19,000US$) for the wife’s medical cost but it also awakened public 
attention about deprived ‘multicultural families’69 whose social welfare conditions are 
deficient due to the complicated procedure and assessment for a foreign spouse to 
acquire Korean citizenship70. As a response to the readers’ growing concern, OMN 
delivered a series of follow-up feature reports dealing with the far limited social welfare 
conditions of non-Korean spouses or immigrants without citizenship, i.e. no public 
health benefit. 
This news event shows how a private matter can transform into the public 
concern through ‘instantiation and affectivity’ (Macdonald, 2000, p.251) of personal 
stories and how readers’ emotional engagement substantiates their extended social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 As the number of couples in marriage with foreign spouses increased, the government officially 
designated those families as ‘multicultural family’. The large number of wives in the rural areas is 
multinational but mostly from South East Asian countries such as Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, or 
China.     
70 Since 2005, the minimum period of legal marriage for a foreign spouse to apply for Korean citizenship 
was reduced from 5 years to 2 years. Without the citizenship, foreign spouses have no social welfare 
benefits such as National Health Service or Income benefits, etc.  
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interest into public action of ‘the diffused audience’ (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 
1998). Here a temporal yet powerful mass of private, physically distanced and scattered 
individuals gathered in online space to pursue a public purpose, for which private 
individuals came to form a public. At OMN, the sharing of information and elicited 
feelings such as compassion and empathetic grief mobilised instant social action of 
donating through online immediacy and interactivity between journalists and readers, 
and between readers through the commentary space alongside the article. The readers’ 
commentary space has a similar function to Readers’ Letters to the Editor in traditional 
journalism in the sense that it provides an important public space to present the public 
view. However, it is of importance to note that OMN’s commentary space represents 
the direct, unmediated, or more precisely, unfiltered sense of public rationality and 
sensibility whereas the traditional Readers’ Letters section is the outcome of the gate-
keeping process regarding content and style. Therefore, the sharing and mobilising of 
emotionally engaged public action through communicative immediacy and interactivity, 
and its direct presentation in the public sphere of readers’ commentary space is another 
feature of OMN’s citizen journalism in stark contrast to the objectivity-oriented 
traditional journalism.  
5.3.2.2. Emotive, colloquial, interpretative self-storytelling: (Re-)tabloidisation of 
news style?   
Another departure from traditional journalism is to deconstruct the conventional news-
writing formula based on objectivity or detachment. Hence, citizen journalists are 
encouraged to write as they feel comfortable whether it is in first person accounts, 
letter-style or in a conversational way. The founder and CEO Oh (Oh, 2005, p.98) 
clearly delineated this point in the launching plan:  
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We seek to demolish the normative writing style established in 
traditional journalism. Our experiment aims to deliver news in an 
easier, more interesting, more meaningful and accurate way. It entails 
diverse writing styles such as conversational or letter-writing style as 
well as straight news writing style. 
As such, OMN liberated news writing from the serious, hard news style full of esoteric 
jargon in abstract language. In a radical approach, OMN adopted the style of the tabloid 
news approach using emotive, colloquial language and interpretative writing. Moreover, 
it heightened the first-person storytelling of concrete, substantial emotionality with a 
base on lived experience. Kim Hye-won’s articles examined in the previous section 
demonstrated how OMN’s “citizen-centred” approach served to allow ‘imaginative 
proximity’ (Tomlinson, 1997, p.77) for audiences to take a certain, private concern as 
“our” public matter. In another example, the citizen journalist Joo Kyung-shim’s article 
entitled “I felt sorry for my middle-aged husband”, which received readers’ third 
highest manuscript fee 71  in 2006, narrated an emotional account of the author’s 
experience as a poor wife who had to watch her sick husband overcome post-surgery 
pain without painkillers and return to work the following day to earn money and pay for 
living expenses. This emotional self-storytelling narrative immediately engaged readers 
and mobilised 358,000KRW (330 US$) of readers’ voluntary manuscript fee with 45 
responses showing sympathy and support for the couple’s predicament. The self-
narrating, instantiated personal story with frank emotional depth became a prototype for 
citizen journalists’ news writing. This radical writing style has paved the way for 
citizens to write news in easy, comfortable ways. More significantly, by making it easy 
not only to consume but also to produce news, it practically removed the threshold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The readers’ voluntary manuscript fee is one of the indexes to gain readers’ perception of a particular 
article along with the number of hits, the texted commentaries, and approvals and disapprovals that are 
similar to likes and dislikes of the Facebook. 
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between journalists and consumers and advanced citizens’ participation in news 
production.  
Not surprisingly, in the mainstream traditional media, citizen journalism is 
criticised as ‘poorly written, self-absorbed and hyper-opinionated’ and mostly non-
objective (Reagan 2003, cited in Nip, 2006, p.229), all criticisms that OMN too 
received. Strikingly, the question of the news writing style and objectivity sits again at 
the centre of a discourse of tabloidization in the mainstream. According to mainstream 
thinking, the tabloid-style of writing mainly degrades the journalistic standards by 
overly simplifying the public issues and focusing on private matters. Accordingly, it 
results in diminishing the ideal role of media for promoting democracy and dumbs 
down the citizenry. In securing journalistic standards, objectivity has been traditionally 
regarded to be a critical factor along with accuracy and credibility. As discussed earlier, 
however, objectivity as a journalistic standard is questionable. Moreover, hard news of 
common concern with a focus on objectivity and abstract reasoning tends to fail in 
enhancing informed and engaged citizenry. As many studies suggest, hard news tends to 
work well only to a particular group of people who are already informed and politically 
aware and engaged. In contrast, it makes people outside this circle feel distanced and 
irrelevant (Hargreaves and Thomas, 2002, p.80;Norris, 2000). In this sense, the theory 
that hard (fact-based, serious) news is in a prioritised position over soft (interpretation-
based, human-interest) or tabloid-style news as democratising media is losing its 
ground. Moreover, the clear divide between the two has been diminishing as the serious 
news adopts the news values of tabloid or feminised journalism and shifts toward the 
form of ‘tabloid-laundering’ (Sharkey, 1997, p.6) or ‘infotainment’ in which 
news/information blends with entertainment. The fast-changing, highly competitive 
media environment, elevated by the newly emergent media technology and the 
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subsequently declining readership of newspapers along with the heightened profit-
oriented forces, expound not only tabloidization as a common phenomenon both in 
quality press and tabloids but also generate hostility and criticism such as ‘inherently 
untrustworthy and lacking in objectivity’ (Allan, 2009, p.20), which professional 
journalists express toward citizen journalism. This recalls the criticism that print 
journalists directed at early television newscasts in the 1950s (Naughton, 1999) and at 
tabloids or tabloidization in the late 1990s and early 2000s.         
In Korean context, as described in Chapter Three ‘Mapping out the South 
Korean Media Landscape’, it was after the 1987 democratisation and the adoption of 
new media technology such as cable television and video media in the 1990s that the 
increased competition began to pressure the media industry with deregulation. More 
significantly, economic growth increasingly expanded the advertising industry, which 
exacerbated the competition among newspaper media whose readership was already in a 
rapid decline72. Correspondingly, as a viable strategy to expand advertising revenues 
and reach larger audiences, 10 national daily newspapers with Joong Ang in the lead 
(1994) adopted a section edition with large and colourful photographs in 199773. The 
additional edition mainly consisted of the non-serious news such as culture and 
entertainment, travel74, ICT, domestic finance, lifestyle and women’s issues, since 
women were emerging as a significant demographic having purchasing power. Yoo 
(2001) noted that despite the increased volume of women-related news stories, the 
approach of most national dailies focused on a patriarchal perspective mainly dealing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The population of newspaper readers rapidly declined from 54.0% in 1995 to 40.8% in 2000 while the 
population of terrestrial and cable television viewers grew from 32.8% (11.4%) in 1995 to 39.9% (17.4%) 
in 2000 (KPF, 2001). 
73 In 1995, Kyunghyang launched an additional section edition titled X-Magazine and in 1997, all the 
other national dailies including Chosun and Dong-A began to provide a separate edition in addition to the 
regular edition.  
74 The Roh Tae-woo government (1988-1993) removed restrictions on travelling abroad in 1989, which 
paralleled Korea’s economic growth. The liberalization of travelling abroad accelerated the public interest 
in leisure and travelling. 
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with such commercialised interests as fashion and diet. Many critics argued that the 
tendency towards the soft news approach had not contributed to the diversification of 
perspectives or the appropriate delivery of readers’ demands but had instead resulted in 
the heightened competition and the debased quality of journalism (Chung, 1997;Nam, 
1998). Eventually, in 1999, the deepening competition among the mainstream motivated 
Chosun, Joong Ang and Dong-A to bring about an increase in the number of pages to 48 
on average from 16 to 24 on average during the authoritarian regimes.  
As another manoeuvre to increase readership and expand advertising revenues, 
national dailies launched tabloids with a focus on sports and celebrity. For example, The 
Sports Seoul Daily (1985) of Seoul Shinmun took the lead, followed by The Sports 
Chosun (1990) of Chosun, The Sports Hankook75 (2005) of Hankook, The Sports Khan 
(2005) of Kyunghyang and The Sports Dong-A (2008) of Dong-A. In addition, they 
made business partnerships with online sports newspapers (Hwang, 2003). For instance, 
Joong Ang acquired some stocks of The Daily Sports along with the exclusive right to 
use its news content in 2003 and eventually took it over in 2005. Hankyoreh also 
increased the infotainment news by receiving sports and entertainment news from an 
online tabloid Good Day. As such, the tendency of infotainment in national dailies has 
become as common as market-driven journalism. Therefore, the supposedly hierarchical 
oppositions between news/the serious/quality journalism/good journalism and 
entertainment/the non-serious/tabloids/bad journalism are dissolving, and are ‘so 
characteristic of journalism’s self-legitimating discourses’ (Dahlgren, 1992, p.14).       
One of the most remarkable events in democratising newspaper media was 
Hankyoreh’s full introduction of the Korean language with horizontal printing at its 
launch in 1988. Certainly, The Sports Seoul Daily, aiming at young male readers who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 In order to target the niche market, Hankook Ilbo distributed the tabloid free.  
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had received education with Korean textbooks in horizontal printing, had initiated those 
printing formats at its launch in 1985 as a tabloid newspaper76. However, the normative 
print style of national dailies was still predominantly a combination of Korean and 
Chinese77 with vertical writing from right to left, all of which made news reading 
difficult and time-consuming. Hence, the accessibility and consumption of newspaper 
news had been limited to a restricted number of intellectuals or the well educated. By 
the time of Hankyoreh’s launch, the usage of Chinese letters in newspapers gradually 
decreased but was still dominant (see below).  
 
 
Figure 1. The Dong-A Ilbo (14th May 1988) 
Source: The Korea Press Foundation (KPF) 
Historically this journalistic practice originated from the Japanese colonisation, during 
which the Japanese government banned the Korean language in public spaces such as 
schools, publications, etc in order to obliterate the Korean identity and culture. During 
the colonial era, Japanese mixed with Chinese letters was the official language taught in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Immediately, its popularity outran the first tabloid The Daily Sports and it continued to sustain as the 
largest-circulated tabloid, followed by The Daily Sports and The Sports Chosun (1990). In 1990, The 
Daily Sports employed horizontal writing followed by The Sports Chosun in 1999. 
77 In a sentence, most nouns were written in Chinese letters and the suffix in Korean. 
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educational institutions and therefore the poor and the uneducated remained excluded to 
a great extent. Vestiges of Japanese colonialism remained after the 1945 Independence 
and the Japanese writing style and size of newspaper continued as a norm in the national 
dailies. Because of this, the founding members of Hankyoreh, who had fought for 
democratic journalism, aimed at raising accessibility of news and information as a key 
factor to enhancing democracy. Consequently, Hankyoreh’s innovation of using solely 
Korean in horizontal printing radically improved the newspaper’s accessibility and 
fostered literacy in people who were poorly educated, particularly in those over 40 at 
that time, and in the young generation who were educated after Independence. In the 
1990s, the 20 to 50-year-old Korean-educated generation constituted the majority of the 
newspaper demographic along with a growing number of female readers. Because of 
this, all the national dailies came to adopt the Hankyoreh’s easy and reader-friendly 
printing style: Joong Ang (1994), Seoul and Munhwa (1996), Kyunhyang (1997), Dong-
A, Kukmin and Hankook (1998), Chosun and Sekye (1999). Consequently, Hankyoreh’s 
radical innovation in printing format substantially democratised news reading by 
enhancing newspaper literacy as an important tool for ‘knowledge acquisition’ 
(Dahlgren, 2009, p.108) in order to participate in the public sphere. Likewise, OMN’s 
new writing style using first person, emotive and colloquial storytelling with the 
adoption of soft news approach democratised news production by radically broadening 
the possibility of styles.  
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5.3.2.3. Similarities and differences between OMN’s citizen journalism and 
tabloidization 
To examine similarities and differences between OMN’s citizen journalism and 
tabloidization, there is a need to differentiate terms used together with tabloidization. 
Those terms include personalisation, popularisation, and feminisation, all of which are 
typically criticized by the traditional standard journalism as debasing journalistic 
standards. However, in highly competitive media industries attempting to gain larger 
audiences for secure advertising revenues (Sparks, 2000, p.3), tabloidization (or 
tabloids) is better understood as ‘its excesses’ and direct exaggerations of some of the 
conventions and codes of traditional news (Langer, 1992, p.128) or ‘an extreme form of 
popularization’ (Dahlgren, 2009, p.46). Moreover, as indicated through some scholars’ 
arguments in an attempt to see the democratic potential of tabloidization (see Bird, 
1990, 2003;Carter, Branston and Allan, 1998;Connell, 1991, 1992;Dahlgren, 1992, 
1995, 2009;Gripsrud, 2000;Holland, 1998;Macdonald, 2000;Tomlinson, 1997;van 
Zoonen, 1991, 1998), the terms ‘personalisation, popularization and feminisation’ are 
used instead of ‘tabloidizaton’ in order to connote the positive sense when it plays a 
democratic role to connect ordinary people to the political life – which is a ‘fundamental 
role of journalism in democracy’ (Dahlgren, 2009, p.48) – and/or to extend the horizon 
of the political beyond the explicitly state-related. 
In this light, OMN’s citizen journalism shares some of the key features of 
tabloidization in a positive sense. Distinguished from the traditional standard journalism 
of a detached, objective and rational mode of reporting, they seek audience/citizen-
centred journalism that is reflected in the writing style and content. On the one hand, 
compared with the more traditional standard news with a focus on privileged elites, 
national and world politics, much attention is given to the events of an immediacy and 
proximity to everyday lives of ordinary people both in OMN and tabloids. In doing so, 
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people’s taste and private concerns, such as women’s personalised, domestic stories that 
were regarded as the matter of private realm, are recalibrated as ‘important and 
contestable topics within the public sphere’ (Dahlgren, 2009, p.46). Moreover, ordinary 
citizens’ ‘experiential knowledge’ (Gamson, 1992;Livingstone and Lunt, 1994) is 
legitimised as significant resource in making sense of the world. On the other hand, 
OMN and tabloidization employ ‘easy-to-consume formats’ such as vivid, colloquial 
language and storytelling of concrete, emotionally charged mini-episodes grounded in 
ordinary people’s lived experience. Therefore, they allow social groups marginalised by 
traditional, elitist, detached formats and styles in abstract language to feel incorporated 
within the society as citizens (see the OMN’s news stories of Adjumma and the working 
poor).  
However, there are three salient differences between OMN’s citizen journalism 
and tabloidization, most of which are related to the negative characteristics of 
tabloidization. Firstly, as a key strategy to achieve larger audiences, tabloidization 
implements sensationalism and thereby concentrates excessively on personalised, 
private scandals of celebrities or politicians, and specifically on ‘victimage stories’ 
(Dahlgren, 1995, p.61) of ordinary people often in disastrous tragedy or crime news 
without providing concrete social, political circumstances. In contrast, OMN’s citizen 
journalism rather focuses on authentic and frank revelations of ordinary people’s lived 
experience with reflexive, emotional depth within the wider contexts of political 
economic conditions, whose understanding becomes deepened and supplemented via 
immediate, interactive discursive commentary space formed by fellow citizens (see 
Kim’s second example article). Secondly, and most saliently, ordinary people’s view on 
various topics, ranging from their everyday lives to politics in the OMN, is articulated 
directly through first person, interpretative narratives with a base on their own 
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perception and experience (see Kim’s first article and Joo’s article) and not by 
professional journalists, as in the case of traditional journalism and tabloids. Thirdly, in 
comparison with tabloids that pay relatively little attention to political processes, 
economic developments and social changes, and instead focus more on diversions like 
sports and celebrities, OMN’s reportage of explicitly state-related affairs and politics, 
and ordinary people’s everyday life stories are given more importance than any other 
news78. Consequently, it would be of importance whether or not the particular media 
provide relevant information, that is useful to citizens, and ‘communicative spaces’ 
(Dahlgren, 2009, p.115), where civic engagement and participation in the political are 
enacted regardless of what forms the media may take. 	  
5.4. Remarkable Turn: The 2002 presidential election  
5.4.1. Mediating the Public Sphere 
Despite several events79 in which OMN drew public attention with its on-the-spot and 
in-depth report, it was during the 2002 presidential election that OMN gained critical 
popularity and success by rupturing the rigid news landscape as an influential news 
outlet. It is widely understood that OMN had played a crucial role in the late former 
President Roh Moo-Hyun’s success in the election80, in which he had little support even 
from his own party and no spotlight from the mainstream media. In this section, I will 
examine the ways in which OMN mediated private individuals to the public concern in 
the election and formed the public sphere. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 On 25th August 2011, OMN launched OhmyStar dealing with popular entertainment.     
79 OMN had become known by providing exclusive news of several events. These included the ‘386 
generation’ politicians’ drinking party after the worship at the Gwangju Memorial (2000), the Korea 
University students’ protest of the former President Kim Young-sam’s visit to lecture (2000), the 
questioning of the Samsung corporation’s illegal inheritance transfer (2000) and etc.    
80 Also see these articles (Chang, 2005;Chang and Lee, 2006;Kim and Hamilton, 2006;Park, 2002;Park 
and Joo, 2004).  
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Among a series of political events during the election that enabled OMN to 
concentrate massive public attention, most notable was the MDP’s81 open primary. The 
70,000 electorate for the election of the party’s presidential candidate consisted of the 
party representatives (20%), party members (30%), and non-party members (50%) 
(Chang and Lee, 2006, p.156) who were unprecedentedly allowed to vote. Moreover, 
2.5 percent of non-party members (1,750) were selected by online voting in pursuit of 
encouraging young people’s participation. In order to report on the MDP open primary, 
which was run in the form of a tour across the nation in 16 regions from 9th March to 
27th April 2002, OMN utilised local-based citizen journalists to team up with 
professional journalists. Particularly, for the Gwangju primary where the MDP was 
originally based, OMN dispatched 20 citizen and professional reporters to webcast 5 
hours of on-the-spot and in-depth live coverage, which was novel at that time. During 
the 16th March Gwangju primary, OMN’s live webcasting recorded 3.24million page 
views. On 30th April, after the confirmation of Roh’s presidential candidacy and an 
exclusive interview with him, OMN again broke its own record with 6.15million page 
views (2.05million users) (OMN, 2002). 
As such, the new method of news delivery provided audiences with a 
substantial sense of presence and engagement with the event on the scene. Particularly, 
OMN focused on a growing phenomenon around Roh in the political geography, which 
was marginalised in the mainstream. For example, there was no Chosun article on the 
day of Seoul primary (27th) in sharp contrast to OMN’s 6 articles delivering it in detail 
ranging from Roh’s public speech and political philosophy and vision to his family 
stories. This indicates that the dominant media ignored the Roh phenomenon until he 
was elected as the official MDP candidate whereas OMN accorded enormous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Until the 2004 general election when the Labour Party formed a negotiating body in the Parliament by 
winning 9 seats, Korean politics was run under two party systems. 
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newsworthiness to it. Moreover, the textual analysis of those articles shows that Chosun 
articles framed Roh in a very hostile, negative way. For example, nearer to the time of 
the election, one article titled “The physiognomy of the presidential candidates”82 
metaphorically constructed a strongly positive image of the conservative GNP candidate 
Lee Hoe-chang as a king whereas denigrating Roh’s image.  
“Lee has a physiognomy of a falcon or an eagle, which means dignified 
and clean…Lee’s mouth has a monkey’s physiognomy, which means 
extraordinarily wise…Meanwhile, the MDP’s candidate Roh Moo-
hyun has a lynx’s physiognomy, which means an infighter. Its character 
is rather self-reliant, not in harmony with others… The deep wrinkle on 
his forehead tells his stubbornness.” (28th November 2002, Chosun, 
emphasis mine) 
It is worthwhile to note that the article, although placed in a small space, had some 
importance as a regular daily section article; it spoke to people’s stereotyped perceptions 
lurking in the collective consciousness and associated Lee or Roh with the desired 
image according to their purpose. For example, nearer an election day in 2002, there 
was continuous gossip about presidential candidates’ physiognomic perception as stated 
in the Chosun’s article. It was argued that the rumoured perception of a candidate had 
played a significant role for some older generation’s voting decision. Interestingly, in 
contrast to Chosun’s physiognomic traits of the presidential candidates there was also a 
rumour spread that Roh’s distinct single wrinkle on the forehead was extremely rare as 
an indication of king’s fortune.  
In addition to what people wanted to know about but could not get from the 
mainstream media, OMN provided a discursive space for interactive and immediate - or 
sometimes prolonged - exchanges of communication to take place among news 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The stereotypical perception of people based on physiognomy is still influential in many aspects of 
Korean life. For example, it has been said that some big companies hired well-known fortune-tellers to 
view job interviewees’ physiognomy, e.g. whether or not an applicant will not leave the company and 
indeed work hard. 
153 	  
audiences through a 100-word readers’ commentary space alongside each article. 
Particularly during the MDP primary, the commentary space alongside the live 
webcasting transformed to a more dynamic, emotional public sphere to express and 
share passions for socio-political change.  
With respect to this active, vibrant citizen participation, it is notable to address 
how the fan community Nosamo played an important mobilising role, and how OMN 
contributed to foster that. Nosamo formed in the aftermath of Roh’s defeat after taking a 
risk by running in the traditionally conservative Pusan province83 in the 2000 general 
election. In the 2002 presidential election, Roh strove to fight the antagonistic 
regionalism between Kyungsang-do and Cholla-do provinces that had been long-rooted 
in Korean politics, and underscored a vision for socio-political reforms. During the 
2002 election, Nosamo – 77 percent of whom were in their twenties and thirties, and 
armed with Internet and mobile-based communications 84  - waged a nationwide 
campaign on-and-offline to spread his reformist image and vision for socio-political 
change. Consequently, the initial membership of 7,000 rapidly grew to more than 
49,000 by July 2002 (Kim, Moon and Yang, 2004, cited in Kang and Dyson, 2007) and 
73,000 by November 2002.  
From my participant observation of Nosamo in May 2002, mainly through 
online forums of the website, Nosamo recruited new membership that was reassured 
and enhanced through offline meetings. The online sub-community held regular or 
informal offline meetings on a regional level in which the scope of topics ranged from 
socio-political issues to trivial, personal events of the everyday just as in communities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Pusan province is one of the main cities in Kyungsang-do province where traditionally the conservative 
GNP is based. In the 2000 general election, Roh Moo-hyun took a risk to run in the province as a 
democratic MDP candidate in an attempt to demolish the conventional separation and antagonism 
between those two provinces – Kyungsang-do and Cholla-do (where traditionally the MDP was based) 
although he could have chosen another easier constituency to help him win.   
84 For more details about Nosamo’s activities for supporting Roh Moo-hyun, see Chang and Lee, 2006, p. 
156. 
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of private interests. The discursive space, in which continuity of these virtual and face-
to-face meetings took place, was often extended to the OMN commentary space as an 
online forum for the discussion of social, economic and political issues at stake. 
Through the instant and interactive conversation, the participants reassured their shared 
hope for socio-political change and strengthened their solidarity.  
It was an example of retrieved citizenship or social capital, the death of which 
Robert D. Putnam (2000; 1993, with Leonardi & Nanetti) lamented in modern society. 
Putnam argues that the social capital as a substantial component for democracy such as 
trust and civic engagement has been seen in decline today in spite of abundance of new 
media. Certainly, there were other online political forums such as Nosamo or Seoprise in 
which discussions of imminent issues took place but these spaces tended to exclude 
antagonists or floating voters. OMN overcame the limitations that Nosamo or Seoprise 
showed as fan-communities and offered an inclusive public sphere for coalition of the 
oppositional forces desiring change. In so doing, OMN mediated a shared dialogue and 
consciousness of socio-political reforms.  
Another focal event during the election was the death of two schoolgirls 
knocked down by a US armoured vehicle on 13th June. Unlike the mainstream media 
that treated it as one straight article, and instead focused on the World Cup football 
tournament, OMN delivered a series of special reports of the event and the SOFA 
(South Korea-US Status of Forces Agreement)85 for over a year86. Although there were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 After the accident, the South Korean police had to hand over custody of the US soldiers who ran over 
the victims to a US military court without any criminal investigation. A 2001 amendment to the 
agreement says that South Korean authorities, upon their request, will be given custody of US service 
members and others covered by the SOFA following indictment for serious crimes such as murder, arson, 
rape and illegal drug trafficking. Otherwise, South Korean authorities must transfer them to US custody 
upon request. However, in practice, the procedure for the South Korean authorities to request custody of 
the suspected US soldiers was complicated and impossible without the US military’s cooperation 
(Military.com, 2011). Regarding the two girls’ death, the US military court acquitted the two responsible 
soldiers of negligent homicide and sent them to the US.  
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continuous protests of small groups, it was after an OMN reader Ang-ma suggested a 
vigil rally in memory of the victims that thousands of citizens took the street to demand 
the US to hand over the soldiers to the South Korean court. At this time, once again 
OMN provided a public sphere for reflexive discussions and mobilisation. The massive 
protests took place every weekend from 29th November to 31st December 2002, and 
expanded to more general anti-American protests. Eventually, the anti-American 
sentiment disseminated among the public helped anti-American reformist Roh Moo-
hyun to stand out in comparison with opposition candidate Lee Hoe-chang, whose first 
son was suspected to have received an unjust exemption of military service during his 
term as a justice of the Supreme Court.  
Around one month before the election, a remarkable political event took place. 
Roh Moo-hyun and Chung Mong-jun of the People’s Unity 21 Party agreed to a single 
candidacy following a survey of public opinion, which had been Chung’s proposal. 
According to the public survey, Roh became the sole candidate of the two parties as of 
25th November. However, Chung cancelled the agreement on 18th December 2002, one 
day before the election. On that day, OMN registered as many as 20 million page views 
in a country of only about 40 million at the time. In addition, the OMN’s news of 
Chung’s withdrawal received 1,810 readers’ commentaries. Over 1,500 commentaries 
were posted about the election, most of which were passionately encouraging voting for 
Roh.  
I shouldn’t sleep at all just like the readers who wrote below.. I too will 
go for voting. (Anti-conservative at 05.36am) 
It is a shame that we as Korean nationals abroad cannot have voting 
right but we strongly support Roh and thus we successfully persuaded 
our parents in Korea to vote for him… Dear young voters in Korea, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 The 259 special reports were conducted from 14th June 2002 to 30th November 2003, when was the first 
anniversary of the memorial vigil rally for the two girls.  
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beg you to vote please. Please let us persuade floating voters and 
parents who considered voting for Lee to vote for Roh. Thus, let us 
make our new history with our own hands. (Korean resident abroad, 
Kang Woo-suk at 05.40am).  
I came back after planting hope. And I will do my duties.. Let us call 
our friends and family to persuade them to vote for Roh….I just want 
my 3-year-old daughter to grow in a hopeful country. I, who am not a 
Nosamo member at all but just love my wife and a daughter, am 
sincerely asking you to vote for Roh (Citizen of Cheonan city at 
07.24am).  
As such, Chung’s abrupt reversal heated the online space with netizens’ discussions. 
Interestingly, it contributed to dramatically consolidate the forces of pro-democracy and 
socio-political reform to vote for Roh and to make many undecided voters, as well as 
supporters of the Democratic Labour Paty candidate Kwon Young-gil, turn to support 
Roh in order to prevent the GNP candidate Lee from winning the presidency. As 
addressed in the readers’ opinions above, the Roh supporters including Nosamo actively 
mobilised voters by online texted communication at OMN and otherwise, mobile 
messages and phone calls, or MSN messenger communication on election day. In the 
end, the MDP’s Roh Moo-hyun dramatically won the GNP over hopeful Lee Hoe-chang 
by over half a million votes. Strikingly, the then elected President Roh gave an 
exclusive president-elect interview87 to OMN for the celebration of its third anniversary 
in February 2003. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 This interview was not Mr. Roh’s ‘presidential’ interview as so many academic articles described – Mr. 
Roh was inaugurated as President on 25th February 2003 and the interview was conducted on 22nd 
February 2003. 
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5.4.2. From the Margins to the Mainstream 
5.4.2.1. Entering the mainstream 
Through the rapidly growing readership and volume of readers’ opinions across a series 
of political events during the election, OMN had successfully positioned itself as an 
influential news outlet. According to the survey of Sisa Journal88 (Ahn, 2009), one of 
the most influential current affairs magazines, OMN had expanded its influence on the 
formation of public opinion since 2000 when OMN became the first online newspaper 
to enter the top ten ranking, at number ten. From 2003 to 2005 following the 2002 
presidential election, it took sixth place at the height of its success after the terrestrial 
television broadcasting media KBS and MBC and the dominant newspapers Chosun, 
Joong Ang and Dong-A. This had immense significance in the sense that a progressive 
Internet-based news outlet had entered the mainstream, leaving behind the other 
competing progressive newspapers such as Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang.   
By the same token, OMN expanded on a nationwide scale. It launched local 
editions covering five regions including two different parts of the south Cholla-do 
province (2000, 2002) and the north Cholla-do (2000), the north Kyungsang-do (2000) 
and the south Chungcheong-do (2002). Moreover, in 2004, it launched a full-fledged 
operation of the podcast OhmyTV in November 2002 and, in 2004, began an English 
language edition of OMN. On 30th March 2004, at the peak of the anti-Impeachment 
protest89, OhmyTV aired the demonstration on the spot and remarkably received 85,000 
texted commentaries alongside the live webcast. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Sisa Journal is a weekly current affairs magazine. Since 1991, it has conducted a survey about the 
influence of news and current affairs media including newspapers and broadcasting media, the Internet-
based newspapers and portal websites. The respondents consist of 1,000 experts who were selected from 
10 expertise areas such as politics, law, medicine, business, etc.   
89 The parliament passed a bill to force President Roh to stand down on 12th March 2004. The anti-
Impeachment protest began from the following day and lasted until the general election day of 15th April. 
More details are charted in the Chapter Six ‘Online Political Satire’.   
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OMN’s augmented influence and success was reassured through its profitable 
business as well. Unlike most alternative online media adopting citizen participatory 
journalism, OMN had a profitable business model: a voluntary subscription payment 
system along with commercial advertising and news sales. In general, 70 to 80 percent 
of OMN’s revenue comes from commercial advertising and 5 percent comes from 
subscription fees of the weekly90 and voluntary subscription payment. The remainder 
comes from the selling the news service to portal websites and mobile phone providers 
(Kim, 2007a). What was unique about OMN’s revenue model was the voluntary 
subscription payment system, which was initiated by a reader’s suggestion on 19th 
December 2002. OMN collected readers’ opinions by emails and through the readers’ 
commentary space and eventually 74.8% approved the suggestion. Hence, OMN 
implemented the scheme from 30th December 2002, which allowed readers to choose 
one of the four subscription options – 3,000KRW per month, 15,000KRW for 6 months, 
30,000KRW per year, and 50,000KRW per year including the weekly – if they were 
willing to pay. Within 5 days of its execution, a subscription was collected from 2,627 
readers totalling 66,143,000KRW (approximately 60,000US$) and it continued to 
increase. In addition to the rapidly growing readership and influence, OMN’s 
advertising grew steadily enough to generate profits from December 200391 that were 
sustained until 2007.  
However, from the 2008 inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration, the 
governmental advertising revenue of OMN rapidly decreased. From 2008 to June 2009, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 OMN’s interview of the MDP’s presidential candidates scheduled on 5th February 2002 was cancelled 
by the National Election Commission. According to the Periodical Registration Law, as an Internet 
website OMN should not be regarded as the press and thus should not be granted to deliver a talk or an 
interview with candidates. Therefore, on 30th April 2002, OMN published an offline weekly OhmyNews 
2002 with focus on the election. The publication of the weekly enabled OMN to carry out an interview 
with the MDP presidential candidate Roh on 30th April. Its yearly subscription was 50,000KRW 
(approximately 46US$).   
91 According to the CEO Oh (2005), OMN had suffered a deficit of around 30millionKRW until then.  
159 	  
OMN received no advertising order from the central government at all (Oh, 2009), and 
instead most of governmental online advertising concentrated on conservative news 
websites92 (Choi, 2009). Consequently, in 2009, OMN’s advertising revenue rapidly 
declined by 70 percent against the previous year. In order to overcome this deficit, 
OMN started a campaign in July 2009 to attempt to reach 100,000 subscribers within 
three years and asked that each new subscriber pay 10,000KRW (10US$) per month. 
From their 2009 base of about 2000 subscribers the number reached 5,380 on 4th March 
2010 and only 7,352 in May 2011. Despite the efforts to (re-)draw public attention and 
support, OMN’s overall outlook is deemed to be uncertain. 
5.4.2.2. Counter-flow of globalisation   
The imbalanced flow of global communication has been discussed since the MacBride 
Commission of UNESCO (the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization) announced by NWICO (New World Information and Communication 
Order) in the late 1970s (Nordenstreng, 2010). And NWICO called for a revitalisation at 
the MacBride Roundtable on Communication meeting in 1989 (Wasko, 1993, p.164). 
As this counter-flow of globalisation discourse strengthened in the mid-1990s and the 
early 2000s with the emerging Bollywood market in the western world, the flow of 
media content from the mainstream to the margins had been a focus in academic 
discourse. In this regard, it is noteworthy that OMN has vastly influenced prospective 
imitators with a small capital but a big hope for alternative journalism, as well as 
mainstream media players both domestically and globally. Firstly, readers’ 100-word 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 The Democratic MP Choi Moon-sun released the analysis of the distribution of governmental 
advertising during this period. While most of governmental advertising went to conservative online news 
sites such as New Daily (75.50), Dailian (64.00), Frontier Times (43.70) and Digital Chosun (41.10), 
online news sites that were critical of the government received few advertising orders - Pressian (zero) 
and Media Today (2.20). The top online newspaper OMN barely managed to receive local government 
advertising order (120.85) but none from the central. The unit used in here is million KRW.  
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commentary space alongside a news article has been adopted in various ways. For 
example, the largest-circulated newspaper Chosun employed it in their online version 
Chosun.com in March 2002. In 2005, BBC, CNN and The Los Angeles Times (online 
editorials) allowed audiences to post comments, photos and videos (Lee, 2007). Soon 
the readers’ commentary space alongside an article became the norm in most online 
news websites worldwide. Secondly, OMN’s citizen reporter system has been adopted 
by differing media: Hankyoreh’s Hani Reporters consisting of 617 citizens (April 
2000); broadcasting media MBC’s iMNews Citizen Reporters (2003); and SBS’s U-
porter (2005) (Sung, Kim, Kim and Im, 2006, p.26).  
Strikingly, OMN’s citizen reporter system has been variously implanted in 
citizen-based news websites in the world. In the US, iTalkNews (2005) was operated by 
six full-time staff of editorial team for checking style, grammar and accuracy of 
citizens’ stories. More significantly, in Japan, several online news outlets were launched 
in pursuit of providing socio-politically progressive views that were marginalised in the 
mainstream. For example, Nikkanberita (www.nikkanberita.com) was launched in June 
2002. One full-time staff and five to six part-time volunteers co-work with citizen 
reporters to deliver alternative news in the world (Park, 2006). In February 2003, with 
the slogan “Let’s make genuine press with the power of citizen reporters”, JanJan 
(Japan Alternative News for Justices and New Cultures) was launched. In addition, in 
August 2006, a Japanese corporation, Softbank, invested 11billionKRW (11million 
US$) for launching OhmyNews Japan (www.ohmynews.co.jp) in cooperation with 
OMN (Lee, 2006). However, these news websites seemed to struggle. In comparison 
with OMN steadily publishing around 150 to 200 citizens’ articles per day, JanJan had 
only about 50 articles sent to the editorial team and its page views reached less than 
0.5% of OMN’s. In order to overcome sluggish growth, Ohmynews Japan reorganised 
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to focus more on citizens’ life stories rather than hard news and cut back 20 employees 
and wages in 2008. There could be many factors for this slump such as the thriving 
blogosphere, etc. However, the main reason seems the lack of Japanese people’s passion 
and desire for change, which might well be inspired and expanded through direct 
participation in news (re)production. Japanese social activist Ishizu’s claim in Japan 
Media Review (2003) is noteworthy. He explains that without a change in the chronic 
political apathy of Japanese people, there would be no social change no matter what 
kind of media may emerge (cited in Kang, 2003).  
5.5. The Cheonan Sinking and the 2010 Local Election  
In the following sections I will examine the ways in which the new communicative 
possibilities afforded by new media such as Daum Agora and Twitter as well as OMN 
contributed to the unexpected turn of the 2010 local election surrounding the Cheonan 
sinking.  
5.5.1. The Official Discourse: The North Korean Torpedo Attack  
5.5.1.1. The JIG announcement  
On 26th March 2010, the Cheonan, a South Korean patrol ship monitoring North Korean 
submarine activity, “was split in two and sank” near the contested maritime boundary 
between the two Koreas. On 20th May, the first day of the official local election 
campaign, the Joint Investigation Group (JIG) – consisting of military experts and 
civilians from South Korea and some advisers from the US, the UK, Australia and 
Sweden – announced that a North Korean torpedo was responsible for the death of 46 
crewmembers. The key evidence for the claim were torpedo fragments having the same 
dimensions as North Korean torpedoes (as seen in North Korean munitions pamphlets) 
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and ink marking ‘number 1’ written in North Korean style found on the fragments 
(Cyranoski, 2010;Yoo, 2010). On 24th May, at the Korean War memorial hall, President 
Lee Myung-bak strongly denounced North Korea for the Cheonan sinking as a 
profoundly provocative act of war. Moreover, the ministers of National Defence, 
Reunification and Foreign Affairs had a press conference to announce several austere 
measures to sanction North Korea. These included the prompt suspension of all joint 
ventures such as Gumkang Mountain Tourism (excepting Gaesung Industrial District93) 
and of the aid programmes for infants, the banning of all traffic of North Korean ships 
in the South Korean sea area, and the restart of propaganda in the military demarcation 
zone, which had been ceased since the 2004 Agreement. In addition, joint military drills 
between South Korea and the US were re-commenced (Hwang, 2010).  
5.5.1.2. Mainstream media discourse: retaliation and warfare 
Instantly, the entire nation was shaken up with a flood of news related to the Cheonan 
sinking. Notably, the discourse of retaliation for the North Korean attack and warfare 
dominated the news landscape. It is worthwhile to examine how the mainstream media 
constructed the discourse. On the day of the government’s announcement of stringent 
sanctions, a Chosun article supported the government’s authority and affirmation by 
asserting the militant measures to undertake and denouncing citizens’ questioning of the 
JIG claims.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 As the largest joint project between the two Koreas, the building of the joint industrial district in the 
Gaesung area in North Korea was initially launched in 2000 by the founder and CEO of Hyundai Asan 
Corp, Chung Joo-Young (who came from North Korea during the Korean War) and the North Korean 
leader, Kim Jeong-Il. Its key objective was to promote the economic cooperation between the two Koreas 
and with foreign nations, as well as to aid co-prosperity of the two Koreas, and to secure competitiveness 
in the global market. Under the agreement, North Korea leases the land to South Korea for 70 years and 
South Korea constructs the free economic zone and sells the area to South Korean and foreign companies 
(Chung, 2006).  
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The government promised to take drastic measures to prevent North 
Korea’s further provocative actions. However, I am very much 
concerned… [that] According to a survey of public opinion, only 72 
percent of respondents trust the JIG’s report and 59 percent oppose 
military confrontation… This time we must take all possible measures 
to discontinue North Korea’s intention of invasion that has lasted for 
the past several decades… The most effective steps would be military 
operation… It is experts’ consensus that we would be able to pave our 
new future if we resolve this matter. If we are afraid of the small price 
to pay now, our tomorrow has no hope and needs bigger, harsher 
sacrifice (Kim, 2010a). 
On the following day, the tone of a Chosun editorial to instigate warfare became acute. 
By signifying a military operation and confrontation as a right of self-defence, Chosun 
manufactured the warfare discourse as a righteous reaction. Its excerpt is as follows:  
At the 1974 general meeting, the UN stipulated, “Regardless of 
declaration of war, the attack by one nation’s land/air/naval forces, fleet 
or aviation is clearly the action of invasion.” It is the case of the North 
Korean torpedo attack… According to the Act 51 of the UN Charter, 
South Korea has the right of self-defence. The US invaded Afghanistan 
one month after the September 11 Terror for the reason of self-
defence…Now is the best time that South Korea should declare the 
self-defence right… In order not only to eliminate anxiety about 
domestic and global security but also to prevent North Korea’s 
misjudgement, the 7th fleet of the US navy should be placed in the 
Peninsula waters and the Korea-US joint drill should be conducted at 
once. Now is the moment we must confront North Korea with all our 
strength (21st May 2010).   
Likewise, Chosun negated citizens’ questioning of the government report as ‘groundless 
rumours’ that ‘doers’ spread on the Internet. In contrast, it placed much weight on the 
JIG report as a ‘scientific, objective’ probe and thus backed up the government’s 
measures. The Chosun articles argue as follows: 
‘Groundless rumours’ (24th May 2010) 
It has been only two years since the ill-found rumours of mad cow 
disease were prevailed on the Internet, and now the groundless, 
nonsensical rumour focused around the reason for the Cheonan sinking 
again continues to spread… Since the JIG discovery of the fragment of 
torpedo propeller at the accident site was released, there are some 
people who are questioning whether the marking ‘Il-bun’ on the inside 
of the propeller was truly written by North Koreans, and how the 
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propeller remained intact in the explosion of the torpedo… In respect 
to the JIG report of ‘scientific’ scrutiny, the US said, “Admirable.” 
Even the Chinese government demanding the ‘scientific, objective’ 
probe did not deny the JIG analysis. Only some of ‘doers’ in our 
society raise doubts at the level of ‘groundless rumours’.  
‘Scientist Yun Duk-Yong’s response to the ‘groundless rumours’ of the 
Cheonan sinking (1st June 2010) 
The head of the JIG, Yun Duk-Yong, said, “When a scientist writes a 
thesis, he/she is always concerned that it will be published to the world 
and recorded for good. I took the inspection of the sunken ship with the 
scientist’s attitude.” He reaffirmed in the name of a scientist that the 
JIG report was true. That is the Cheonan ship was torpedoed by North 
Korea.   
As such, the dominant war discourse in the mainstream media eventually overwhelmed 
the policy- and issue-based discussions that were expected to take place nearer the 
election. Until the JIG announcement, the opposition parties and civic groups had 
robustly raised questions about the Four-River Restoration Project and the Sejong City 
Project, and claimed the full-fledged implementation of free school-meals from primary 
to high schools. However, the JIG report and the mainstream war discourse constructed 
strained political situations and thus even the opposition parties became very cautious 
not to be mistakenly accused of supporting North Korea. Notably, the political editor-
in-chief of Hankyoreh, Kim Chong-Chul, said in late April that the Cheonan sinking 
delayed the feature story about the local election that focused on topical issues. In 
addition, Chosun addressed that they anticipated issue-based stories would be largely 
delivered nearer the election but if the crucial evidence of the reason for the sinking was 
released before the election, then perhaps the Cheonan issue would overwhelm the 
election once again (MediaToday, 2010). Eventually, these worries turned out to be 
true.  
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5.5.2. Citizens’ Counter-Discourse 
5.5.2.1. Agora 
Citizens’ genuine search for the truth about the Cheonan sinking grew exponentially 
after 26th March. In particular, netizens persistently questioned the blue marking 
‘number 1’ (its Korean pronunciation is Il-bun) on the torpedo fragment that the JIG 
provided as a crucial evidence for the North Korean attack. At the most visited portal 
online forum Agora, that had provided a discursive public sphere during the 2008 anti-
US beef protest, were diverse investigations and analyses conducted by netizens. For 
example, 475 posts were uploaded on a single day, 20th May, the day of the JIG 
announcement. To illustrate some of the netizens’ critical insights from Agora:   
The JIG asserted that the marking Il-bun proved that the Cheonan ship 
was torpedoed by North Korea… but the marking on the North Korean 
drill torpedo which was collected by the navy was written Sa-ho (‘Sa’ 
means 4 and ‘ho’ means number)…and certainly its marking was 
rusted away… but the marking that the JIG submitted as crucial 
evidence was so clear that it looked newly written.. The JIG must 
explain the reason for the discrepancy between the styles of marking 
numbers on the North Korean torpedoes…One more thing… why is 
there no one that apologized, or any military authority that took 
responsibility for the event.. How on earth could the Ministry of 
National Defense, who said would resign because of the event, still 
shamelessly direct the army and have a meeting with President, 
pretending nothing happened…As a member of the nation, I will fight 
for the truth of the Cheonan sinking (Soulmusician).   
Soulmusician pointed out two things. Firstly, the JIG claim that the blue marking Il-bun 
was key evidence for the North Korean attack was not convincing because the writing 
style did not fit into the traditional North Korean style and the letter looked re-written. 
Secondly, the government authority should have taken responsibility for the death of the 
soldiers. Particularly, the JIG’s weak, unclear argument about the marking aroused 
intense reactions like Soulmusician’s. For instance, the post “Oops! Navy’s critical 
mistake” of netizen Saengnamul suspected that the marking seemed to be written over 
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the rusted torpedo propeller after it had been salvaged from the sunken ship. Within a 
day, the post was viewed 11,134 times and drew 56 readers’ responses. Likewise, the 
commentaries varied from a fact-based analysis, a satirical scorn of the JIG review to 
the promotion of participation in the upcoming local election:  
Given the 200kg gunpowder explosion, it is preposterous that the 
torpedo could be undamaged and furthermore the marking remains 
intact, which is as paradoxical as surviving crew members with no 
injury (Ddamjaengi). 
Today I saw the best comedy ever (Bugsoo; hee). 
Hush.. if this information leaks, they might do repainting tonight 
(Yahwoori).    
After watching two hour live coverage, I concluded the JIG 
announcement was nonsensical (Mawoori).  
I guess the government may have provided wrong evidence – the 
marking Il-bun-… all of which made me think the quality of the North 
Korean products – torpedo and the marking ink that stays intact even in 
an intensively heated explosion – is excellent! (Early-Summer)   
The best North Korean marking pen ever… it should be granted a 
Nobel Stationery Prize! (Baram) 
I thought the government is campaigning for a no.1 GNP candidate in 
the election94 (Spring of Prague).  
Even if what we think is the truth, what could we do.. All we can do is 
to vote. Let’s all vote! (Bungauhppang) 
Moreover, there arose a conspiracy theory among netizens largely at the Daum Agora 
and personal bloggers’ pages about the timing of government’s investigation and 
announcement. They questioned that although the salvage of the Cheonan was 
conducted nearly two months after the sinking, the JIG disclosed the report just 5 days 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 In Korean politics, a candidate is numbered according to the size of a party’s parliamentary seat. 
Accordingly the ruling party is usually given the number 1 (Il-bun), and the second largest opposition 
party is numbered 2. In addition, the conservative party GNP has reigned for over three consecutive 
decades and thus its candidate’s number was Il-bun and the party logo has been ‘blue’. In the 2010 local 
election, the ruling party GNP’s candidate’s number is ‘Il-bun with blue logo’. In this sense, netizens are 
metaphorically ridiculing the government’s announcement about the crucial evidence for the North 
Korean torpedo attack – the ‘blue’ marking Il-bun.   
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after the ship was salvaged and only 10 days ahead of the election. In addition, the 
government announced the austere measures one day after the late former president 
Roh’s 1st anniversary. In other words, the netizens claimed that the government and the 
GNP tried to use the Cheonan sinking as a political manoeuvre to win the local election 
by manufacturing a collective fear.  
Consequently, unclear and insufficient disclosure of relevant information to the 
public only resulted in exacerbating netizens’ doubts and distrust of the government 
authority. The traditional way of manufacturing public opinion by means of a warfare 
discourse forged through the mainstream media no longer worked well. Citizens’ 
rational questioning about the JIG report and vibrant communication on the Internet 
seemed to neutralise the political manoeuvre. As users’ commentaries at Agora 
illustrated above, the mockery of the unveiled evidence for the Cheonan sinking was so 
playful that it maintained readers emotionally engaged and interested enough to read 
through others’ responses. Moreover, those commentaries provided alternative views 
and analytical information of the issue that were not available in the mainstream 
conservative media. In the sense that news provides information and interpretation of an 
event, Agora space played an important role of a news medium by which citizens acted 
as key players to question the truth of the JIG announcement and bring up conspiracy 
theories. 
5.5.2.2. OMN  
Despite its declined influence and readership since 2006, OMN still played an important 
role in arousing public attention at a time of particular socio-political unrest like the 
2008 protest. In addition, in the sense that OMN provided a public sphere for common 
people who were not technologically skilful and preferred institutional media for 
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writing, it is worthwhile to examine how citizens shaped the Cheonan event with 
relevance to their everyday lives. An excerpt of an OMN article titled “A 70 year old 
common folk’s letter to the Cheonan ship sellers” (Hong, 2010b) is illustrated below.  
I am in my 70s, born in the 1930s during the Japanese colonial era and 
witnessed our country’s independence. In the Korean War, the North 
Korean communists killed my grandfather, father and uncle. My sons 
and I all served military service as we believed it was the duty of the 
people. Therefore, I am one of common people who underwent massive 
upheavals of Korea’s modern history… I have carefully observed the 
current events of the Cheonan sinking… I was convinced that the 
Cheonan was sunk by North Korea as they proclaimed revenge last 
November when they lost the naval battle of Daecheong in West 
maritime…  
In the Cheonan sinking, 46 seamen were killed (not a single officer was 
killed) and 10 more victims died during the process of the JIG 
investigation.. Moreover, my conviction of the North Korean attack 
became gradually uncertain since the JIG failed to clarify neither the 
North Korean submarine’s penetrating route nor the demolition 
method.  
It seems that we are in a defenceless state, given that the North Korean 
submarine blew up our warship and disappeared so swiftly in the 
middle of the Korea and US Joint drill with two US Aegis destroyers 
and ten warships…  
Most common people are the former ranks like me unless they are 
awarded a medal for death in a battle. To you officers, the lower ranks 
may look like insignificant beings but you must know that the majority 
of the people now holding sovereign power were once the lowest ranks 
in military service just like me… 
It was terribly shameful that the president demanded North Korea to 
account for the sinking… but avoided the responsibility of military 
authorities in charge of the tragedy… I hope that he will not drive the 
nation into war in order to show his confidence of victory despite his 
military service exemption. If a war broke out, we, the majority of 
common people, would be simply dead since we have no capability to 
escape abroad at all. Most importantly, the government should 
reassure that the military authority will take responsibility for the 
sinking and that we will be safe as the first priority. As a finalising 
remark, you, who are able to escape from this country if in war, do not 
sell war anymore. That makes me shudder. (Emphasis mine) 
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The author’s personal background – 70 years old with experience of military service 
and the Korean War – drew readers’ rapport to form a base to build an understanding. 
Contrary to the stereotypical image of over 50-year-olds with experience of the Korean 
War, the citizen author challenged the authority of the government and the GNP. In 
other words, he provided a critical reason for citizens’ distrust and constant questioning 
of the JIG review by delivering additional information that had not been revealed by the 
authorities, which was that the ship had been sunk in the middle of a Korea-US joint 
naval drill. In this way, he aroused public attention to the hidden fact and added weight 
to the voice of netizens and civic activist groups.  
Moreover, the frankly articulated feelings from the standpoint of common 
people who have no power or authority in social terms, elicited common people’s 
emotionality about the current issue. Emotions such as anxiety about national security, 
confusion about the truth of the sinking, sorrow for the seamen’s deaths, and anger 
towards the government and military authorities, resonated among readers with 9895 
texted commentaries registered. Despite some antagonism, most commentaries from 
common people strongly supported the author’s affective thinking96. Some of those 
responses are delineated below:  
I absolutely agree with you. I was born in 1932, fought as a private in 
the 1950 Korean War and was discharged with a war wound in 1951, 
and all my three sons completed their military service. Therefore, I am 
a common person just like you. That is why I feel a complete rapport 
with every line of your story. Yes, let us keep peace in the two Koreas, 
rather than getting the Order of Military Merit by stirring up war. 
(Sigolnoin [old country man]) 
I am too an old man having done my military service at a young age. 
Your opinion is nearly the same as mine except one thing - from the 
beginning of the Cheonan event, I thought it was not caused by North 
Korea but by accident. Moreover, the JIG’s announcement has too 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The reader’s voluntary manuscript payment for this article recorded 215,000KRW.  
96 I coined affective thinking, which means that thinking and feeling cannot be separated but interlinked. 
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many loopholes to change my mind. I think it is not just that the 
government neglected the 46 dead navy men and then awarded medals 
to them as heroes. More disturbingly, it is too cruel that the GNP used 
the event for the sake of their winning the election. I am very much 
concerned that 60-and 70-year olds support the GNP according to the 
survey. Thus, I hope 20-and 30-year olds take an active part in ballot. 
(All the same)  
One of the key issues in the election was the free school meal for 
children… How come was it shifted so instantly to the Cheoan sinking? 
Would it not starve poor children? Would it matter more than war (to 
the government)? Would the war matter more than winning the 
election?? (Water ghost) 
As such, citizens’ reinterpretation and re-contextualisation of the current issue 
reengaged readers to contemplate and discuss the public issue including election-related 
policies like the provision of free school meals, the Four-River Restoration Project, etc.  
5.5.3. Tweeting and Re-tweeting: Unexpected Turn of GNP Defeat  
Surprisingly, in contrast to the prevailing anticipation, the election turned out to be 
disastrous for the GNP. According to public opinion surveys, it seemed that the 
Cheonan event and the government’s austere measures a few days ahead of the election 
had made a substantial effect for the GNP to take the lead; the ruling party was 
anticipated to win 8 to 9 of the 16 governors’ posts. However, the result was the 
opposite: the GNP managed to win only 6 seats and the DP won 7 seats and the Liberal 
Advanced Party 1 seat and the independent candidates 2 seats. The electoral turnout was 
54.5 percent, the highest in 15 years, to which young people’s active participation 
contributed. Traditionally in Korean politics, it is a norm that a high voting rate among 
young people leads to the victory of democratic and progressive-oriented parties. The 
Democrats won the majority nationwide and strikingly even in Gangwon-do province, 
which is closest to the borderline between the two Koreas and therefore traditionally the 
domain of the conservative GNP. Undoubtedly, there were some factors that possibly 
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aided the victory of the Democratic candidates. These included the successful solidarity 
and single candidacy among the opposition parties including the DP, the People’s 
Participation Party, the Labour Party and the New Progressive Party, the celebrity Kim 
Je-dong’s being laid-off (Nam, 2010;Yang, 2010) from an entertainment programme 
allegedly due to pressure from the GNP and a Buddhist monk Moon-Soo’s self 
immolation in protest against the Four-River Restoration Project97.  
In spite of the government’s continuing announcements of austere, war-
triggering measures and the conservative media discourse, the most striking factors, 
leading to the victory of the democratic coalition groups over the ruling conservatives, 
were the citizens’ critical insight as regards the Cheonan sinking and the poverty of the 
government proclamations that followed. Particularly, using mobile micro and SNS 
media like twitter, blogging and citizens’ actions to raise and mobilise the public 
attention of the election, which was largely ignored by the conservative mainstream 
media, contributed to the unexpected turn of the election.  
5.6. Conclusion 
As ICT became more prevalent with the mass adoption and availability of the Internet, 
citizens’ mistrust of the conservative mainstream media and politics became interwoven 
with a new possibility afforded by new media and the impact of new media outlets like 
OMN rippled through the fabric of Korean society.  
Empowering citizens by providing media platforms that reflected their 
everyday lives and issues of concern transformed the notions of “Who is a journalist?” 
and “What is news?” and questioned the theoretically supposed boundaries between the 
public and the private. By removing previous journalistic standards and maximising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 For details, please see Han (2010a) Hong (2010c), and Nam (2010). 
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people’s engagement and control of news production, in which the newsworthiness is 
focused on the relevance of events to people’s everyday lives, OMN broke down the 
linear relationship between professional journalists and citizens. As such, OMN shifted 
the focus of news from the view of editors or power elites to the emotionality and 
rationality of the people.   
This reshaping of the news was a dynamic shift in the journalistic paradigm and 
the resulting democratization of the news had real and often radical effects on the social 
and political landscape. Citizen journalism transformed the way people produced and 
consumed the news, whilst traditional mainstream news media were seen as bastions of 
power elitist views that people, particularly young people, found difficult to relate to.  
Critics in the mainstream argue that allowing citizens’ access to the exclusive 
arena of professional journalism has dumbed down news consumers by debasing the 
traditional standard of journalism. On the contrary, I hope I have shown that a more 
inclusive and more relevant news media, with institutionalized, citizen-led direct 
participation, tends to engage audiences with news that could be shared and 
recontextualised as the public concern and, in a number of powerful examples 
discussed, brought about real social change with the democratization process.   
Since the emergence of other new forms of media (SNS like Twitter, etc.), 
OMN has lost its novelty. Therefore, readership has declined which has significantly 
affected their influence and revenues. However, the most important legacy of OMN’s 
entry into the news media hinges on the redefinition of what is public versus what is 
private concern, which has continued to evolve with new forms of media. When a 
significant proportion of the news touches citizens’ lived experience and is shared 
across the dialogical space, people begin to feel the relevance of their lives in 
connection with others, which is important for validating personal opinions and 
173 	  
emotions, and mobilizing public sentiment into action leading to grassroots social 
change. 	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6. Online Political Satire:  
Placing politics in affect and entertainment 
Talk is action, action is communicative (Holland and Quinn, 1995) 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I attempt to explore democratic possibilities of online political satire, 
where politics is presented as a central concern in an entertainment mode. It is of 
importance to identify which particular mode of communication creates a discursive 
space in which private individuals are connected to the political (public) world, which is 
a fundamental role of democratic media (Dahlgren, 2009). In other words, in what 
context do media offer a recurring discursive space for people to engage with politics in 
their everyday lives?  
As having potential to enable an inter-subjective communication as an 
indispensable component for a public sphere, the role of conversation has long been 
emphasised by many media and political communication scholars (Bohman, 
1996;Calhoun, 1992;Couldry, Livingstone and Markham, 2007b;Dahlgren, 2006, 
2009;Habermas, 1974, 1989[1962], 1996). The Enlightenment rationality has positioned 
news and current affairs media as the most important genre of political discourse 
(Schudson, 1998), discrediting other non-serious media genres. News is traditionally 
believed to play a crucial political role in the realization and maintenance of a healthy 
working democracy. In contrast, entertainment media have been denounced by political 
science and political communication scholars as inherently harmful to democracy by 
aggravating the public’s political apathy and cynicism through the promotion of 
unhealthy media consumption and the spectacularisation or entertainmentisation of 
politics (Postman, 1985).  
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However, recent research suggests that ‘serious’ news and the official discourse 
of politics is largely failing to connect everyday politics to people’s lives (Baym, 
2010;Buckingham, 2000;Gray, Jones and Thompson, 2009;Jones, 2010) and not 
delivering their historic role of producing ‘informed citizens’ (Schudson, 1998). In our 
everyday lives we make sense of the world or our experiences through an ‘arational’ 
mode as ‘a combination of using our head and heart’ (Livingstone and Lunt, 
1994)(Livingstone & Lunt, 1994, p.276). Moreover, as John Street (2001) argues, 
‘politics is contained and constituted within non-political’ contexts and thus can be 
something fun to play with. In this regard, political satire, where politics is a central 
concern and is represented in an entertainment mode, needs to be considered in a new 
light. By the same token, it is important to contextualise the democratic potential of 
political satire in a given society – whether or not it is offering a discursive space for 
people to talk about politics in their everyday lives.    
Given this need, I will firstly examine the historical development of various 
forms of political satire in South Korea from 1961 to the early 2000s. In early 2004, 
when the President Impeachment bill was passed in the parliament, diverse forms of 
anti-Impeachment protest were conducted, and specifically online political parody 
played a key role in encouraging young people’s interest and engagement in the issue 
(Kwon, 2004;Park, 2004;Roh, 2004). No doubt as a result of the furore and protests the 
voting rate 98  grew by 2.7%, which was 59.9% of the population, and the pro-
government Open Uri party won the majority with 152 seats and the Progressive Labour 
party formed a negotiation body in the parliament for the first time in Korean political 
history.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The voting rate was 84.6% in the 12th general election in 1985 and gradually decreased until the 16th 
general election in 2000 (Hwang, 2004). 
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Therefore, I will examine how online political satire contextualised the current 
political issues and engaged people with politics around the President Impeachment bill 
and the general election in early 2004. For this, I chose three online political parodies 
and DC Inside, all of which led the online political satire boom at that time. Through 
analysing the logic of those political satires in connecting politics to audiences, as well 
as the communicative actions of the DC Inside members in relation to the focal issue, I 
aim to locate the potential links between entertainment/affect and politics. Finally, I will 
examine what the emergence of amateur satirists implies in the conventionally theorised 
relations of expert’s knowledge and lay reasoning. In so doing, I will critique the 
distinction between emotion and reason, news and entertainment, and professional 
thinking and lay knowledge in respect to politics.   
6.2. The Development of the Korean Political Satire  
The following sections chart the history of satirical political talk in various forms, 
ranging from word of mouth to the Internet-based satire, in relation to the degree of 
censorship and freedom of speech and expression in particular political, technological 
circumstances under study, which influenced the style and the extent of satire. The 
historical circumstances comprise three phases: before the 1987 democratisation; 
television satire boom after the democratisation; and the ICT-based satire boom in 
various mixed genres in the mid-2000s. In doing so, the aim is to illustrate the ways in 
which varying forms of political satire in particular time and space offers citizens an 
alternative means of critically discursive engagement with politics as well as of 
entertaining themselves.  
  
177 	  
6.2.1. Before the 1987 democratisation 
In regard to the relationship between freedom of speech and the prosperity of satire, 
Matthew Hodgart (1969, p.77) argues that freedom of speech is an indispensably 
‘essential condition’  for satire to be practised and prospered, whereas Dustin Griffin 
(1994, pp.138-140) claims that satire thrives in a rather repressed society where open, 
direct challenge to those in power and authority is not permitted. This is because Griffin 
sees satire as an indirect apparatus – such as irony, innuendo, allegory and fable – to 
attack politicians’ assumed intelligence and integrity, becoming necessarily useful 
where public criticism of political authority in official media is prohibited or far limited. 
These seemingly conflicting arguments of political satire can be applied in the Korean 
context, but only to varying degrees in a different time. On the one hand, satire has 
offered alternative ways of questioning and challenging political power and authority in 
the face of stringent censorship or ‘political reprisal’ by the authoritarian government to 
great extent. On the other hand, however, some degree of political tolerance and speech 
freedom is a necessity in order for political satire to flourish and to be enjoyed as a form 
of institutional media, which was clearly evidenced in the case of online political 
parodic satire boom in the mid-2000s.   
In the past three decades under the military authoritarian rule (1961-1987), as 
expounded in the chapter of Korean media landscape, open criticism of the ruling power 
and authority had been prohibited in the official media. Instead, as an indirect attack, 
ridiculing jokes about authoritarian presidents spread ‘by word of mouth’.  Through this 
dissemination, ordinary people formed a public sphere to criticise of the authoritarian 
power publicly, which allowed them to feel a sense of (temporary) liberating subversion. 
For instance, under the Park Jung-hee regime (1961-1979), the best known joke was a 
slightly sneering riddle about president Park and the first lady Yook: What do you call it 
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if Yook and Park have a fight in the Presidential residence Cheong Wa Dae? The 
answer was ‘Yook-Park Jeon’ which literally meant an extremely violent hand-to-hand 
fight. While it is difficult to translate humour across language and culture, this riddle 
diminished the President and the first lady in absolute power and authority to a barbaric, 
lowly and sickening position.  
Under the Chun Doo-hwan authoritarian government (1979-1987), there was a 
ludicrous event, which reveals how tyrannised the society was: as publicly known, two 
entertainers, an actor named Park Yong-shik and a comedian Lee Joo-il, were banned 
from playing in television dramas because their close resemblance to Chun’s facial 
appearance and their public presentation were regarded as a sort of defamation to Chun. 
In this repressive circumstance, a common joke about Chun was that when asked some 
questions of his favourite poet Suh Jeong-joo’s pen name, a famous movie title, and the 
name of the sculptor who created the masterpiece The Thinker, Chun answered all three 
wrongly, which ridiculed his intelligence. For the poet, Chun answered Midang instead 
of Maldang because he didn’t know it; for the movie, he mis-named Sa-kwan-kwah 
Shin-sah (its original English title is An Officer and A Gentleman) as To-kwan-kwah 
Shin-Toh because he read the most simple Chinese characters incorrectly; and he named 
the famous French sculptor Auguste Rodin as Oden (which means a fish cake in Korean) 
because in an exam he copied his would-be successor Roh Tae-Woo’s wrong answer! 
(Han, 2004). This, of course, indirectly ridiculed Roh as well.  In the relentlessly 
repressed society, those simple but witty, jokes of derision offered an opportunity for 
people to talk freely and even laugh at the most powerful authority. By situating all 
power and authority of the incumbent President in a far lower, contemptuous and 
disparaging discourse among ‘small groups of private individuals’, people could feel a 
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small sense of superiority and empowerment, though it was a momentary feeling that 
the institutional media could not yet provide  
6.2.2. Television’s political satire boom in the wake of the 1987 democratisation  
In the UK and the USA, it was in the late 1950s and early 1960s when political mockery 
became gradually acceptable on television and the view of politicians as something 
funny to ridicule, not just revere, slowly emerged from vigilant and self-controlled 
broadcasting institutions. In South Korea, institutionally mediated jokes about politics 
didn’t emerge in television broadcasting until the late 1980s, and even then quite slowly 
with a level of humour that might sound unsophisticated or immature to western ears. 
However, whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to outline cultural context in full 
detail, it should be sufficient to acknowledge that differences in culture and history 
naturally lead to differing senses of humour.  
In line with the 1987 democratisation, President Roh Tae-woo took a far softer 
position in controlling the media and public opinion than his predecessors. Roh allowed 
comedians to mimic his persona in television entertainment programmes. This opened 
up a way for political satire to be possible in mainstream broadcasting at the time.   
The first television satire programme appeared in 1987 after the 6.29 
Declaration. In the comedy programme Humour St. #1 by KBS 2, the section ‘President, 
Our President’ became very popular. This programme satirised the Korean Chaebol 
(family-owned and -run conglomerates) that were deeply corrupt but exerted power and 
influence in many aspects of the society through its close connections to political power. 
The comedian and satirist Kim Hyung-gon acted as the president of a virtual Chaebol 
Bi-Ryong Corporation and his oft-repeated, leading lines - “It should be successful… 
but it cannot be..” - became a popular phrase in various situations among audiences 
nationwide (Baek, 2006). And his ludicrous, quick stroking of the chin was associated 
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with the first lady Lee Soon-ja’s pointy chin (she was symbolised as the second most 
powerful authority to President Chun Doo-hwan in the country at that time). Especially 
the scene of supporting actors’ rubbing their palms in a flattering way to whatever Kim 
said and making their hands as a bell shape and turning them like the bells are ringing, 
represented the authoritarian society corrupted by flattery, iniquity and injustice in the 
Chun regime (Kim, 2006a). The most celebrated scene was when the brother-in-law 
(wife’s brother) shouted in the middle of a serious board meeting, “Let’s eat first! Work 
later!” To this absurd – given the Korean culture’s work ethic - proposal, Kim replied 
back, “Well, well, well.. if that were not my brother-in-law, I should fire him!” This line 
scathingly reveals the vices and follies of how the ruling elements of society, including 
Chaebol, were intertwined for their own good and interest – the deep-rooted operational 
mechanism of the society focused on personal connections rather than individual’s 
competence and qualifications.   
In the Chun regime, the first few minutes of the 9 O’clock primetime news 
were always allocated to a daily report about President Chun and first lady Lee as a 
means of propaganda showing how great our leader supposedly was. In this repressed 
society, the freedom of speech was far more limited and open attacks on the government 
or politicians were not allowed. Ordinary people could make indirect criticism and 
derision of the President and the corrupt ruling class by parroting the comedian Kim’s 
scathing lines and funny gestures in the course of everyday conversation with friends or 
family members. This was perhaps the only way that private individuals could share a 
sense of empowerment and dissidence. Interestingly, as a result of the 6.29 Declaration, 
the presidential election was approaching and the ruling party was highly cautious to 
avoid losing their votes in case of raising antagonism through censorship, and so 
television satire was aired in relatively freer circumstances and gained huge popularity.          
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Following Kim’s incisive satire there were a series of similar programmes that 
dealt with current affairs and politics, although the degree of satire was still limited to 
some extent. The KBS entertainment programme, Nero’s 24 hours, mocked the tyranny 
of an emperor Nero and his servants’ hypocrisy, flattery and deceitful reverence to him 
for their own sake. In July 1988, one of the major broadcasting companies, MBC, 
allocated a political satire section, Comedy Company – Choi Byung-Suh’s 
DdaDdaBuhDda99, in the Sunday entertainment programme Sunday Night Parade, 
which was the most popular entertainment programme at that time. The comedian Choi 
skilfully mimicked the voices of President Roh Tae-woo, the ex-president Chun Doo-
hwan and the three leading opposition politicians – Kim Dae-jung (DJ), Kim Young-
sam (YS) and Kim Jong-pil (JP). He also accurately imitated key gestures and publicly 
familiar, over-used phrases in their speech: DJ – with his particular Southern dialect and 
intonation “I think this way. I lament so deeply”, YS – also with his unique 
pronunciation “This time let’s terminate it certainly’, JP – “That’s difficult..” and Roh 
Tae-woo – “You trust this man,100 please” (Choi, 1988;Kim, 1992). This programme had 
significance in the sense that the satirist Choi and the producer of the programme were 
the first to experiment with placing omnipotent politicians, including the incumbent- 
and ex-president, as objects to be played with and ridiculed in an institutionalised media. 
This contributed to demystifying the most powerful authority by interweaving their 
silliness and irreverence into Choi’s preposterously parroted dialogues and gestures.  
In the Kim Young-sam government (1993-1998), the political jokes on 
television became more aggressive and twisted. The satirist Chang Duk-kyun, who is an 
author of a series of popular television political satires like KBS’s President, Our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 DdaDdaBuhDda [Korean] is an adverb. Its meaning is raising a question in a verbal word of a rigid 
style.    
100 The term ‘this man’ means himself, Roh Tae-woo.  
182 	  
President (1987) and Learning is Rewarding in the End (1996), argued that political 
satire became more acceptable after 1993 when he got his satirical book about President 
Kim published. Indeed, the political satire section Learning is Rewarding in the End on 
the SBS entertainment programme Comedy Punch Punch (1996) gained huge popularity. 
In the programme, the comedians mocked the two ex-presidents Chun Doo-hwan and 
Roh Tae-woo, and a parliamentary man Chung Joo-young, who was a founder of 
Hyundai and was elected as an MP in 1992. By the time the television satire broadcast, 
the two ex-presidents had been sentenced to death by a parliamentary hearing in charge 
of the 1979 coup d’état and the 1980 Gwang-ju Massacre. In Comedy Punch Punch, the 
television actor Park Yong-shik, who had been sacked because of his similar appearance 
to Chun under the Chun regime, fittingly played Chun in the satire this time, and the 
popular comedian Choi Byung-suh parroted Jung Joo-young’s persona who – whilst 
known as being compassionate and humane, albeit somewhat ignorant of politics – was 
involved in a sex scandal at that time. Similarly, there were a series of satire 
programmes such as SBS’s Comedy Observatory (Meeting of Observatory’s Executive 
Committee, 1993) and Lee Joo-il’s Tonight Show (1996).   
Yet the jokes about politicians were allowed only to the extent that the satire 
did not defame politicians in authority and power: the simple mimicking of an 
incumbent President was allowed but ridiculing or scornful mockery of the President or 
his family members was still prohibited. For example, in 1997, the segment Python’s 
Dream, of the KBS comedy programme Heaven of Humour, satirized Kim Hyun-chul, 
the second son of the incumbent President Kim, relating to a controversial political 
event at that time. In January 1997, in the course of investigating the conglomerate 
Hanbo Corporation’s bankruptcy, the prosecution disclosed that Hanbo Corp. had 
received an enormous amount of special loan in return for bribes.  Kim Hyun-chul was 
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deeply involved in the incident. As a result, Kim Hyun-chul had to attend a 
parliamentary hearing and in May 1997 was sentenced to two years imprisonment for 
influence peddling, bribes and tax evasion. It was a politically shocking event in the 
sense that Kim Hyun-chul was a key figure of an inner consulting team for President 
Kim and was sentenced during Kim’s presidency, which had never been imagined 
before. A few days before Python’s Dream was broadcast, a daily newspaper dealt with 
the episode in detail. Eventually the 17-minute episode got cut down to a 2-minute show. 
This event constructed a regressive atmosphere of political satire in the broadcasting 
industry until the next government, the regime of Kim Dae-jung  
6.2.3. Political satire boom across the media in late 1990s and early 2000s 
Kim Dae-jung, who had fought for democracy throughout his lifetime as a key political 
leader of the progressive, left-centre party, took office as President in 1998. It was the 
first time in modern Korean political history that the progressive, left-centre formed the 
government through a peaceful, legitimate election. Following his election, the late 
1990s and early 2000s marked the second satire boom in diverse forms of media 
because the Kim Dae-jung government enabled freedom of speech to be extended in 
every aspect of society. The satirical treatment of the ‘incumbent President’ was 
permitted in television comedy programmes. In addition, the advancement and 
abundance of ICTs facilitated the prosperous online parody culture, which were charted 
in detail in Chapter Three ‘Mapping Out South Korean Media Landscape’. 
Accordingly, newly experimental forms of mixed genres emerged. The KBS’s 
Comedy File (1999) was a mixed genre of news and entertainment. This relatively long-
lived programme was aired at 8.20 to 9.20 on Tuesday evenings from December 16, 
1999 to March 26, 2002. The Comedy File consisted of six sections, one of which, News 
Punch, dealt with news and current affairs of the week in an entertainment, parody 
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mode. In late 1999 a number of high-ranking civil servants’ sons were disclosed to be 
exempt from military service in an unlawful way – bribery or forgery of medical 
documents – and immediately this event became a heated issue. In accordance with this 
event, News Punch mocked the corruption and hypocrisy of those politicians in power 
by parroting the old phrase Buh-Ja-Yu-Chin 父子有親 and playing with its 
homonym富者有親.  The first set of characters means that the moral sense of the 
relationship between father and son (父子) is to love each other (有親).  However, 
different ideograms 富者有親 are also pronounced Buh-Ja-Yu-Chin. But here,‘Buh-Ja 
(富者)’ means rich people. The implied meaning of this group of characters is that rich 
people take care of their own, including exempting loved ones from military service.  
A couple of years later, MBC attempted to pursue a fully fledged political satire 
in a Monday entertainment programme Tonight Good Night, which included Prime 
Minister’s Diary (2001) with more emphasis on the satiric point of current topical issues. 
Prime Minister’s Diary, which employed the format of the British comedy series Yes, 
Prime Minister (1986), was shown to spur audiences’ interest in politics by providing 
its ludicrously detailed portrayal of the incompetent, bureaucratic civil servants in the 
cabinet surrounding the Prime Minister 101  (Kang, 2001;Kim, 2001a;Kim, 2001b). 
Likewise MBC’s Tripartite Debate of Comedy House (2003) parodied the television 
debate format of the 2002 presidential candidates, in which the comedians mimicked the 
former presidential candidates of the three major parties – Roh Moo-hyun (MDP), Lee 
Hyoi-chang (GNP) and Kwon Young-gil (Democratic Labour Party (DLP)) – from a 
playful to scornful way by highlighting their distinctive gestures and phrases (Kim, 
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101 Prime Minister’s Diary was awarded the best programme of the month in May 2001 bestowed by the 
Citizens’ Coalition for Democratic Media. 
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popularity across generations and thousands of audiences’ feedback comments were 
posted weekly on the programme bulletin board. Most of those responses were that the 
programme was impressively entertaining and even more informative than the most 
popular current affairs programme 100 Minute Debate (Song, 2003). 
6.3. Background for the President Impeachment Bill and the 17th 
General Election 
6.3.1. Discord between the radical reformative and the conservative 
It can be recapitulated that the impeachment motion surfaced because of the factional 
feud between the MDP and the OUP, and the conflict between the radical reformist and 
the conservative in Korean politics in a broader sense. Throughout modern Korean 
political history, since the Park Chung-hee government until 2002, the two leading 
parties, the MDP and the GNP had been firmly grounded on their regional footing with 
the former rooted in Cholla-do province in Southwest Korea and the latter in 
Kyungsang-do province in the Southeast. The two parties had long had a relationship of 
extreme animosity. In particular, this antagonistic regionalism began to be publicly 
promoted and utilised during the 1971 presidential election by the Park regime (Park, 
Kim and Sohn, 2000, p.115). Over the past three decades of authoritarian rule, higher 
positions in central and local governments and media companies had been filled by 
people from Kyungsang-do province, the region of the presidents’ hometowns. 
Accordingly this long-standing regionalism has structured socio-political conflicts 
embedded in every aspect of society and thereby there have arisen sustained questions 
about regionalism.  
Arriving with an image of a ‘moral, clean politician’ President Roh Moo-hyun 
was elected not by the support of his own party, the MDP, but by tremendous popular 
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support for socio-political reforms for genuine social integration. Right after Roh’s 
inauguration in 2003, there began heated debates about socio-political reforms to 
terminate corruptive political practices and the deep-rooted regional connection within 
the MDP. The MDP split into two factions: more reformative and pro-Roh party 
members and traditional, conservative Cholla-based party members who opposed Roh. 
In November 2003, the former set up the Open Uri Party (OUP) comprising radical 
reformists of the former GNP and MDP members, and the Reformative People’s Party 
members. As President Roh resigned his membership of the MDP and joined the OUP, 
the OUP became a ruling party and the MDP became an opposition party. Consequently 
this caused a huge criticism of Roh within the MDP.  
Meanwhile, in line with the political reform, in late 2003, the Supreme Public 
Prosecutor’s Office investigated the illegal provision of funds for each political party 
from major companies during the 2002 presidential election. The GNP was found to 
have accepted tens of billions of won in bribes from businesses. At the steering 
committee meeting on 23rd October 2003, the GNP leader Choi Byung-ryul admitted 
their receipt of illegal funds by saying “I apologise that we took the illegal fund 10 
billion KRW (approximately 5.5 million GBP) from SK Corporations”. Shortly 
afterwards Choi went on a 13-day hunger strike for the introduction of an independent 
investigation of the alleged corruption of President Roh’s close relatives. Given Choi’s 
previous admission of illegal funds, however, his fasting generated neither public 
support for the cause of the hunger strike, nor much anti-Roh sentiment, only resulting 
in aggravating public criticism of the GNP’s corruption.  
At a press conference with television broadcast journalists on 24th February, 
Roh’s remarks that “I hope that the people will give enormous support to the OUP in 
the general election… If my good performance as President helps the OUP to gain votes, 
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I would like to try all my best as long as it is lawful.” prompted a controversy of 
whether or not it was a violation of the president’s duty for an electoral neutrality. The 
National Election Commission (NEC) made an authoritative interpretation that Roh had 
infringed the elections law and therefore urged him to observe the president’s legal duty. 
In reply, Roh proclaimed that he could hardly accept the decision since it was his duty 
to support the OUP as a member. On 5th March, the MDP leader Cho Soon-hyung 
proclaimed that without Roh’s public apology for the breach of the elections law and for 
the alleged corruption of his relatives, as well as his promise for the prevention of the 
recurrence of those incidents, they would propose an impeachment motion against 
President Roh. However, President Roh responded that their claims were only 
politically motivated.  
Consequently, on 9th March, the MDP initiated the impeachment motion in 
collusin with the majority party GNP but failed to pass the bill in the face of the OUP’s 
immense resistance. On 12th March, the two parties eventually passed the motion in 
collaboration with the Liberal Democratic Coalition (LDC) and voted 193-2 to impeach 
Roh. Amid the ensuing roughhouse between the OUP and the three other parties, the 
chairperson Park Kwan-yong ordered the OUP MPs forcibly removed from the 
legislature so as to allow the motion passed. The absurdly chaotic scene of the 
unprecedented political event was televised via the three networks KBS, MBC and SBS. 
The passed bill was immediately transferred to the Constitutional Court to judge its 
legitimacy grounded on the Constitution.  
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6.3.2. Public dissent and the victory of OUP in the general election 
This event raised a nationwide public anger against the MPs that passed the 
impeachment motion, especially considering Roh had been elected by such grassroots 
popular support, and because some of those MPs were tainted by political corruption. 
According to public opinion polls conducted by various organisations102, including the 
MDP’s own polls, nearly 70 percent of the nation opposed the impeachment bill (Choi, 
2004b;Kim, 2004;Kwon, 2004). Correspondingly, various activities of resistance took 
place particularly in online spaces. Immediately the Internet search word ‘impeachment’ 
was ranked first and numerous relevant online communities were launched. For instance, 
at Daum, one of the largest portal websites in Korea, 453 impeachment-related online 
communities were newly launched as of 23rd March (Choi, 2004a), waging vibrant 
forms of anti-impeachment campaigns on- and offline. These included: an online 
petition campaign; attachment of an emblem of a black ribbon onto their messenger ID 
for their expression of lamenting ‘the death of democracy’; and a number of 
impeachment-related UGCs virally spread on the Internet such as video clips, parodic 
satires and songs, cartoons and humorous or acidic jokes. Such online political parodic 
satires, which began to boom after the GNP’s admission of acceptance of illegal funds 
in December of the previous year, rapidly expanded to ridicule the impeachment motion. 
In particular, the epicenter of those UGCs – by means of digital technology of 
composite photographs – was DC Inside in which over 3million members registered. 
Besides, newly emergent political satire websites such as Liveis.com and Mediamob 
rapidly became popular around the unprecedented political event: the number of daily 
visitors rose 2.5 times between early March (before the Impeachment) and late March 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 The portal websites Yahoo Korea and Naver, and the press media Seoul Shinmun and Joong Ang 
conducted the public opinion poll right after the political event.     
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(Kang, 2004a). Similarly, a series of massive nationwide protests103 took place offline as 
increasing number of people considered the impeachment bill unnecessary and unjust. 
Furthermore, the anti-impeachment protests transformed into campaigns for 
participation in the approaching general election. Citizens’ heightened political interest 
and engagement were shown in the fast increasing page views and postings in election-
related online forums: in early April in such major portal websites as Naver, Daum and 
Yahoo, the number of daily postings rose to over 6,000 and the daily page views 
increased more than 100 percent from March (Chung, 2004).  
In the 17th general election, the OUP won a majority with 152 seats. In sharp 
contrast, the MDP, which had led the impeachment motion, won only 9 seats and 
became the second minority after the newly emergent Democratic Labour Party with 10 
seats. Moreover, most of the opposition politicians who had taken the lead in the 
impeachment – Chairperson of Parliament Park Kwan-yong, the GNP’s leader Choi 
Byung-ryul and floor leader Hong Sa-duk, the MDP leader Cho Soon-hyung and 
general affairs manager Yoo Yong-tae – lost their seats and resigned from the political 
circle. On 14th May, the Constitutional Court overturned the impeachment motion. The 
Court concluded that President Roh had breached the civil servant’s duty to maintain 
political neutrality in the election but it did not suffice as lawful reason for impeaching 
the incumbent President. The Court also rejected the other alleged indictments that Roh 
had neglected the responsibility to govern a state and to recover the nation’s economic 
crisis, or received the illegal political fund during the 2002 presidential election 
campaign.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The Pan-national Action for the Nullity of the Impeachment Bill and the Clearance of Corruptive 
Politics, which launched a series of anti-impeachment vigil rallies, also set up a website 
(http://www.anti312.net). On 6th March, long before the website’s launch, citizens’ self-organised online 
community No Threat to the People (http://cafe.daum.net/antitanhaek) was launched and the number of 
its members reached over 90,000 in two weeks. This voluntary community promoted vigil rallies for anti-
impeachment, organised the campaigns for voting and mobilised citizen volunteers for the aid of the 
rallies (Choi, 2004b).  
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6.4. Online Political Parodic Satire 
6.4.1. From the Playful to the Scornful Critique – entertaining, informative, 
subversive commentary of politics 
Like other mediums of satire, the most commonly used strategy for online political 
satire was parody. Parody is a vital and powerful vehicle for critiques and ‘unmasking 
the duplicities’ of the vices or follies of mankind (Hariman, 2008;Hutcheon, 2000, 
pp.32-34). Linda Hutcheon (2000, pp.xiv-32) defines parody as a form of ‘repetition 
with critical difference’ in ‘its ironic “trans-contextualization” and inversion’ and/or as 
contrast of one text to another with the intent of mocking or ridiculing it. The critical 
distance was implied between ‘the backgrounded text being parodied and the new 
incorporating work’. In Korean online political satire during the Impeachment bill, ‘the 
backgrounded text being parodied’ was the popular film posters and ‘the new 
incorporating work’ was political contexts of the Impeachment bill including related 
politicians and parties as examined below. In the online media environment embedded 
in every aspect of Korean society, visitors to websites inevitably include the ‘less 
politically interested’ (Baumgatner, 2007, p.333). Online political satire facilitates 
engaging politically apathetic audiences to the political world via a means of humour.  
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1. Tanhaek - Flying Ruinous National Flag 
 
  Figure 2. Tae Guk Gi – Brotherhood of the War 
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             Figure 3. Tanhaek – Flying Ruinous National Flag  
                              (Source: Dokkaebi News) 
To give a sense of the initial impact and to reinforce the ironic contrast in one of the 
most popular online satires, Tanhaek – Flying Ruinous National Flag, a parody of the 
most popular Korean movie ‘Tae Guk Gi – Brotherhood of the War’ (Flying Tae Guk 
Gi in Korean title) was used. In what looks like the blockbuster film poster the two 
heroes, originally acted by handsome lead actors Won Bin and Jang Dong-gun, are 
replaced with the GNP leader Choi Byung-ryul and the MDP leader Choi Soon-hyung, 
posing proud and trying to look tough. Throughout the entire movie, a solid brotherhood 
is suggested as a beautiful, great cause; actor Jang Dong-gun enters the military 
voluntarily in order to protect his younger brother played by Won Bin, who was 
forcefully drafted during the Korean War. In contrast, here in Tanhaek, the two 
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politicians’ cause for likely brotherhood is ugly and disgraceful, presented through their 
lines in the speech balloons:  (on the left) “Hyung (the ending syllable of Cho Soon-
hyung’s first name), we must stay alive and ruin the nation!” (on the right) “Ryul (the 
ending syllable of Choi Byung-ryul’s first name), of course. We cannot die alone!” This 
implicitly suggests the coalition between the two parties to pass the impeachment bill 
‘for their own sake’ not for the national interest, must be fulfilled by the MPs.  
In addition, at the bottom of the poster parodic satire, was a photograph of some 
of the 47 OUP and the two other party members wrestling around the Chairperson’s seat. 
This represents explicitly how violent and tumultous the surroundings of the parliament 
were. Hence, this satire arguably provokes audiences’ shared resentment towards those 
politicians and institutionalised politics. Moreover, at the very bottom the lines read: 
“2004 Korean Politicians’ Ruthless Show! Co-directed by Choi Byung-ryul and Cho 
Soon-hyung, Distributed by the GNP and the DP, Co-produced by the 16th Parliament, 
Special cast – Kim Jong-pil and the Liberal Democratic Coalition” These mock credits 
clearly indicate the satirist’s social intent to show that the three parties conspired to 
impeach President Roh for their own good. As such, by using parody as a main weapon 
to attack the corruption and hypocrisy of those MPs in conspiracy, Tanhaek provided 
not only a mockery of politicians and the business of politics in a playful and ludicrous 
way, but also provided information to allow the viewer to get a sense of what had 
happened and by whom in terms of the President’s Impeachment.   
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2. Memory of Tanhaek 
  
 
#1 
Wow ~. That is the violation of the election law! 
Catch him! Freeze!~ 
 
 
 
 
#2 
You will be dead! 
 Let’s impeach him~ Impeach! 
   
 
 
#3 
Yah~ Do apologise in public! 
Otherwise, we will impeach you~ 
 
 
(What would happen?...) 
 
 
#4  
Come here~ Come~ 
 
 
 
#5 
Let’s see! Where is an apology statement…? 
Is it here…? 
 
 
 
#6 
(Fuck you…) 
 
 
 
 
#7 
Memory of Tanhaek 
We are allowed but you are not. 
 
Figure 4. Memory of Tanhaek (Source: DC 
Inside104)  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Please see the page (http://gall.dcinside.com/list.php?id=compositionsi&no=2062&page=368&bbs=). 
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Similarly, another derisive popular joke about the event was the online political satire 
titled Memory of Tanhaek, which parodied several video clips of the movie ‘Memory of 
Murder’. This parody offered more detailed political contexts of the impeachment issue 
in a sequential narrative: the three MPs who played a key role in passing the bill – Choi 
Byung-ryul and Hong Sa-duk of the GNP and Cho Soon-hyung of the MDP – claimed 
President Roh had breached the election law and so Roh would have to apologise in 
public; otherwise they would impeach him. However, Roh refused to do so and instead 
gave them a rude gesture meaning ‘Fuck you’. This end scene of Roh’s farcical reaction 
provoked uncontrolled laughter, which no doubt resulted from the subversion of the 
existing power relations between Roh, in an inferior position, and the three MPs 
representing the 192 MPs against him; the simple, yet rude bravado of the little man 
standing against the odds, something many powerless people could identify with. Its 
final punch is contextualised in the parodied end text: “We are allowed but you are not”., 
The “we” signifies “the GNP and the DP” and “you” indicates “Roh” and “allowed” 
implies “allowed to support their own parties”. In short, the two parties’ claim is wrong 
and also unfairly made and the thematic social intent of the parody eventually won 
public sympathy and rapport.   
In this way, the satire Memory of Tanhaek provides not only information about 
political contexts of the event – who, how and what – but also subversive humour that is 
shared among the audience and generates a common resentment and antagonism 
towards those key politicians who passed the bill. Through the combination of a 
postmodern parodied pastiche of banal contemporary aesthetic materials (altered movie 
flyers and familiar pictures) and social common interest (the Impeachment bill), the 
online satire offers an entertaining and informative commentary of politics. In such 
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political satire, while ‘fun’ or ‘humour’ is a crucial affective element revealing shared 
social feelings like joy, pleasure, aggression and resentment, another consequence is 
that it can inspire people to understand and engage with current political issues. 
3. Water is Self-served 
 
Figure 5. Water is Self-served (Source: DC Inside105)  
At first sight, it is easy for most Koreans to recognise the familiar building of KBS. And 
the placard hung on the building catches the eye.  It reads: ‘Water is self-served’. 
“Water is self-served” is the most commonly used term in low-priced, ordinary 
restaurants in Korea. The juxtaposition of the slogan with the KBS building is intended 
to provoke viewers’ curiosity and interest, which stimulates further reasoned activities 
such as searching for more detailed information on the Internet or exchanging talks 
among fellow netizens.  
In fact, this parodic satire was a scornful joke about the DP leader Cho Soon-
hyung’s visit to KBS. On 12th March 2004 when the President Impeachment bill was 
being passed, the three networks aired the parliament live. Two days later, the MDP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Please see the page (http://gall.dcinside.com/list.php?id=compositionsi&no=2835). 
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leader Cho Soon-hyung visited KBS and MBC to complain that their broadcast had 
been partial. At MBC, the chief of the Reporting department met them to have a 50-
minute talk. But KBS merely sent a head of the Human Resources department to meet 
them. Cho immediately requested to meet the chief of the Reporting department but was 
refused. Later Cho complained to press journalists, “They did not even give us a glass 
of water, even after 12 minutes had passed.” This episode was aired by the 24 hour 
news channel YTN’s Unforeseen Image106.    
With respect to the ‘Water is self-served’ parody, most of audiences’ reactions 
(as revealed in comments posted online at least) varied from fun and joy to resentment 
and aggression. Some of those affective comments are presented below:  
“It’s too much.. too funny.. I might get fired.. but I will keep laughing.. 
Korea is the democratic republic! More than doubly recommended!” 
(Oops) 
“It’s really a high quality!” (By the way) 
“Water should be self-served if water is not served within 12 minutes.” 
(Smile) 
“Those are natural treasures and so do not possess them by yourself.” 
(No way)  
It’s clear that online political satire produces shared laughter. Since humour is mainly a 
social phenomenon, it stimulates building social bonds among viewers or participants of 
the dialogue. Also, laughter is a critical weapon to ponder politics in an open, playful 
and scornful way. The pleasure that political humour provides often results from using 
parodic critiques to deconstruct the pretentious authority and power of politicians, who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 YTN (Yonhap Television News) is a 24-hour news channel that is analogous to CNN or BBC World. 
In 2003, YTN’s Unforeseen Image began airing three episodes within the midday news programme News 
Parade, delivering short video clips of public figures’ trivial speeches and behind-the-scenes stories in a 
sarcastic way. At weekends, the selected episodes of the week Weekly Unforeseen Image are aired. This 
programme drew public attention when it broadcast the live scenes of the parliament relating to the 2004 
impeachment bill and of the MDP leader Cho’s visit to KBS. This programme usually deals with the 
topical issues at stake, which sometimes provokes complaints or criticism from politicians. 
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are generally treated with reverence in the conservative media. In this light, the way in 
which online political satire offers pleasure to the audience is similar to what Ian 
Connell (1991, p.252) points out about ‘a certain pleasure’ that the tabloids provide. He 
delineates as follows:  
…the pleasure comes from the acts of revelation as such. They 
engender a reaction of the sort – ‘well, you’ll never believe what I’ve 
just read about so-and-so’. But there was also a certain pleasure in 
seeing those who would set themselves above or apart from the ‘rest of 
us’ brought down by the revelations.  
Consequently, by revelation of corruption or hypocrisy of those in power and authority 
such as politicians or bureaucrats, these forms of media make audiences feel 
empowered, and offers great pleasure.  
What attracts audiences to political satire? As stated previously, some scholars 
argue that political satire demands comprehension and knowledge of the political 
context of the humour just as news audiences must understand the generic conventions 
of news. If this is right, then where do audiences get ‘comprehension and knowledge’ of 
political context from? On the one hand, audiences can get the necessary information 
about politics through engagement with the news and current affairs media. However, 
on the other hand, I believe it is not necessary to possess much depth of understanding 
and knowledge of politics or news to appreciate certain forms of political satire. If, as I 
would like to suggest, by virtue of living in the society we have only a general sense of 
whom or what a satirist is parroting, then the ‘ironic incongruence’ between that which 
is being satirized and the altered image set in the parodied text can make audiences 
laugh without having sophisticated background knowledge.    
In other words, the intriguing element to attract audiences’ first gaze is parody 
of the most familiar of various media forms, as in the film posters and sequences in the 
Korean online political satire shown earlier. For instance, in the Memory of Tanhaek, 
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the familiarity of the parodied sequence and scenery of the movie Memory of Murder 
and the politicians’ familiar, albeit juxtaposed, appearance provided sufficient 
background for understanding the satire. By repositioning politicians normally in power 
and authority into unfamiliar, ironic situations (i.e. politicians in the movies) in which 
they were represented as ridiculous, ruthlessly violent, vulgar and selfishly pretentious, 
the pretence of politicians and the business of politics became uncovered and the 
existing power relations got subverted. Consequently, online political satire, as a 
subversive positioning of the familiar in the unfamiliar, invites audiences not only to get 
a shared humour and joy of subversion among fellow viewers and satirists but also to 
feel empowered, however superficially, with a sense of community and a feeling of 
superiority to the ones mocked. What is most important is the feeling itself and how it 
can lead to further, personal curiosity about the subject being parodied.  
By transposing political figures’ personas into the parodied texts or genres in a 
‘defamiliarised’ (Critchley, 2002), ‘ironic context’ (Hutcheon, 2000), political parodic 
satire offers audiences not only a playful means to make sense of the political world but 
also a discursive space in which they are encouraged to question politics and 
contemplate it in the everyday. 
6.4.2. From the ‘messy’, accidental talk to the political action 
As the general election was approaching, vibrant forms of online activities among DC 
Inside users took place in a series of campaigns for raising the voting rate. It is notable 
that ID ‘DC Bingguri’ created a parody titled Voting Army that he re-parodied as Solo 
Army, which was virally spread and became popular during the 2003 Christmas season. 
The original posters of Voting Army were Nazi propaganda used in World War II (Choi, 
2004a;Roh, 2004). 
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4. Voting Army 
 
Figure 6. We are Voting Army (Source: DC Inside107) 
 
Shown is one of the 27 cuts of Voting Army. The slogan that voting is the base as well 
as the mainstay of democracy is presented on the top, which is consistent with the 
original intention of the poster. On the bottom it is said that we are a strong voting army. 
On the red flag to the left the written text implies that we are a voting army. Overall, 
this parody delivers a strong message that to sustain a healthy democracy, voting is our 
responsibility and pride. Also the word “we” serves to distinguish us from others/them 
and to build the feeling of social bonds among a group of audiences or participants in a 
messy talk of the satire and related political events. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Please see the page (http://gall.dcinside.com/list.php?id=compositionsi&no=2431&page=357&bbs=). 
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The entire series of Voting Army posters served to arouse netizens’ attention 
and interest in the general election as can be seen from viewer comments and 
demonstrators that used placards showing the posters (see below). More profoundly, it 
served to form a discursive space for an informal, open-ended, ‘messy, reflexive’ talk 
(Bohman, 1996, p.145).   
The discursive space was filled with open-ended talks ranging from the parody 
itself to the elections law and voting in the election, and from the emotional discharge to 
the reasoned action as presented below.   
“Hit gall, hit gall108! Voting Army recommended~ .” (O~) 
“Fucking breach of the elections law.”109 (KIN) 
“I’m only 19 years old and so have no ballot.. So sad and resentful.” 
(Ah Ah) 
“Excellent poster.. Certainly will have to ballot and clean up those 
rubbishes.”110 (Han-min-ryun KIL) 
“Superb! Absolutely will go to vote~!” (song7664) 
“Enjoyed it…I will absolutely vote.” (less) 
As the above selection of online communications among DC Inside users suggests, the 
messy, open-ended conversation is a product of the emotionality – pleasure and fun, 
resentment, aggression, catharsis – that political parody provides or triggers. In a 
relatively easy, friendly and anonymous atmosphere in the Internet, the accidental, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 ‘Hit gall’ is abridged from Hit gallery in which the netizen’s parodied artwork is uploaded if the 
number of its click reaches over 10,000.   
109 By the 2004 President Impeachment, the NEC and the police cramped down severely on online 
political parody and consequently some amateur satirists especially Shin Sang-min and Kwon Se-il were 
accused of libel on political candidates according to the elections law.     
110 Here ‘those rubbishes’ denotes the three parties in coalition to passed the Impeachment bill as his ID 
suggest: Han alludes the Han Na Ra(Grand National) party, Min indicates the Min Joo (Democratic) party 
and Ryun implicates the Ja Min Ryun (Liberal Democratic Coalition). Thus this line suggests Jan-min-
ryun’s decisive will to ‘vote’ and to vote ‘for the OUP’.   
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messy talk takes place ‘in practice of commentary, quotation and polemical 
reformulation’ (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994, p.11).  
As many scholars point out, the talk, particularly the loose, open-ended talk and 
its potential for empathy and affective elements played a significant role in stimulating 
political action and sustaining a healthy democracy (Couldry, Livingstone and 
Markham, 2007b, p.170;Dahlgren, 2006, p.278). Through the loose, accidental talk, the 
DC Inside members mobilised themselves to take diverse political actions on various 
levels – launching a campaign for voting on-and-offline, discussing the Impeachment 
bill and the election, creating parodic satire and uploading it, participating in vigil rallies, 
etc. The conversations on the DC bulletin board suggest the participants’ thinking and 
feelings of the topical issue as below:  
“I made sure that I didn’t like Roh Moo-hyun but the present political 
situation isn’t right.” (Super-puzzlement) 
“Do you feel enraged only when you have much knowledge on a 
subject? We can be angry even when we don’t know it well.. I’m very 
indignant now.” (Well-well-well) 
“The anti-Tanhaek vigil rallies wouldn’t be a protest of Roh’s fan 
community Rohsamo as some conservative media argues. And the key 
purpose for the rallies is ‘anti-Impeachment, not ‘a support for Roh 
Moo-hyun..” (DJ energy) 
“I’m going to the rally. I’ll look for our Doggie111 flag. It’d be me if 
you saw a man with a long hair up in a suit..See you then.” (Returned) 
“I’m so sorry that I couldn’t bring my own parody artwork this time. 
But I will make sure that I’ll bring something next time when I 
participate in the rally.” (So) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 As a symbol of DC Inside, it was used in many ways in the 2004 Impeachment rally – on a flag of DC 
Inside, in various parodied pickets and online parody to promote ballot and the like.   
  Voting Army – Doggie is also a member of robust Voting Army.  
                                                       Let’s ballot all together. 
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“I can’t take part in the rally this time but will definitely go next time.” 
(Sluggard) 
The pictures below demonstrate how the DC Inside members presented their 
emotional thinking of the current issue. They brought various forms of anti-
Impeachment protest that they made themselves. Most of those pickets were what 
parodied currently prevailing quotations – Water is self-served, KIN112, Ddan Min 
Ryun or Voting Army – or popular movie posters or cute Doggie pictures that 
symbolise DC Inside.  
 
 
Figure 7. DC Inside members after the vigil rally (19th March 2004) 
Source: DC Inside113 
 
                 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 ‘KIN’ is an Internet-based slang that had been used mainly among 10 to 20-year-old young people. But 
now it has been settled as a commonly used term among netizens. ‘KIN’ indicates a Korean word ‘즐’ 
which is a shortened word for ‘지랄’. Thus the ‘KIN’ is used to mean ‘fuck off’, ‘bad luck’.    
113 Please see the page (http://gall.dcinside.com/list.php?id=compositionsi&no=3415&page=340&bbs=). 
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Figure 8. DC Inside member’s parody – Voting Army 
Source: DC Inside114 
 
Into those parodied texts or pictures, the participants added their own lines: “Kuk-‘hae’-
eu-won115 (‘Harmful’ MPs)”, “Water is self-served!”, “KIN”, “Invalid Impeachment!”, 
“Are you a floating voter? You’ve hardly forgotten the 3.12 Barbarian Event116, have 
you?”. The messy, open-ended talk about the parody with fellow netizens generated 
such emotions as pleasure, joy, laughter and resentment. As indicated in the 
conversation above, such emotions shared among participants extended into a discursive 
space of the issue and further actions. Moreover, through various direct actions to 
change the existing political situation - raising public attention by creating online 
political parodies, putting a sign of ballot stamp ○ㅅ onto their online ID, organising or 
participating the anti-Impeachment vigil rally with their DIY parodied pickets. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Please see the page (http://gall.dcinside.com/list.php?id=compositionsi&no=3415&page=340&bbs=). 
115 In Korean pronunciation Kuk-hoi-eu-won means MPs. The protesters altered the syllable ‘hoi’ into 
‘hae’ which means ‘harmful’. In this way they twitted the 193 MPs who conspired to pass the 
Impeachment bill for their own interest, instead of serving for the national interest. 
116 This indicates the Impeachment bill which was passed on 12th March. By using the term ‘barbarian act’ 
instead of the Impeachment, the protester signifies it as the extremely abhorrent event.  
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In a nutshell, in the course of these diverse activities on-and-offline, their 
shared pleasure and joy increasingly augmented and facilitated the further political 
activities. Consequently online political satire reveals feelings that stimulate messy, 
open-ended, reflexive talks, and rational thinking and activities. In this sense, online 
political satire provides a potential linkage between emotion and reason.     
6.5. Ordinary People’s Reflexive, Affective Thinking of Politics 
So what distinguishes online political satire from political satire in institutionalised 
media? On the one hand, amateur online satirists emerged in the period of the 
Impeachment and the general election in 2004. Most satirists are not professionals, but 
citizens far from institutionalised, expert media. With the advancement of user-friendly 
communication technologies and the provision of open spaces where anybody can 
upload their work, netizens can become satirists to express their political intent in the 
parodied text. During the 2004 President Impeachment, one of the most popular online 
amateur satirists Shin Sang-min was an undergraduate student who had just started 
learning how to make a personal homepage online. With simple web-based skills and a 
handful of informative resources that he obtained from news and current affairs media, 
Shin produced 28 online political parodies of the event and uploaded them to DC Inside 
and other websites. Shortly afterwards he was interrogated by the Seoul Metropolitan 
Police Agency on charges of illegal campaigning117 against the GNP ahead of the 
general election. The agency concluded that he had committed an offence. However, 
this event raised a controversy in relation to the freedom of speech and expression. 
Many netizens focused around DC Inside launched an online cafe at Daum to protest his 
innocence and the number of its members reached over 1,500 within 4 days (Park and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 According to the Elections Law, it is banned to make false accusations about politicians or to release 
documents that could affect poll results.  
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Joo, 2004). They argued that it seemed unfair that the Police Agency guaranteed 
professional satirists’ freedom to produce satires at any level in the institutionalised elite 
media but cracked down on amateur satirists. This case could be seen to reflect how the 
Western modernist dichotomy is embedded in the Korean social system – rejecting 
ordinary people’s thinking as ungrounded and unprofessional in comparison with 
professional satirists in elite institutional media as expertise, scientific and grounded as 
Livingstone and Lunt (1994, p.178) argued.   
On the other hand, various forms of audiences’ activities related to online satire 
also contributed to challenging the existing relations of lay reasoning and expert 
knowledge in a different way. The popularity of a specific political satire suggests how 
precisely and playfully the satire represents the public sentiment of a focal issue. Its 
relevance and proximity to ordinary people’s thinking and feeling can be measured by 
the number of clicks or textual responses or the frequency of its exposure on other 
websites like web blogs or online forums of portal websites or online community 
bulletin boards. As some scholars argue that reading a ‘novel’ or listening to or viewing 
news or soap opera is a public, political activity (Habermas, 1989[1962];Lacey, 
2006;McKee, 2004), audiences’ responsive activities relating to online political satire – 
clicking, playing, copying and pasting, responding to online satire by textual 
communication, uploading them on varied websites – are also a form of expressing their 
reflexive political view and feeling, which is a critical engagement with politics.  
In summary, the modern separation between expert reasoning and lay people’s 
feeling and thinking is challenged in the constellation of online political parodic satire. 
Ordinary people’s affective thinking, which has been devalued and unappreciated as 
unprofessional or useless, is being repositioned in the political world not only through 
ordinary netizens’ placing of the reinterpreted affect and reflexive meaning of current 
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politics in their own political satire but also through audiences’ responsive political 
activities online. 	  
6.6. Conclusion – Reconnecting everyday politics 
There is an increased scepticism about the fulfilment of the democratic role of news and 
current affairs media to connect people to politics so as to create an engaged citizenry. 
On the contrary, entertainment can offer a more flexible way of engaging with the 
elements ‘informing politics than the official discourse of politics’ (Curran, 2011, p.67).  
Moreover, there is a need to identify and expand various channels and forms of 
democratic media to stimulate mass participation in politics. Therefore, through tracing 
the development of political satire in relation to the freedom of speech in the changing 
media environment in Korean society, and examining online political satire during the 
tumultuous period of the Impeachment bill, I attempted to locate the democratic 
potential of entertainment media, which can provide a discursive space to facilitate 
citizens’ engagement in political talks in an entertainment mode. In the three decades 
before the 1987 democratisation, when freedom of speech was severely repressed, 
simple word-of-mouth jokes about the incumbent President provided a discursive space 
for ordinary people to talk about politics in a playful, ridiculing way. In the wake of the 
1987 democratisation, televised political satire boomed through the late 1980s. 
However, its depth of dealing with politics was limited to the extent that comedians 
mocked fictional characters representing those in power and authority or just mimicked 
the President’s voice or gesture in a gentle way within the boundary that censorship 
allowed. In the late 1990s and early 2000s when the first peaceful exchange of the 
government took place and the Internet media became rapidly embedded in people’s 
everyday lives of media use, the hybrid genre of short-lived satire merged across the 
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media – online fake newspapers, internet broadcast satires, television animated 
infotainment programmes and the entry of internet fake news to current affairs 
television programmes. These forms of satire were produced by institutionalised elite 
media or professional experts.  
Focused around the 2004 President Impeachment bill, online political parodic 
satire thrived. Unlike the previous political satire, the emergent online political parody 
challenged the Enlightenment dichotomy. On the one hand, amateur satirists created 
online parody from non-expert’s knowledge, which were incorporated with their 
affective, reflexive meaning of the event through comprehension and reinterpretation of 
expert knowledge in the news media. On the other hand, ordinary netizens verified their 
affective feelings by means of various responsive activities online.  
Then how did online political satire around the Impeachment bill provide a 
discursive space to connect private individuals to the focal event? The online political 
humour resulted from the subversive repositioning of the familiar – politicians or 
political situations – into unfamiliar, ironic situations in which the pretence and 
hypocrisy of politics was revealed and ridiculed, and hence the existing power relations 
were undone. In this way, online political parody invited viewers to engage with open-
ended, accidental talks to let them ponder the focal issue – the Impeachment and the 
general election – and to stimulate political participation on a different level as was 
evidenced in the gatherings of online groups in offline demonstrations. Furthermore, in 
the course of taking direct part in the rally by expressing their affective thinking with 
DIY political parody, group members felt a sense of fun and empowerment.  
Through its critical, reflexive laughter, political satire provided a mediating 
domain in which emotion, reason and politics are linked in ‘arational’ mode 
(Livingstone and Lunt, 1994, p.276). Moreover, online political parodic satire 
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destructed the modernist dichotomy between expert reasoning and lay knowledge and 
reconnects politics to ordinary people’s everyday lived experience. As I hope I have 
shown, ordinary people’s affective thinking, traditionally devalued as ungrounded and 
unprofessional, was (and continues to be) repositioned as grounded, meaningful and 
reasoned in politics in the course of the production and consumption of online political 
satire. As such, online political satire contributes to bridge between affect and 
entertainment, and politics by providing a discursive space of informal, open-ended, 
‘meandering’ (Dahlgren, 2006, pp.278-279) and ‘messy’ (Bohman, 1996, p.145) 
everyday talk.  
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7. The Paradox of Fandom:  
The politicising of teen fans of the pop band TVXQ 
“Sovereign power resides in the people’s will.” 
                  (Article 1 of The Korea Constitution, the chant most sung in 
the anti-US beef rally) 
7.1. Introduction 
The 2008 vigil rally began with strong opposition to the government’s agreement on the 
reopening of US beef import despite the danger of mad cow disease118. Soon after, this 
rally evolved into a nationwide political protest against a wider scope of government 
policy. Unlike most of the past protests in South Korea, the rallies were not ideology-
based for political change but were singularly policy-based, directly relating to the 
people’s day-to-day lives. Moreover, teenaged students, especially teen girls, led those 
rallies to a large extent. According to the police estimation, about 60 to 70 percent of 
the protesters in the early stages were teenaged schoolgirls (Huh and Kim, 2008). More 
intriguingly, at the centre of these teen girls’ activism, were various teen fan groups of 
K-pop stars – Super Junior, SS501, Shin Hwa and TVXQ (Moh and Yang, 2008).  
While academically engaging myself with the rally as an observer, I came to 
wonder how those teen fans, conventionally regarded as apolitical and mindless 
followers of their pop idols, became politicised. What is the relationship between the 
teen fans and their pop idols in their everyday lives and within this activism in 
particular? Did the stars instigate their activism such as Lady Gaga’s efficacious 
mobilisation of her fans for various causes like charity and LGBT awareness, whose 
strategy is common within Western fandom? If this is not the case, in what ways were 
the stars or the teen fans related to the political activism? And what is the implication of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Its official name is bovine spongiform encephalopathy. The more popular term ‘mad cow disease’ will
 be used throughout the chapter.  
211 	  
the teen fans’ politicisation to the relationship between fans and publics, and popular 
culture and politics?  
The relationship between fandom and politics, especially civic participation, has 
recently emerged as an important agenda in cultural studies, specifically inside the field 
of fan studies. Yet there are few rigorous academic discussions of the concern and, 
moreover, there arises an urgent need for empirical studies (Brough and Shresthova, 
2012;Hinck, 2012). Among those efforts, Liesbet van Zoonen (2004, 2005) expounds 
their close linkage by pointing to three analogies in respect of the structural formation 
of their subjectivity as a result of performance and ‘an intermediate process of 
identification’ (2005, p.59) that is emotionally charged either with stars or with 
politicians, activities such as public discussion and deliberation, and affective 
investments central in both domains. In regard to the connection between popular music 
and politics, van Zoonen (2005, pp.37-51) suggests that the politics of popular music is 
often the product of ‘specific articulation of lyrics, genres, artists and audience 
appropriations’. For instance, nonpolitical songs often gain political significance 
‘because of their use in a specific politicized context’ and this intersection takes place 
often accidentally rather than systematically. In this sense, it is of importance to analyse 
particular contexts and ways in which cultural, affective involvement of ‘particular, 
located audiences’ in the everyday comes to matter for the public sphere (Livingstone, 
2005c, p.33) and thereby translates into political action. This particular performance of 
the audience, specifically fans, within ‘a mediating domain’ (Livingstone, 2005c, p.17) 
constructs their subjectivity either as publics or private fans.  
In this light, my aims in the chapter are to identify the contextual and 
processional dimensions of the fan-based politics in which teen fans’ cultural and 
affective engagement transforms into political citizenship. Therefore, in addition to my 
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questions raised above, I will endeavour to investigate which emotions play what kinds 
of roles in the process of teen fans’ politicisation. For the analysis of the teen fans’ 
political action, I will use Gamson’s (1992) collective action frame in which injustice, 
agency and identity play out to support political consciousness. And I will also attempt 
to examine if any dimensions of Dahlgren’s ‘civic culture’ (2003, pp.153-160; 2009, 
pp.102-125) – knowledge, values, trust (affinity), spaces, practices (talk) and identities 
– are identified in the fan activism and what this means for the relation of popular 
culture to democratic politics. In so doing, I hope I will locate the legitimate place of 
entertainment, fans and emotions in democratic politics. 
7.2. The US-Beef Import Deal and the 2008 Vigil Rally 
7.2.1. The US-Beef Import Agreement and the Key Issue  
On 18th April 2008, South Korea and the US settled the agreement on the full reopening 
of the Korean market to US beef product imports, which had remained unresolved in the 
Korea-US FTA trade pact119. The agreement stated that, as a first measure, from mid-
May 2008 Korea would import beef with SRMs120 from cattle younger than 30 months 
old121. As a following step, US beef aged over 30 months old was to be imported under 
the condition that the US would publish in the Gazette an enforcement ordinance that 
cattle feed containing animal parts, especially SRMs, would be prohibited (Kim, 
2008a;Lee and Lee, 2008b). Eventually Korea would import almost all US beef parts. 
Moreover the Korean government would retain no right to take measures to stop US 
beef imports even if a new case of mad cow disease were to break out in the US (Oh, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 The pact reached a conclusion in 2007 except for the US beef import deal. Korea was the third largest 
market for US beef prior to the import ban in December 2003 when mad cow disease broke out in the US. 
120 SRMs are Specified Risk Materials like brains, eyes, spinal cords, and organs, all of which are 
categorised as highly risky to be infected by mad cow disease. Under the agreement, most SRMs were to 
be imported except the tonsils and the distal ileum and a part of the small intestine.  
121 In the US domestic market, beef from cattle only under 30 months old is consumed and in Japan US 
beef aged only less than 20 months old is imported in order to prevent mad cow disease. 
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2008) and be required to wait until the Paris-based World Organisation for Animal 
Health lowered the safety rating of US cattle in order to halt imports (Kim, 2008b).  
The key concern aroused by the agreement was that there was no substantial 
measure to secure the safety of US beef aged over 30 months and thereby protect public 
health from mad cow disease. Progressive parties including the Unified Democratic 
Party and the Democratic Labour Party and civic groups criticised the government for 
making the hasty agreement that they claimed would threaten not only public health and 
safety, but also the domestic livestock farming industry. The criticism was based on the 
fact that cattle feed containing animal parts is a definite cause of mad cow disease and 
cattle over 30 months old have a higher likelihood of being infected with mad cow 
disease. Under the former US beef sanitary standards agreement made in January 2003, 
Korea imported only boneless US beef under 30 months old and maintained the right to 
ban all shipments of the US beef immediately whenever a case of mad cow disease 
broke out in the US or when banned vertebrae was found in a shipment. In fact, there 
had already been two instances in which Korea had to ban or suspend US beef imports: 
in December 2003 when mad cow disease broke out in the US and in October 2007 
since the prohibited vertebrae were found in a shipment (Joo,	   2008;Moon,	   2008).	  
Besides, by the time President Lee Myung-bak had a summit talk with George W. Bush 
and announced the agreement, there were immense recalls of US beef exports (Lee and 
Lee, 2008a). These occurrences raised a grave question of the standards of the US’s 
meat processing facilities and procedures. Consequently, the government was criticised 
for their haste to comply with US demands rather than to ensure public health. 
In reply to the criticism, the government and the conservative party GNP 
proclaimed that they would take necessary steps to secure the safety of US beef by not 
rushing to lift a regulation on beef from cattle aged over 30 months and instead 
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implement the agreement gradually. In addition, they said they would	   take	  measures	  for	  protecting	  Korean	  cattle	  farms	  from	  bankruptcy (Yang, 2008a). However, there 
was no feasible	   action	   to	   fulfill	   their	   promises.	   To	   make	   matters	   worse, remarks 
from the minister of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Food that the beef from cattle 
over 30 months old would be safe if the part of SRMs were removed, provoked a public 
backlash.  
The conventional mainstream media apparently underscored benefits of the FTA 
trade deal that the beef agreement would engender. In contrast, a few traditional media, 
like Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang and Seoul Shinmun, Hankook Ilbo and MBC PD’s 
Suechup (Notepad) criticised the accord by focusing on potential risks of the agreement 
in the intermittent beef-related articles. In particular, it is notable how a public terrestrial 
broadcaster, MBC, broadcast their regular programme, PD’s Notepad, entitled: “Urgent 
news coverage! Is US beef safe from mad cow disease?” that delivered details of the 
agreement. The in-depth, investigative programme, which aired on 29th April 2008, 
drew the first massive wave of public attention to the reopening of US beef imports. 
The programme pointed to the problem of the quarantine inspection standards agreed 
with the US in comparison with the standards that China or Japan had agreed to with the 
US. It also stressed that Koreans are highly susceptible to mad cow disease due to 
genetic structure122 and noted that, in particular, Korea has a food culture of eating 
stewed or steamed brains, skulls, and bones, which are part of SRMs. Above all, what 
made a huge impact on raising public concern and fear of US imported beef under the 
accord were shocking scenes of a downer cow, which was unable to stand – most likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 The programme showed the result of gene analysis that the Koreans’ attack rate of mad cow disease 
goes up to 95% in comparison with 35% for westerners’, specifically Caucasians’ when eating beef 
infected with mad cow disease. This claim was also verified in the former government’s internal report 
documented in September 2007, which recommended to ban the import of all the parts of SRMS (Choi, 
2008).	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due to mad cow disease – that was butchered, processed and sold as edible beef from a 
US cattle slaughterhouse and the heart breaking stories told by the parents of American 
mad cow disease patients. This programme provoked tremendous online 
communications afterwards. Netizens from various areas – lawyers, doctors, 
housewives, people working for NGOs and students – proffered their strong opinions, 
as detailed below.  
7.2.2. Candlelit Vigil Spreads Nationwide Like Wildfire 	  
Prior to PD’s Notepad broadcast on 29th April, there had already been ongoing 
discussions on the Internet relating to President Lee’s general policies as well as US 
beef imports. As one of the major portal websites, Daum’s online forum Agora123 is a 
space in which netizens talk about a wide range of topics from personal, trivial events or 
problems to such focal issues as the US beef import deal. Two weeks before the US 
beef agreement, on 6th April at Agora, a high school student nicknamed Andante posed 
an online petition for the impeachment of President Lee, in which he criticised the 
government’s currently proposed policy including construction of Grand canals, the 
implementation of English education in all subjects from primary school and the 
privatisation of public companies such as the National Health Service. As of 13th May, 
1.3 million netizens signed the petition. This number suggests that people became 
outraged about the government’s general policies, further inflamed by the hastily signed 
beef agreement.  
The large scale of serial vigil rallies was organised and mobilised in online 
communities and forums, especially Agora, and blogs with diverse ideas of ways of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Throughout the 2008 vigil rally Daum came to outrun Naver, which had previously ranked as the 
number one portal website. Daum offered a converging public sphere for diverse online forums and 
communities for netizens not only to exchange information and opinions, but also to produce and 
distribute various user-generated content including political parody, posters warning of US mad cow 
disease and real-time live news of the vigil rally and of the government policy. 
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delivering public concerns and demands. Eventually the online communities – Michinso 
(mad cow) dot net (www.michincow.net), Citizens’ coalition against President Lee’s 
policy and the Centre for nationwide movement for impeachment of Lee Myung-bak – 
held the first vigil rally on 2nd May 2008, which continued until 5th July124.  
By mid-May the vigil rally had expanded nationwide, with traditional media and 
immense online communications contributing to setting the beef issue as a mainstream 
agenda and orchestrating the rally. The major networks – KBS, MBC and SBS – dealt 
with the issue everyday despite their variation in time allocation and point of view. 
MBC’s 9 O’clock News was, in particular, believed by many protest participants to 
convey their voices and the problems of the beef deal in detail from reasonably fair 
perspectives. Accordingly they received enormous moral support from the advocates of 
the rally. Eventually this turned out to be a major challenge to the government’s claims 
of the 100% safety of the beef125.  
What the mainstream media failed to deliver was complemented with real time 
web-cast and protesters’ eyewitness accounts in the community online forums or blogs. 
The live webcast was produced by individual netizens armed with webcams and laptops 
with wireless network or online video sharing, UGC-aggregated service Afreeca, online 
news webcast OhmyTV and Colour TV, and existing newspapers Kyunghyang, 
Hankyoreh126. In this way, they served to renew the narrative of protests with real time 
video footage and to mobilise viewers to partake in protests. Prominently, Afreeca 
provided a central platform for fact-based live webcast of the vigil rally from the second 
day of the rally, 3rd May 2008, and became the most viewed live webcast during the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 On 5th July the Citizens’ Council against Mad Cow Disease, constituted by around 1,700 civic groups, 
officially terminated the intensive vigil rallies of 65 days, which had been taking place nearly every day 
since 2nd May. The coalition also declared the day as people’s victory day.  
125 Correspondingly, the government exerted pressure on MBC by suing PD’s Notepad for dissemination 
of “false” facts in early June, as well as by ordering MBC executive committee to dismiss the 9 O’clock 
News anchors in late April 2009. 
126 The webcast of the rally began from 31st May 2008.  
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rally. As an exemplary incident, on the early morning of 25th May when protesters 
began to occupy the road for the first time in the course of serial rallies and the conflict 
between the police and the protesters became violent, the number of viewers of 
Afreeca’s live web-cast reached over 307,000. In particular, the live scene of a female 
undergraduate being brutally trampled by feet of the riot police enraged netizens and led 
them to join the morning protest. The following day the scene was immediately 
transmitted on MBC’s 9 O’clock News (Yang, 2008b) and widely reported in the 
progressive newspapers.	   The number of daily hits of the rally webcast on Afreeca 
reached 1.27million and the total number of viewers was 8 million – 17 percent of the 
whole population – as of 20th June 2008 (Kuh, 2008). 	  
Despite President Lee’s public apology on 22nd May, its failure to deliver 
pertinent measures without renegotiation thereby further fuelled the rally. Consequently 
a massive protest took place on 10th June of the 21st anniversary of the 1987 
democratisation, which was the largest since that historic event. On that single day, the 
vigil rally took place in around 120 places nationwide and in total over one million 
citizens took part (Chang, Lee and Oh, 2008;Shin, Chung, Sohn and Park, 2008). Over a 
half million citizens gathered at Seoul Plaza in central Seoul, the symbolic site of the 
1987 democratisation. They shaped a long candlelit line of about 2.5km marching from 
Gwang Hwa Moon to Nam Dae Moon, holding up various slogans ranging from “No 
US beef imports” to “2MB127 Out.”  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 2MB stands for the then President’s name Lee Myung-Bak. Number 2 sounds like his surname Lee in 
Korean pronunciation. It is also used satirically in the rally slogans to mean that the president’s brain 
capacity barely reaches 2 mega bites.  
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Figure 9. The Candlelit Vigil Rally on 10th June 2008 
Source: OhmyNews (http://www.ohmynews.com) 
7.2.3. The Outcome 
This monumental, nationwide protest had produced an immediate outcome: the 
government had an additional talk with the US trade deputies in order to seek effective 
and feasible measures to secure the safety of the beef, and gained a key outcome of the 
banning not only of beef aged over 30 months old through the QSA programme 
guaranteed by the US government, but of four SRM parts – brain, eyes, spinal cords and 
skull.  
7.3. Revived Censorship 
It is notable that the regulation of the media in Korea has been intensified since the 
events under review here. The Lee Myung-bak government has taken several measures 
to control the free flow of public opinion and the criticism of the state affairs on the 
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Internet during the 2008 vigil rally and afterwards. For example, the police imprisoned 
the CEO of Nowcom, which owns the Internet webcast Afreeca, for violation of 
copyright law. Some critics claimed that it was unfair to detain the CEO given judicial 
precedents that violators of the copyright law got sentenced to a fine with no detention. 
It was widely believed that this case foreshadowed the government’s clampdown on the 
Internet so as to gag any criticism spreading through the Internet after the 2008 vigil 
rally.  
As of 3rd May, the media regulator, the KCC, requested Daum to blind postings 
or replies critical of President Lee Myung-bak on the grounds of cyber-slander as 
defined by the Information and Communications Law. The regulator was widely 
believed to target Daum as it had provided the converging platform for public 
discussions and hot debates relating to government policy and the US beef import in 
particular. Furthermore, as of 1st July 2008, the Korea Communications Standards 
Commission ordered Daum to delete 58 of 80 postings under an accusation of 
promoting a boycott campaign by certain advertisers of the three newspapers Chosun, 
Joong Ang and Dong-A (Park, 2008) which had been criticised by advocates of the rally 
for reporting the vigil rally unfairly. In addition, in late August the police prosecuted 24 “netizens” for leading on- and off-line boycott campaigns to press major advertisers to 
stop providing advertisements for those newspapers. They had circulated a list of those 
advertisers on the Internet and encouraged netizens to make a continuous complaint call 
to the advertisers, which resulted in the companies’ suspension of ads in the three 
newspapers.  
Due to the government’s crackdown on Internet communication, a number of 
online communities actively engaged in the anti-US beef protest on- and off-line 
changed to be strictly private to their own members. For instance, Soul Dresser, 
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composed of mainly women in their 20s with an interest in fashion, not only raised 
around £30,000 (60 million KRW) in order to support what they claimed were the fair 
press – Kyunghyang and Hankyoreh – but also publicised in those newspapers their 
authentic reason for the rally and the refutation of the government’s claims of the 100% 
safety of the US beef. Soul Dresser also carried out a couple of flash mob performances 
under the title “The Korean democracy is dead” at the crowded shopping mall Coex in 
Seoul (Chung, 2008b). Since the government’s repression of online discussions and the 
arrest of the rally participants128, however, the community Soul Dresser closed and no 
longer appeared in the result of online community search with the search phrase ‘Soul 
Dresser’ as of 28th November 2008.  
Furthermore, on 28th January 2009, the KCC unveiled extended and fortified 
regulations aimed at curbing what it claimed were slanderous commentary and 
unsubstantiated rumours on the Internet. According to the rule, 153 websites including 
entertainment auction and shopping sites are now subject to follow the Internet Real-
name Act that requires users to register with their real name matching their National ID 
number when uploading postings or responses on a bulletin board. In 2008 the number 
of websites subject to run the registration system was only 37 and they were limited to 
portal websites of over 300,000 daily users and online newspapers of at least 200,000 
daily users. Under the newly introduced law, however, 116 websites with over 100,000 
daily users have to run the real-name registration system.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 According to the government’s self-assessment of the performance of 2008, 1,649 rally participants 
got judicially punished and 1,844 civic groups involved in the protest were notified as being unlawful. 
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7.4. TVXQ – Rising God of Cassiopeia 
 
Figure 10. TVXQ fourth album cover 
Source: SM Entertainment (http://www.smtown.com) 
One of the pioneering K-Pop star groups, the quintet boy band TVXQ was created in 
December 2003 by SM Entertainment, which established the ‘star system’ in Korea and 
made the first pop idol band H.O.T a huge hit from 1996 to 2001. TVXQ made Number 
One ranking in April 2004 in the terrestrial television station MBC’s music programme 
Music Camp that was to be an indication of their success in domestic music market. 
Their band name Dong Bang Shin Gi (동방신기 東方神起) means ‘Rising God in the 
East’. They have various names in different countries: Dong Bang Shin Gi (동방신기) 
in Korea and Tohoshinki in Japan. However, aiming at world music market, 
representatively China and Europe, TVXQ, an acronym for Tong Vfang Xien Qi (東方
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神起) in Chinese pronunciation and a simpler name, started being officially used. 
Throughout this chapter, I will use the acronym TVXQ for 동방신기. Beginning with 
their Number One ranking in Channel V Thailand’s Countdown International Chart for 
4 consecutive weeks in 2006, they have expanded their success in Asia including 
Thailand, Japan, Taiwan, China and Korea, and beyond. Particularly their first ‘Best 
Song’ award in the Japan pop chart Oricon in 2008 meant that they gained a foothold in 
world music market, since Japan was the second biggest market in the world next to the 
US129. As of January 2013, TVXQ ranked first in the Oricon chart for the 12th time and 
recorded estimated sales of 3million copies in Japan, which outran any other overseas 
musicians in the country (Cho, 2013).  
TVXQ has several online fan communities – Dong Ne Bang Ne, Iccadong, 
Yuaerubi, Cassiopeia – and the age of fan members are various from teens to those in 
their 30s or 40s, although most fans are female. The fans call one another Cassiopeia, or 
Cang or Ca-A as shorthand for Cassiopeia, which represents the TVXQ fan 
membership. The official membership of Cassiopeia is estimated at around 800,000 
worldwide and thus TVXQ was registered as the musical group having the largest 
number of fans in the 2008 Guinness World Records (Yu, 2013). The TVXQ fans do 
various volunteering and charity activities in the name of their stars: visiting orphanages 
and nursing homes, donating money and hundreds of rice-sacks to celebrate band 
members’ birthdays and promote the members’ performances in television dramas, 
musicals and concerts. As such, beyond merely adoring and following their stars, 
Korean fandom actively and powerfully engages in the management and the promotion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 It is anticipated that Japan will overtake the US to become the world’s biggest music market in 2013. 
‘The year-end 2012 table from the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) showed 
that the U.S. and Japan combined accounts for more than half of the global recording industry, with the 
American market just 1.3% ahead’. 
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of the popularity of their stars, which is coined as fancom130 – the norm of Korean fan 
culture (Chung, 2008a;Im, 2010). For example, on 31st July 2009, three members of 
TVXQ – Hero Jae-joong, Michy Yoo-chun, Xiah Jun-su – petitioned for provisional 
disposition of their 13 years exclusive contract with SM Entertainment. Under the 
contract, if TVXQ wanted to terminate the contract before its expiry, they would have 
had to pay exorbitant penalty fees to SM, i.e. three times SM’s investment and twice 
their expected earnings (Lee, 2009). The Association of TVXQ Fans formed 
immediately after the petition and worked in various ways in order to publicise the 
unfairness of the contract between SM Entertainment and TVXQ, and to advocate the 
three members’ rights, including: submitting a petition accusing SM Entertainment of 
its unfair and inhumane contract to the National Human Rights Commission (Park, 
2009); filing a petition, signed by over 0.12 million supporters on- and off-line 
internationally, for the correction of the unfair contract; filing a complaint for the unfair 
trade of the exclusive contract to the Fair Trade Commission; putting advertisements in 
the newspaper Hankyoreh131, in buses nationwide and underground tube stations with 
the voluntarily raised fund; and boycotting SM products (Kim, 2009; 2010). Although 
the fans’ wish for five members of TVXQ to continue to work together failed to be 
fulfilled, the court ordered to allow three members’ independent activities from SM 
Entertainment and the Fair Trade Commission directed SM Entertainment to take 
corrective measures about the exclusive contract period and conditions. Consequently, 
the liberated three members formed a new band named after the initials of their Korean 
names JYJ in October 2010 and two other members remained as TVXQ under the 
contract with SM Entertainment from January 2011 (Hong, 2010a;Kim, 2010c). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 The shorthand for “fan company”.   
131 They put an advertisement saying, “They are not monkeys. TVXQ are human beings who have 
personal rights and the right to make their own decisions” in the first page of Hankyoreh. 
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7.5. Teen(-fan)s at the Forefront and Media Discourse 
In the beginning of the 2008 anti-US beef candlelit vigil rally, the majority of 
participants were teenaged students, especially teen schoolgirls. And among those teen 
girls were the fans of pop music stars like TVXQ, Shinhwa, Super Junior, SS501 and 
Big Bang. The live video clip of two schoolgirls’ presentation on central stage at the 
second day rally site was rapidly spread on the Internet. At the free speech session, they 
jumped up to the stage and proudly claimed in turn:  
“I am a Cassiopeia. I would like to see TVXQ once more. We would 
like to see our beloved people much longer and we do not want them 
sick at all. (To their fellow teen fans) Now you are the hope for Grand 
Korea.”132  
Soon after, a round of rapturous applause from the assembly followed. It was of 
unequivocal surprise that the protest was led by those young schoolgirls and this fact 
impinged on promoting adults’ attention and participation in the rally. Among adults, 
especially university students who had been thought of as a leading political agent in 
Korean history of “street democracy”, the teen girls’ enormous political participation 
evoked the feeling of reflexive responsibility that resulted in an increasing number of 
adult citizens joining the rally.  
The unprecedented phenomenon of teen girl politics raised diverse reactions and 
discussions. The day after the live video clip of the two girls’ speech spread virally on 
the Internet, the mass media immediately reported the teens’ partaking in the rally. The 
mass media broadly reported the teenagers’ political engagement rather than on the 
specificity of teen girls’ or teen fans’ politics. The textual analysis of 10 general-
circulation newspapers articles revealed two central discourses of teen(-fan) protesters: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 For the video clip, please visit the webpage (http://blog.daum.net/spottv/3989345). 
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(1) emotional crowds, and (2) rational political actors. In the following, I will endeavour 
to expound how this polarity of the media discourse is operative on the basis of the 
normative reason/emotion opposition in relation to politics, which keeps us blind to the 
meaningful role of emotions in participant politics.  
7.5.1. Emotional crowds  
The narrative “emotional crowds” incorporates four thematic threads - teen protesters 
influenced by celebrities, teen protesters swayed by Internet rumours of mad cow 
disease, teen protesters instigated by leftists and anti-Americans, and the need of 
surveillance and guidance of teen participants. In respect of teen fan participants in 
particular, the media predominantly focused on the negative impact of celebrities: 
Popular stars are criticising the government’s US beef import 
agreement everyday…The stars’ remarks are often reproduced with 
fans’ responses in the Internet. Unverified rumours are being widely 
diffused, augmenting anxiety in the society. (5th May 2008, Joong Ang, 
emphasis mine)    
It is undesirable that celebrities made emotional remarks on the current 
issue. Their comments can easily provoke impressionable teenagers. 
(6th May 2008, Dong-A, emphasis mine) 
Celebrities highly influencing adolescents took a main actor’s part in 
bogus disturbance. (6th May 2008, Chosun, emphasis mine) 
There are increasing number of celebrities joining to spread the ill-
grounded mad cow disease rumours…But their arguments should have 
at least the minimum level of logic, validity and persuasiveness…The 
list of celebrities advocating violent and false rumours is being 
disseminated on the Internet as the list of ‘socio-politically conscious 
celebrities’. It makes me rethink how powerfully celebrities affect our 
teenagers’ thinking. (7th May 2008, Chosun, emphasis mine)    
They are likely blind to believe the information that was disseminated 
through the Internet and mobile phones, and proved to seriously lack 
deliberation and judgement. They were influenced by some entertainers’ 
criticism of the US beef agreement and were in a rush to prompt fellow 
teens. In addition, they were so immature that they were too easily 
affected and persuaded by a trivial stimulus. (6th May 2008, Hankook 
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Ilbo, emphasis mine) 
These accounts represent celebrities as emotional and irresponsibly influential to spread 
unverified, false, ill-grounded and illogical rumours and incite teenagers who were 
described as impressionable, immature, easily manipulated, and lacking serious 
deliberation and judgement. These negatively assigned qualities of teen protesters are 
far distanced from rational, politically significant and deliberating publics, rather in 
parallel to the concept of ‘crowds’ projected in early social scientific study of mass 
movements (Gould, 2010, p.18). The negative quality of crowds, emotionally driven, 
easily swayed by rumours and demagogues (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001, p.2), 
‘illogical, unreasonable, reckless, and inclined toward extremism and anarchic disorder’ 
(Gould, 2010, p.20), was ascribed to teen protesters represented in the Korean 
conservative mainstream media under study. This pathological approach to reduce teen 
fan protesters as a crowd was lumped together with the traditionally derogatory 
stereotype as ‘overly emotional, irrational, imprudent audiences’ (Dayan, 2001, 
p.746;Livingstone, 2005d, p.17), and ‘part of an undifferentiated, easily manipulated 
mass’ (Gray, Sandvoss and Harrington, 2007, p.2):  
Teen protesters rarely had pertinent, correct information of the US-beef 
import…most of them have never studied the issue at school but came 
to know it through the Internet only…Socio-psychology experts 
analysed these teen protesters as psychologically parallel to so-called 
‘mindless avid fans’ following their stars in the sense that emotional 
teen participants immersed themselves in the issue of mad cow disease. 
(12th May 2008, Dong-A, emphasis mine) 
Moreover, the discourse of “emotional crowds” is intensified by the theme that teens’ 
political activism was mistakenly instigated by strategic propaganda of left-wing, anti-
American organisations:  
It is a pity that teenagers, who must be full of scientific inquisitiveness, 
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believe unscientific propaganda just as told. By means of Internet, the 
ill-judged teens are likely to be brainwashed with anti-Americanism 
and the fear of mad cow disease. (5th May 2008, Dong-A, emphasis 
mine) 
Underlying the conception of teen protesters as emotional, unscientific, ill-judged 
‘crowds’ is a binary opposition between reason and emotion, which sees emotion as 
irrational and secondary to reason in the political arena. In this view, ‘unthinking, 
illogical, immature student protesters were to be watched and guided, not to leave their 
classrooms where they should focus on study under the control of an authoritative 
institution, and not to run out to dangerous protest sites’ (7th May 2008, Dong-A, my 
italics). In fact, this discourse was observed in educational sites. By early May, as the 
number of the teens joining the demonstration rapidly grew, education authorities 
instructed middle and high schools to preclude students from participating in the protest 
(Chang and Yu, 2008). In addition, the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education sent 
school inspectors including about 800 teachers to the protest site to stop students’ 
political participation (Kim and Oh, 2008).  
7.5.2. Rational political actors  
In sharp contrast, the themes – a rationale for and a praise of teens’ participation in the 
rally – were intersected into the discourse of “rational political actors”, conveyed by the 
progressive media Hankyoreh and Kyunghyang in particular. The reason theme was 
delineated in two aspects: on the one hand the teens participated in the rally in order to 
secure the safety of US beef and on the other hand to resist the swiftly changing and, in 
some cases regressive, educational policies of the Lee government, such as 
implementing the entire curricula taught in English and the revisited pre-class study133. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 In 2006, under President Roh Moo-hyun’s government, the compulsory pre-and-post-class study at 
middle and high schools was prohibited based on the notion that this enforcing way of study incites 
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In addition, the media narratives constructed teen participants in the rally as an 
emerging political force:  
…Now teenagers set a social agenda more powerfully than established 
politicians or journalists so as to make social impact… (22nd May 2008, 
Kyunhyang, emphasis mine) 
…Experts analyse that teenagers, educated and brought up by 386-
generation parents, are emerging as new ‘political actors’ 
distinguishing from youth in their 20s who are rapidly becoming 
conservative… (7th May 2008, Kyunghyang, emphasis mine) 
However, the discourse of rational political actors is still restrained within the normative 
rationality/emotionality dichotomy. Despite the clear departure from the derogatory 
image of teen protesters as “emotional crowds” and the appreciation of the teens’ 
political participation, the attempt to conceptualise the quality of political actors as 
‘devoid of emotions’ (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001, p.5) appeared to maintain:  
… Teenagers indeed directed the press… Despite their anxious passion 
and immaturity, they rationally and intelligibly judged what the 
abandonment of our sovereignty of inspection would result in…(11th 
May 2008, Hankyoreh, emphasis mine) 
Social movements are ‘an extension of normal, everyday politics’ in which ordinary 
actors participated in order to press their demands when blocked from normal political 
channels (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001, p.5;Gould, 2010, p.22) or when 
institutional politics is not working properly. And emotion plays a crucial part to 
motivate and sustain civic engagement and participation in social movement. In this 
light, I will endeavour to identify the role of emotions and the possible linkage of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
overly high competition among schools, as well as students, for entering a good university and at the 
same time it adversely affects students’ health and study efficiency. Under the system, students have to 
spend around 16 hours at school from 7.30am till 10 or 11pm. In addition, most of students go to private 
institutes for extra study until 1 or 2am afterwards. It is extremely competitive to enter a good university 
and thereby the education policy regarding entering universities is a hot potato at all times in Korean 
society. As soon as Lee Myung-bak was inaugurated as president on 25th February 2008, he announced a 
series of new educational policies, including a return to some of these old study systems, which caused 
public criticism and deep concerns.  
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emotion to reason in politics through examining teen fans’ politicisation.  
7.6. Politicisation of Teen Fandom 
7.6.1. Altruistic Love beyond Admiration   
My analysis of Yuaerubi online communications in May 2008 shows that most 
communications were concerned with worries and fear of mad cow disease, specifically 
in respect of their pop star. The fan fiction Happy Days interestingly contextualises the 
US-beef issue in unique ways in which teen fans – Cassiopeia – relate to TVXQ. The 
story unfolds as follows:  
(Monologue of TVXQ) 
Now there are only a few days left before our grand comeback stage in 
Korea. Then all of sudden Cassiopeia told us not to come back and 
instead stay and keep performing under the name of TOHOSHINKI in 
Japan. Why is that? We do not understand at all. Even a month ago, 
they said they had loved and would love us as always…. Now we are 
hardly able to trust them as they seem to betray us… By the way, what 
on earth is happening in Korea? … 
(Monologue of and talks between Cassiopeia) 
We are Cassiopeia. The only thing we can do is to support and protect 
TVXQ. Now sooner or later they will return to Korea. We have been so 
excited and happy with many Cassiopeias, waiting for their comeback 
for about two years… Then there is the news that a President elected by 
adults with the hope of boosting economy will import strange US beef 
and then every Korean might be dead. The due date for import is 20th 
May.  
Cassiopeia A: “What should we do!!! Are we dying, too?!!!”  
Cassiopeia B: “So we have to protest and if it does not work…we 
would have no other choice but die…. coz the mad cow disease virus is 
believed to be passed through not only beef but almost every sort of 
quotidian necessities…” 
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Cassiopeia A: “Then what would happen to TVXQ? They are coming 
back soon…” 
Cassiopeia B: “They will be dead if they come…” 
The protest against US beef import is still going on but it does not seem 
effective. The President does not listen to our demands at all… So I 
requested TVXQ’s best friends to persuade TVXQ to remain in Japan 
because we want them to live even if we die, and tell them that we no 
longer love them. It is so heartbreaking but we cannot let them die… 
On their arrival at the airport, we shouted at them to go back and lied 
about our love for them. In the end, they returned back to Japan and we 
all cried with their families… Now we are dying… TVXQ and 
Cassiopeia came to part for good. 
This fan fiction offers an incisive picture of teen fans’ affective relationship with TVXQ 
and their way of understanding the current issue – the US beef import and its potential 
danger, and the protest. The story reveals teen fans’ affective investment in TVXQ is 
love that is unconditional and unselfish so that they want to protect TVXQ even if they 
have to sacrifice their lives. This “altruistic” love was distinctly identified in the teen 
fans’ articulation of what TVXQ and their music mean to them in their everyday lives: 
“TVXQ guided me to find my life dream to become a musician… They 
are so precious that a word cannot convey what they mean to me.” 
(YD) 
“TVXQ is my shelter in bad times. Although I cannot touch them, see 
or talk to them face-to-face, a piece of their picture, voice and video 
clips give me strength to carry on my everyday.” (HS) 
“TVXQ is the centre of my world, a tonic for my life, and so precious 
people who have been with me through my teen age.” (KH) 
“It’s been nearly 6 years since I became a TVXQ fan. They are my 
sanctuary in Korea where there are few places that we teenagers can 
release our stress.” (ISC) 
“Once I wanted to kill myself because life felt too tough and 
devastating to go on. But I could escape from the abyss of depression 
and the suicidal thoughts with the imagination that I won’t be able to 
see TVXQ and to listen to their music for good if I die… Five members 
of TVXQ were just pop idols that I admired and adored… But as they 
have been with me for one thirds of my life so far, now they are my 
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good friends whom I want to be together in my whole life and protect 
to continue to sing.” (SC) 
As such, TVXQ and their music had an inexplicable significance, substantially 
integrated in their everyday lives: love; an essence for life like water and oxygen; life 
itself; the only reason for happiness; pride; a mood manager; and a friend, lover and 
family that they want to protect from whatever happens. The particular circumstance of 
Korean teenagers makes the relationship between these teens and TVXQ stronger and 
more special. The reality for Korean teenagers is harsh indeed. Their daily routine 
seems to revolve around only one goal: to enter a good university. The weekday of high 
school students typically begins as they rise at 6.30am, arrive at school by 8am, finish 
by 4 or 5pm, and then go back home for early dinner. Then they take a shuttle bus to a 
private crammer or hagwon where they get extra-school lessons from 6 to 10pm and do 
self-study by 1 or 2am and rise at 6.30am next morning to do it all over again. Around 
65% of high school students enter university but Korea has the highest suicide rate of 
industrialised OECD countries.  
In these distressing circumstances, TVXQ is an indispensable existence that 
maintains the teen fans’ everyday. And their affective investment in the beloved star – 
altruistic love – provided a common ground to take an initial attention and interest in the 
US beef import and the danger of mad cow disease, which were interwoven in fan-
created contents dealing with the issue such as Canta’s Happy Days and related posters.  
7.6.2. Yuaerubi built on Trust: A central communicative space for the self-
mobilising teen fan politics	  	  
The teen protesters, whom I interviewed, have been loyal fans for 4 to 6 years since 
TVXQ made their debut and Yuaerubi members for similar years. As the Internet is 
embedded in almost every aspect of Koreans’ everyday life, news they get on the 
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Internet serves as a major source for what they learn about the society, particularly to 
young people including the teen fans. For making sense of the world, the teen fans also 
use traditional forms of television and newspaper media at times. In their everyday 
Internet culture, in which they spend about 1 to 3 hours per day on average, Yuaerubi 
was the most frequent and first-visited ‘communicative space’ (Dahlgren, 2009, pp.114-
116). If they were in the third year of middle or high schools, they could manage only 
one day per week for a Yuaerubi visit and usually spent nearly all day long once they 
logged in. In Yuaerubi, they read TVXQ-related news and notifications, and fan-
generated postings, watch concert video clips and respond to fellow members’ postings 
on ‘everyday trivia’ (Crawford, 2009, p.252) in the ‘Tearoom Coffee’ bulletin board. 
They sometimes circulated TVXQ-related artefacts to other online fan communities or 
the TVXQ Telzone bulletin board of a portal website Daum, and vice versa. The sharing 
and (re-)circulating of constantly renewable meaning of TVXQ not only intensified fan 
community membership but also created and revitalised ‘social ties’ (Jenkins, 2006b, 
p.140) between geographically isolated and fragmented individuals within Yuaerubi and 
beyond. The accounts of the teen fans elucidate how the fan community maintains and 
solidifies around affinity:  
“I’m shy and don’t like to make close friends on the net in general… 
but, in ‘Tearoom Coffee’ of Yuaerubi, if somebody talks about her 
worries, we listen to her and try to give helpful advice although we 
don’t know each other. It’s because we are all Cassiopeia.” (LR)  
“I chat to Yuaerubi members in the ‘Tearoom Coffee’ whenever I log 
on. They are the one that I can talk to and rely upon in bad times…and 
chat about any trivia, including TVXQ and my private problems in 
particular.” (HH) 
“I appreciate Yuaerubi members because they love whom I love… and 
now I feel they are like my friends and family… With Yuaerubi 
members, I can talk about anything that might sound shameful and so 
that I can hardly talk to offline friends… Once we feel we become 
close enough, we exchange phone numbers for texting or phoning and 
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later do some activities together: going to TVXQ concerts and 
terrestrial broadcasting companies’ public music broadcast in which 
TVXQ performs, shopping and going to McDonalds together.” (IRW) 
Affinity ‘as a minimal sense of commonality’ (Dahlgren, 2003, p.157) with Yuaerubi 
members played a key role in building and maintaining the relationship among fellow 
fans within Yuaerubi. Affinity shared among teen fans is parallel to the notion of ‘(thin) 
trust’ as one of six dimensions of Dahlgren’s civic culture,  which is based on honest 
and reciprocal relationships with people whom we don’t know personally but with 
whom we feel we can have satisfactory exchange. As indicated in the teen fan IRW’s 
account, affinity built on ‘thin trust’ sometimes develops into personal friendship that 
demands a kind of ‘thick trust’ entailing ‘bonding of exclusive, tight, intragroup ties’. 
But in a loosely networked late modern society, thin trust becomes a more relevant, 
predominant mode for civic engagement (Dahlgren, 2009, p.113) as the interviewed 
teen fans retain toward Yuaerubi members. The teen fans’ narratives above also 
substantiate van Zoonen’s (2004, 2005) argument that fan and civic participation are 
both maintained by affective investment. That is to say, the feeling of love for TVXQ 
and trust (thin or thick) among Yuaerubi members are analogous to the counterpart 
(citizens’ admiration for politicians and trust among citizens) in political constituency. 
Social networks, built on trust among teen fan participants, served to mobilise 
themselves and friends into protest. Interestingly, in contrast to the widely held belief in 
academia that it is necessary for people to have intellectual understanding of society 
before they act to change, some teen fans acted first by their friends’ encouragement 
without political consciousness, which is rather constructed in the process of 
participating, as Gamson (1992, p.6 & pp.110-111) suggested.  
Yuaerubi provided the ‘diffused audience’ (Abercrombie and Longhurst, 1998) 
with a meeting point of multi-platforms, where they not only exchanged shared 
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emotions, information and developed informed opinions, but also engaged in 
discussions of various subjects including TVXQ.  
“In the ‘Tearoom Coffee’, lots of new postings are uploaded every 
minute… They are about our beloved stars, and political or world 
issues that I didn’t know...so I get information and other people’s 
opinions, and discuss with fellow members about those topics… 
During the anti-US beef protest, we discussed passionately.” (SSE) 
“As I log onto Yuaerubi almost every day, the community is the space 
where I can communicate with fellow fans freely and learn a lot on 
diverse subjects such as my beloved pop star and social, political issues 
sometimes. I didn’t realise the seriousness of the US beef import and 
mad cow disease until I encountered discussions with Yuaerubi 
members about the possible hazard of US beef aged over 30 months 
old.” (HE) 
As Habermas (1989[1962], 1992) pointed out, these teen fans’ accounts epitomise how 
activity in the literary public sphere, engaging discussions of taste and the pleasurable 
enjoyment of conversation among fellow fans, spilled over into the political public 
sphere of the discussion of social, economic and political questions. Moreover, this 
online political public sphere branches out to and converges with other discursive 
spaces of social interaction like school and other online communities that the teen fans 
belong to. The account of KHR highlights this point: “The next day at school I 
discussed with classmates not only about what I read, viewed and heard at Yuaerubi the 
night before but also about the lived experience of some friends’ participation in the 
rally.” As such, Yuaerubi served as a central ‘communicative space’ (Dahlgren, 2009, 
pp.114-116) for the teen fan participants among various spaces in which relevant 
‘knowledge’ (Dahlgren, 2003, pp.157-158; 2009, pp.108-110) is accessible and 
available and its interpreted meaning were circulated, updated and reinforced through 
informal, ‘meandering’ talk as a way of ‘practice’ (Dahlgren, 2009, p.117). In the 
following sections, I will examine the ways in which the components of ‘the collective 
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action frame’ – injustice, agency and identity – (Gamson, 1992), and associated 
emotions were deployed in the process of teen fans’ political mobilisation. 
7.6.3. Injustice: Moral Shocks and Demonization   
The information, which the teen fans acquired through fan-created fictions and posters, 
and discussions across various on- and off-line spaces like Yuaerubi and the school, 
engendered various emotions as below:  
“I was so terrified and anxious since the first and largest market for 
cheapest US beef was the army and TVXQ would be enlisted for 
military service in near future under the conscription system.” (LR) 
“I was so angry because a few politicians and President made the 
undemocratic decision of the US beef import that was a matter of life 
or death for the people. Not only me but also my family and friends, 
Cassiopeia and TVXQ brothers all could be killed from mad cow 
disease. That suddenly made me feel faint and cry… So I came out to 
the rally.” (TY)  
“Once I came across the fan-created poster and video clip of US beef 
and mad cow disease in the ‘Tearoom Coffee’ of Yuaerubi where I 
often chat with fellow fans, I got inexplicably enraged by the 
government’s careless decision of US beef import. So I searched for 
more related information at other websites and recognised the 
seriousness of the issue… Besides, the government’s arrest of innocent 
citizens partaking in the rally made me so angry. Eventually I partook 
in the protest.” (FT)  
“As a member of our country, I felt the US beef import was not right. 
So I browsed various websites for further information. With much more 
knowledge of the issue, I got so indignant that I couldn’t sit quietly 
without any action. So I decided to participate in the protest and went 
to the 3rd of May protest with my friend.” (HE)   
The emotions identified in the teen fans’ narratives are dreadful fear, anxiety, anger and 
indignation. These emotions are considered as the motivational basis in the growth and 
unfolding of social movements and political actions (Gamson, 1992;Goodwin, Jasper 
and Polletta, 2001 ;Hoggett and Thompson, 2012;Kuklinski, 2001;Marcus and 
Mackuen, 2001;Thompson, 2006). As the first step toward recruitment in social 
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movements and political action, ‘moral shocks’ (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001, 
p.16) take place when unexpected and sudden events or a piece of information 
threatening the existing circumstance arouses feelings of fear and anxiety. These 
emotions stimulate their ‘political learning’ (information search and processing) and ‘reflexive, informed reconsideration’ (Marcus and Mackuen, 2001, p.61) of the issue, all 
of which are regarded as required activities of citizens. This substantiates ‘affective 
intelligence’ theory (Marcus and Mackuen, 2001, p.41) to some extent that ‘emotionality 
sustains our capacity to use reason in precisely those circumstances when the benefits of 
reason are most required and most wanted’. And such feelings transformed to a sense of 
anger and indignation at ‘injustice’ as against ‘democratic value’ (Dahlgren, 2003, p.156; 
2009, p.111) – the import of unsafe US beef jeopardising public health including 
family, friends and TVXQ in particular – which played as the important emotional basis 
for mobilisation for collective action (Gamson, 1992, p.31;Hoggett and Thompson, 
2012, p.11). It necessitates the process of ‘demonization’ (Vanderford, 1989, p.174), that 
is to identify concrete and specific adversaries, who brought injustice – undeserved 
hardship or harm, in an entirely negative light and with regard to the broader structure in 
which they operate (Gamson, 1992, pp.32-33).  
In the teen fans’ narratives, the target of demonization is clearly defined: the 
government pushing forward the unsafe US beef import in contrast to the public 
opinion. Moreover, through the process of demonization, the teen fans’ motive for the 
anti-US beef protest expanded into a wider scope of other government policies such as 
the construction of grand canals in the four main rivers, the privatisation of the public 
health service and the newly proposed education policy in particular, which had 
immediate ‘proximity’ (Gamson, 1992, p, 12, 36) to the teens’ daily lives. As such, the 
teen fans’ existing anger and indignation over the hardships that they experienced in the 
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everyday were coupled with the injustice of the US beef import. Below is the teen fans’ 
extensive criticism of the government’s policy in general:   
“What the hell is the Lee government doing? All their policies are 
ridiculous: pre-and-post study, granting permission for parents to give 
small amount of money to teachers, all taught programmes in English, 
separation of superior and inferior class; what are the grand canals that 
are slower than walking for?... I couldn’t understand them at all.. All 
made me so resentful.” (SC) “Most proposed policies of Lee government were for the rich and so 
evoked criticism and complaint from the public. This was more than 
enough to protest, let alone unsafe US beef import.” (SSE) 
These narratives elucidate that the rally participants comprehend the US beef import 
issue in a broader structure in which the government policy is operative. Through 
participating in the protest, their experience of widening the horizon of understanding 
public affairs offered ‘truly integral education of the role of a citizen in democratic 
society’ as a teen fan participant HH articulated. 	  
7.6.4. Identification of Acting Agency 
‘Agency’ (Gamson, 1992, p.7) is the consciousness that people see themselves as 
potential, social agents to improve the status quo through collective action and thereby 
is a key component for political mobilisation. And this notion of ‘citizen-agent’ is the 
foundation of ‘civic culture’ that is essential for democratic society (Dahlgren, 2003, 
p.153). Whether or not the teen fan protesters retained this consciousness can be 
examined by answering the following questions: Do the Internet rumours or anti-
American groups or celebrities manipulate or affect teen fans’ political activism as the 
conservative mainstream media argued?; Do they perceive themselves as a member of 
citizens to retain capacity to change the surrounding situation?  
According to my study, there were only a few teens that believed and got 
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influenced immediately by the so-called rumours. A fifteen-year-old fan named KAH 
recalled, “I was only fourteen last year. I didn’t want to die of mad cow disease at a 
young age while using sanitary towels or cosmetics made from ingredients infected with 
mad cow disease. Once I heard the so-called rumour, I came to object to US beef more 
vehemently.” Apparently the rumour seemed to stimulate the teens’ sensibility to pay 
initial attention to the issue at an early stage.  
However, most of the teen fans that I interviewed refuted those claims strongly. 
They clearly acknowledged the rumours were exaggerated to some extent. The 
following accounts of the fan participants pinpoint this:  
“Among rumours were some overstatements but anyway it is true that 
over 30 months old US beef isn’t safe, isn’ it?” (MR) 
“Rumour is just a rumour, and there exists some truth in it although 
some were overly exaggerated. Moreover, we are not that stupid to 
believe it at face value.” (KDY) 
With more exact and pertinent hands-on knowledge through the gathering and checking 
of the facts not only from the Internet and conventional media but also from discussions 
across on- and off-line spaces, they came to get a clear sense of what the issue was 
about and sifted out the fact and truth from the rumours. As the remarks of fan 
protesters illustrate in the following, they negated the claims that celebrities, the Internet 
rumours, or any political groups (i.e. leftists) swayed them, and discerned the core of 
the issue:   
“A so-called rumour didn’t affect me much although it drew my first 
attention and made me acknowledge the seriousness of the issue. As the 
import of unhealthy US beef was so shocking itself and was the key to 
the agenda, I neglected it just as a rumour.” (VMP) 
“Was it that trivial to disregard it as just a groundless rumour? In fact, 
now that the government blamed huge public demonstrations on the so-
called ill-founded rumour instead of taking necessary measures, the 
number of protesters and anti-Lee Myung-bak increased.” (LWNR)  
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Rather, the teen fan participants strongly expressed deep pride in their fan activism. In 
addition, they clearly recognised themselves as ‘citizen-agents’ taking responsibility to 
lead the nation, and thereby they took actions to achieve the safety of the imported US 
beef. The following statements demonstrate that they not only understood the meaning 
of ‘citizenship as a form of identity’ (Dahlgren, 2003, p.159) but also were practicing 
political ‘citizenship as their rights and obligations’ (van Zoonen, 2005, p.7) to actively 
engage in the state’s affairs:  
“Some adults sneered at us teenagers, referring to us as mere children 
that knew nothing about politics, and told that we should focus on study 
only. And some people criticised us teen fans of degrading the sacred 
demonstration… But as a Cassiopeia, it is not a shame that we tried to 
secure the safety of our pop stars from mad cow disease. Because 
TVXQ are equivalent to my precious family and friends.” (FT) 
“Even to me as a teenager, there seem so many things wrong. What on 
earth are adults doing, not rectifying them? For instance, most adults 
seemed apolitical, going for holidays on election days... They chose a 
wrong person as president and are now busy with criticising? I wanna 
tell them to take action, vote when they can instead of just sitting and 
complaining. In contrast to those adults, I was so proud of our fandom 
of participating actively in the rallies.” (HS) 
“It is unacceptable in the country that I would lead in the near future 
that the government was engrossed in avoiding responsibility for their 
imprudent decision of unsafe US beef import and was making excuses. 
So we took decisive actions to express our opinions, instead of merely 
thinking or debating.” (ISC) 
In addition, the account of ISC unveils that protest provides the people including the 
teen fans, ‘who have little opportunity to participate in any of the institutions that set the 
conditions of their daily lives’ (Gamson, 1992, p.59), with a critical means and a 
political public sphere to communicate their opinions and demands immediately to 
those in control of institutional governance.  
In order to call for the government’s reconsideration of the US beef import deal 
and other policies under discussion, the teen fans took multiple actions. The accounts of 
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SJ, a third year middle school girl who actively participated throughout the rally from 
early May, articulates the fan activism. She partook in the protest with her 30 fellow 
fans in the region and school friends who also joined the rally to protect their pop idols 
like Super Junior and Shin Hwa. They mobilised and encouraged each other by means 
of mobile phone texts or postings of the time and date of rallies on online community 
bulletin boards, and brought in their DIY slogans such as “Against US beef,” “We’ll 
Guard You, TVXQ”. Moreover, they took diverse online activities, especially the teen 
fans that could not join the rally for their daily ‘legitimate demands’ (Gamson, 1992, 
p.7): mandatory night study at high school, living in a small town too far from the 
protest site and parents’ refusal. In this light, online protest had similar weight to offline 
protest as a vehicle to deliver their opposition to the unsafe US beef import. Their online 
actions varied: putting the sign ⓧ and the candlelight emoticon134 next to their online 
nicknames or on personal blogs, fund-raising, signing online petitions, sending 
messages to join the rally to friends and frequent discussions with fellow fans and 
friends.  
7.6.5. Imagining Nationhood: Self-identification of an imagined community 
As unveiled through the teen fans’ narratives, TVXQ carried a holistic signifier of 
“altruistic love” and “life” for the fans and a meaningful way for them to engage and 
feel this love in their everyday fandom. The feeling of altruistic love for TVXQ played a 
crucial role in extending a sense of community and imagining nationhood, beyond 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 
 
The Association of University Students’ Blogs for Venture Sealtale.com made and distributed the 
candlelight emoticon for those who wanted to participate in the rally but could not. Each time when an 
online user puts this emoticon on their blogs or by their online nicknames, the number of distribution was 
shown on the right hand of the emoticon.  
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‘mediating relations’ (Hoggett and Thompson, 2012, p.8) of the teen fans with TVXQ. 
In other words, the fans’ altruistic love for TVXQ extended the subject of love to their 
beloved people including their family and friends and themselves. This identification 
accompanies the process of defining “we” in opposition to “they” ‘who have different 
interests or values’ (Gamson, 1992, p.7, 84), which in turn entails imagination of “us” 
and demonization of “they”. This collective identity that enables and maintains 
communities and nations is built on shared feelings toward fellow insiders and 
perceived outsiders (Ahmed, 2004) : (thin) trust toward fellow fans and altruistic love 
toward TVXQ, family and friends, and anger and indignation toward the governmental 
authority as demonstrated in the fans’ articulation. In this way, they extended the 
horizon of their idea of nationhood – from the individual to the nation of Korea as an 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991, p.6). The following accounts illustrate this 
point:  
“To us, the pop star is our beloved people just like family, or ourselves 
and also the member of our nation, I am proud of our fandom indeed.” 
(FT) 
“My main reason for partaking in the protest wasn’t my pop star only. 
But as the people of Korea, TVXQ would support us for participating 
in the rally I believed. And as a fan, I have a rapport with the fans 
represented in the media that joined the rally for protecting TVXQ from 
mad cow disease, for it’s natural that we want to secure our favourite 
artists’ health and safety.” (ISC) 
As such, for the teen fans, to secure the safety of the US beef from mad cow disease 
means to guard the safety and health of TVXQ, family, friends and themselves as 
members of the nation, and contemplated the beef issue and general public policy as 
their own agenda to be unravelled. Importantly, identification of agency through 
collective action and nationhood as a sense of extended community intensified through 
social bonds to participants in the group partaking together in the rally. The teen fans 
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articulated their emotional experience at the rally as follows:  
“It was such a great pleasure that I partook in the rally together with 
my school friends and Ca-As and I found that they had the same 
thought as me and I could express my opinion in public.” (TP) 
“It was so amazing that so many people, including our Cassiopeas and 
teen students wearing school uniforms, joined the rally. To think that 
we all gathered together for the nation, I was so proud to be Korean… 
and proud of our Cassiopeas and myself in particular, who’d not been 
interested in politics at all before, to protest for our nation.” (HE) 
“And particularly when we were marching together peacefully in the 
main road of central Seoul, holding candles and crying out for our 
demands, I could feel a sense of joy and pleasure as a member of nation 
and TVXQ fans that we partook together in the rally for a better society.” 
(IRW) 
“When together with other participants singing along a tune of Article 1 
of the Korean Constitution, whose lyrics elucidate that sovereign power 
resides in the people, I felt inexplicably strong passion like a sort of 
patriotism deep in my heart, joy, pride and emotional bonds to the 
group of protesters, which I had never experienced before.” (ISC) 
Participating in the protest together with fellow citizens toward the shared end, the teen 
fans felt strong social bonds, a sense of belonging to the nation, a sense of pride in 
collective agency, and joy and pleasure of imagining a new and better nation. While 
moral outrage offered initial motivation for the teen fans to participate in the protest, 
these latter emotions encouraged those who were participating and motivating friends to 
participate.  
7.6.6. The Paradox of Teen Fandom 
What remains to the teen fan participants after participating in the anti-US beef protest? 
And what does this imply for the relationship between reason and emotion, politics and 
entertainment? Most teen fans that I interviewed revealed that they had been apathetic 
about politics until participating in the protest:  
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“Before this rally, I was apathetic of state or world affairs at all because 
I felt news was so boring. But through participating in the rally, now I 
try to compare the news on different channels, newspapers, and the 
Internet in order to get precise information and to see if the government 
pushes forward something strange again.” (TY) 
“Before I was apolitical and didn’t read or watch news at all… but now 
I carefully watch banner news at the bottom of television screen and 
search for further information on the Internet…Because I, as a member 
of the nation, should pay attention to what’s going on in the society. 
Otherwise, our future would be at risk. Moreover, in 10 or 20 years, I 
will let my children hear my story of political participation, which will 
be great learning for them.” (PB)  
“Because I didn’t like complicated situations, I used to be indifferent in 
state affairs. Then through this participation, I came to realise I 
shouldn’t be ignorant any more…I think if I take interest in public 
affairs, people around me will naturally get interested too…if a similar 
event like anti-US beef protest takes place in the future, I will probably 
participate not only because I want to feel that heartfelt feeling on the 
site but also because I should sustain my country myself.” (KH) 
As the teen fans’ accounts of the lived experience suggests, it becomes clear that 
emotionality is linked to the rationality of politics, especially in recurring and sustaining 
political interest and participation. In other words, diverse forms of emotions, gained 
through the collective and lived political engagement for a common good – such 
feelings as pleasure, pride and the unity of participants in the rally as ‘collective 
intelligence’ (Levy, 2001) – produced or extended a wider scope of conversations with 
diffused yet converging fan members when things matter to their life world.   
The lived experience of political participation became a collective memory that 
works to sustain their socio-political interest and engagement in the everyday and also 
becomes a heritage of ‘learning’ for future generations, as a teen fan PB articulated. And 
such civic cultures, as indispensable and desirable components of political citizenship, 
became materialised into their daily ritual of media use – reading news articles carefully 
and trying to get a critical view of the mediatised event by comparing diverse online 
news resources with the conventional media.  
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7.7. Conclusion: Fan-Citizens 
As the paradoxical teen fandom demonstrates, emotion and entertainment cannot be 
detached from the rationality of politics, and instead are closely linked to it by 
stimulating and sustaining political interest and producing ‘the virtues of democratic 
communication’ (Dahlgren, 2003, p.157) to facilitate participatory action. The altruistic 
love for TVXQ provided a common ground among teen fans to take an initial interest 
and attention in the US beef import issue so as to contextualise as their shared concern 
and enabled their imagination of an extended community embracing themselves, their 
beloved people and the nation of Korea. Moral shocks – fear and anxiety about mad 
cow disease – transformed into the righteous anger and enthusiasm for justice and a 
better reality. In participating in the protest, moreover, the teen fans experienced such 
important political emotions as pride in collective agency intensified through social 
bonds to participants in the rally toward the shared end, and joy and pleasure of 
imagining a better nation.  
These emotions accompanied rational actions such as information search and 
processing, voicing of concerns, self-mobilising with aid of efficacious and speedy 
mobile communication technology, and direct participation in the protest. In particular, 
through enlightening discussions among fellow fans and friends on- and offline, teen 
fans came to form informed publics, capable of sifting out what is true or not. It 
suggests ‘a shift from the individualized conception of the informed citizen toward the 
collaborative concept of a monitorial citizen’ (Jenkins, 2006a, p.208). Such activities, 
which can be regarded as ‘civic competences to anchor democracy in everyday actions’ 
(van Zoonen, 2005, p.61), were actualised in the course of the teen fan activism. In a 
deeply mediatised world, we all carry varying identities of fans or/and citizens, etc, 
whose activities often overlap and shift in different contexts, and determine whether or 
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not they meet the quality of a mediated public. In this light, the teen fandom served as ‘a 
mediating domain’ (Livingstone, 2005c) in which the performance of the teen fans 
constituted political subjectivity of citizens, and shaped and facilitated the political 
public sphere.  
Thus far, the teen fan activism under study clearly shows that the supposedly 
fixed, hierarchical binary opposition between politics and entertainment, reason and 
emotion, and citizens and fans is an ideological rather than an empirical distinction and 
is inevitably in flux and thereby is recalibrated dependant upon particular context. 
Therefore, it is confirmed that the traditionally held normative dichotomy is not valid in 
the context of this case study under examination.   
Nevertheless, Daniel Dayan (2001, p.752, 761) might argue that the vigil rally 
and accompanying actions were a temporary political event that produced the ‘elusive 
and pretended publics’ lacking a sense of seriousness and stability. In contrast, the lived 
experience of the political event became a collective memory for the teen fan 
participants who were previously apolitical yet now practicing a rite of political 
citizenship in their everyday media use as articulated in their accounts. They continue to 
inform themselves of state affairs that they discuss through diverse forms of media. 
Therefore, it is of importance to realise that the current entertainment culture can offer a 
political public sphere in which cultural, affective engagement of fans and audiences in 
a broader sense shifts into a public activity. 
246 	  
8. Locating the Public in the Private 
The stating point to develop my thesis is a belief in the people as a bearer of potential 
civic agency. The people retain multiple subjectivities that are enacted by their 
particular activities in a different context, sometimes as a consumer, a fan or a citizen. 
In pursuit of enhancing general public participation in politics, it is of importance to 
identify and to expand various conditions and contexts under which civic agency is 
actualised in the people’s everyday communicative practices through diverse forms of 
media use. Thereby, I set the research questions as such – in what context do hybrid 
media offer a discursive space to connect people’s everyday lives to the public world as 
well as to recruit and sustain political interest? How does affect play a critical part in 
making sense of the public world and mobilising political participation? And, in what 
ways do private individuals come to shape publics?  
These questions were examined in the three cases of the OMN citizen 
journalism, online political satire and teen fandom. Through these case studies of South 
Korean specificity of civic engagement in recent socio-political events by means of the 
ICT-based media use, the thesis aimed to identify the relation between the presumably 
differentiated categories – the public (reason/news/publics) and the private 
(emotion/entertainment/audiences) – complicated and renegotiated in everyday politics 
in respect of emotions, hybrid media and publics, and to locate the mediating conditions 
under which the private becomes recalibrated as the public.  
In what follows, I will discuss the key findings of these case studies in relation 
to the existing literature, and expound if there are any similarities or differences 
between the case studies that could give more insight in the wider conditions under 
which entertainment or affect does or does not become relevant in a political context. 
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The concluding part of the chapter will discuss the contributions of the thesis to the 
recent debates in respect of the relations between affect, entertainment and publics in 
politics.  
In Chapter Five, through analysing the distinctive ways in which the OMN 
citizen journalism contested the traditional normative values of what counts as news and 
who counts as journalists, I attempted to critique the supposedly hierarchical opposition 
between the private (the non-serious/the personal/the emotional) and the public (the 
serious/the political/the rational), following feminist thought. In the first place, by 
institutionalising citizens’ participation in news production that was once regarded as 
the exclusive realm of the professional and allocating 70 percent of space to the news 
stories created by citizen journalists, OMN offered a discursive space to legitimise 
ordinary people’s experiential knowledge as an important way of knowing and resource 
in the sense-making of the world and the connecting of the public world to their private 
lives. Legitimisation of knowledge is the contested space in which experts and 
especially professional journalists continue to attempt to position their knowledge 
within the domain of scientific authority and legitimacy differentiated from common, 
experiential knowledge of the laity. However, the OMN citizen journalism diminished 
the traditionally privileged position and authority of professional journalists and thereby 
the supposedly hierarchical divide between journalists and audiences, and expert and 
common knowledge. 
Distinguished from the traditional standard journalism of a detached, objective 
and rational mode of reporting, OMN’s “citizen-centred” approach was extensively 
manifested in “feminised” writing style and content. On the one hand, OMN adopted a 
tabloid-style of news writing, which is “easy-to-consume and –produce” formats such 
as vivid, colloquial language and first-person interpretative storytelling of instantiate, 
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emotionally charged mini-episodes of ordinary people’s everyday lives. Unlike the 
traditional standard news with its emphasis on privileged power elites and politics, by 
giving considerable newsworthiness on the events of high relevance or proximity to 
ordinary people’s everyday lives, OMN revalidated the everyday and the private that 
had been degraded as dumbed down or mere tabloidization in the standard journalism. 
As examined in Kim and Joo’s news stories, ordinary people’s private concerns, such as 
women’s personalised, domestic stories that were regarded as the matter of private 
realm, and/or social groups, such as Adjummas or deprived multicultural families often 
misrepresented or marginalised in the standard journalism, were redefined as important 
topics within the public sphere with a new light of positive image, especially in the case 
of Adjumma. In addition, in the case of Kim’s second article about a multicultural 
family’s predicaments, “feminised” news of personalised, affective stories stimulated 
audiences’ emotional engagement through such emotions as compassion and 
sympathetic grief, and allowed them to see beyond their own immediate private 
interests and interpret the matter as “our” public concern, and particularly OMN’s 
commentary space offered a discursive space in which the discussion extended into a 
wider scope of social, political conditions.  
During the 2002 presidential election, OMN became successfully positioned as 
an influential news media by concentrating on the people’s demands for immediate, in-
depth coverage of Roh Moo-hyun who was negatively marginalised in the mainstream 
press as well as his own party. Moreover, OMN’s 100-word readers’ commentary space 
along with the news story offered the public sphere in which participants exchanged 
their viewpoints and aspirations for socio-political reforms. Thereby, the election of Roh 
was the victory of the truly popular vote largely inspired by citizen-centred coverage in 
OMN’s citizen journalism.  
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The analysis of the Cheonan sinking illustrates the power of online citizen 
journalism to mediate private individuals to the public world. Rather than simply 
trusting the political discourse of the dominant media or governmental authority, 
netizens raised a question of the truth of the event through analytic yet sometimes 
emotional reinterpretation of the event from their viewpoint as shown in the citizen 
journalist Hong’s stories. Moreover, the instantly formulating interactivity among 
online news readers alongside the questions not covered by the mainstream media 
enhanced discussions of issues and alternative information impossible to achieve via 
traditional conservative news outlets. The formation of this dynamic public sphere 
among citizens, by using online forum Agora including OMN, is the real power of 
citizen journalism.  
In sharp contrast to the criticism of citizen journalism as ‘dumbing down’ the 
citizenry, OMN’s “feminised” news, articulated through citizens’ own perception and 
lived experience on the ground, (re-)mediated between ordinary people and the public 
world, and recalibrated the supposedly private, personal matter as the public concern. In 
this light, this case study substantiates feminist scholars’ sustained efforts to contest the 
gendered hierarchical distinction around the terms ascribed to the quality of news (e.g. 
hard, objective versus soft, feminised) (Carter, Branston and Allan, 1998;Holland, 
1998;Macdonald, 1998;MacLaughlin, 1998;van Zoonen, 1991, 1998). Moreover, OMN 
revalidated ordinary people (outside the boundary of power elites in socio-political 
terms) as retaining civic agency, and their knowledge as a legitimate way of knowing 
within the citizen journalism system. In this regard, this study supports the view of 
cultural studies scholars such as Livingstone and Lunt (1994), Gamson (1992) and 
Dahlgren (2003, 2006, 2009) in their attempts to view (ordinary) people as retaining 
civic agency to act as citizens to change surroundings for a better society.  
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Chapter Six attempted to link politics to affect and entertainment as a 
communicative mode to bring up an opening conversation among participants. In short, 
entertainment-based forms of media, which appeal to a broader range of emotions and 
generally have a wider public appeal, should be reconsidered as an important media 
genre to engage people with the public world, at least how their first contact with 
politics through entertaining forms like political satire can lead to greater involvement 
with the issues.   
There are at least three aspects to the humour found in political satire. Firstly, 
satire of a politician or ruler, normally considered a person of power and elite status, 
tends to give the viewer a sense of empowerment, or/and a sense of the 
disempowerment of the politician. The more power the person being satirised has, the 
more dangerous the satire (in particular when the freedom of speech is extensively 
limited), and the more we tend to laugh, perhaps partly at the joke itself and partly at 
ourselves for daring to share it. Secondly, by placing a familiar politician or political 
situation or issue in an unfamiliar and often ludicrous context, our humour reflex is 
activated by the surprise and cleverness of the juxtaposition. Since there is a general 
bias of thinking that most politicians are not to be trusted, making them look foolish 
might also trigger a sense of justice, which provides a kind of righteous satisfaction. 
And thirdly, being a social experience normally, humour creates a bond with others that 
we find enjoyable. Sharing laughter with others creates a feeling of solidarity but at the 
same time can create animosity towards the one(s) who are being satirised or who are 
offended by the satire. To consider the satirised in a powerless light or belonging to an 
underclass of citizenship helps to give satire a satisfying and unifying power. The 
emergence of ICT culture has aided the ease at which physically distanced private 
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citizens or non-experts in socio-economic terms can connect and interact with fellow 
citizens.  
In the case of parody, it seems clear that familiarity is critical to attract 
audiences to political satire.  However, it is not necessary for the familiarity to be 
particularly in-depth or knowledgeable regarding a particular political issue for the 
initial attraction and resulting enjoyment to occur. Merely by living and working or 
studying in a society, most citizens can glean sufficient knowledge of cultural and 
political issues and personalities to enjoy seeing them lampooned. Whether it is true that 
a greater understanding of the political issues or personalities creates a greater 
appreciation of the satire is debatable and beyond the scope of this research.  
The greatest power of online political satire is its potential to spread virally, 
giving it widespread appeal. The other distinguishing feature is the 'amateur-ness' of 
much of the satire, which is often created by non-professional satirists for playful and 
critical pleasure and appreciated as such by audiences.   
In what was probably the most turbulent of political times in recent Korean 
history, online satire flourished around the controversy of the President Impeachment 
bill and general elections of 2004. With the widespread availability of high speed 
internet – resulting in many people gathering much of their information online – and the 
extended freedom of speech during that time, the period was ripe for all kinds of 
political commentary from wider sources than ever before, including amateur online 
satirists. Even those who had no previous interest in politics were now exposed to 
online political satire if they spent much time browsing the Internet. That exposure led 
to shared laughter that piqued more curiosity about the issues under parody. Therefore, 
political action such as street demonstrations grew to include those who had had their 
first taste of political involvement through online satire.  
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Through exploring the K-pop star TVXQ teen fandom in the 2008 anti-US beef 
protest, Chapter Seven aimed to identify the contextual and processional dimensions of 
the fan-based politics in which teen fans’ cultural and affective engagement transforms 
into political citizenship. In addition, the study attempted to locate the role of various 
emotions played out in the process of teen fans’ politicisation. The polarized image of 
the teen-fan protesters represented in the Korean media – ‘emotional crowds’ without 
reason versus ‘rational political actors’ devoid of emotion – reflects the dominant social 
discourse of the elements of affect, entertainment and fans in relation to politics. This is 
parallel to the Enlightenment dichotomy, which this study attempted to contest.   
The teen-fans’ “altruistic” love for TVXQ beyond admiration, which was being 
renewed around their everyday fandom, offered a common ground among teen fans to 
take an initial attention and interest in the US beef import issue, and to imagine an 
extended community embracing themselves, family and friends, and the nation. Among 
various on-and off-line spaces including schools, Yuaerubi offered a central 
communicative space in which relevant knowledge and “felt” opinions were circulated, 
updated and reinforced through informal talk and social ties built on trust among teen 
fans were developed. Through discussions with fellow fans, who shared the altruistic 
love for TVXQ and (thin) trust toward one another, the beef import was contextualised 
and constructed as the common concern to be resolved.  
In addition to altruistic love, various emotions were identified as playing 
important political roles. First, fear and anxiety of mad cow disease stimulated political 
learning (relevant information search and processing) and reflexive, informed 
reconsideration of the issue. And these emotions transformed to righteous anger and 
indignation at injustice, which was identified through demonization (identity in 
Gamson’s term) of the government who made the unsafe beef deal. The teen-fans’ 
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existing anger that they experienced in the everyday, such as anger at educational policy, 
was coupled with the injustice of the unsafe beef import and extended into a wider 
scope of governmental policy. As such, injustice played a crucial role to mobilise teen-
fans’ political action. Contrary to the negative media discourse portraying teen 
protesters as ‘emotional crowds’, the teen-fans’ articulations suggested their capacity to 
retain civic agency, which was actualised and reinforced through solidarity felt with the 
participants in the protest, and was associated with other feelings in participation such 
as pride and hope in collective agency, and joy and pleasure of imagining a better 
society. Collective memory constructed through the lived experience of political 
participation became an important resource to sustain the teen-fans’ socio-political 
interest and engagement in their everyday media use.  
As the key findings suggest, this case study supports recent discussions of 
media and cultural studies, and social movement theory. But I will delineate some 
scholars’ works that were justified saliently by the study. First, it substantiated van 
Zoonen’s argument of a close linkage between fandom and politics by showing that the 
teen-fans’ everyday practices of their fandom was translated into the activities of 
citizens in a political context. Second, the study showed that Gamson’s collective action 
components – injustice, agency and identity – are essential elements played out in the 
process of teen-fans’ political mobilisation. Last but not least, Dahlgren’s six 
dimensions of civic culture were identified in the study as important elements for 
constructing the teen-fans’ political participation. As such, these works usefully 
informed the study but there are some missing loops that I attempted to fill in: for 
example, political roles of such emotions as joy, pleasure, pride, fear and anxiety, and a 
concrete example to show the relations to affect. In this light, this study contributes to 
the valuable aforementioned research in shedding light on the relations between affect, 
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entertainment and politics in the everyday.   
The common feature identified as a crucial element in connecting private 
citizens to the public world and recruiting and sustaining public engagement was 
“emotional” relevance (proximity) to a particular issue or event. If the issue is not 
directly relevant to the people’s daily lives, there needs to be some emotional reaction to 
engage audiences with the issue so as to interpret the (private) issue as “our” concern. 
However, the ways in which the proximity was contextualised and the roles of emotions 
in a different context were varied as suggested in the discussion of the findings of the 
three cases above. The emotions that play a political role, e.g. mobilizing political 
interest and participation, are played out differently in a different political, cultural 
context in which people’s communicative practices are performed.  
As such, these pages have shown, through providing powerful empirical cases, 
that the supposedly differentiated categories ascribed to the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
are renegotiated in respect of the relations between affect, hybrid media (entertainment) 
and politics. In doing so, the thesis has contributed to locating the democratic potential 
of affect and entertainment in enacting civic agency for the people (ordinary people and 
fans in the study) to practice political citizenship in their everyday lives so as to form 
publics to improve their life conditions. As a concluding remark, I would argue that the 
thesis contributes to enhancing participatory democracy by embracing various forms 
and channels of the people’s everyday communicative practices as a legitimate way of 
political engagement and participation.  	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Appendix 1. 
Roh Tae Woo’s Declaration of 29 June 1987 
	  
1. The constitution should be expeditiously amended, through agreement between 
the government party and the opposition, to adopt a direct presidential system, 
and presidential elections should be held under a new constitution to realize a 
peaceful change of government in February 1988.  
2. In addition to switching to a direct presidential election system through 
constitutional revision, I think that, to carry out elections democratically, it is 
necessary also to revise the Presidential Election Law so that freedom of 
candidacy and fair competition are guaranteed and so that the genuine verdict of 
the people can be given. A revised election law should ensure maximum fairness 
and justness in election management, from the campaigns to the casting, opening 
and counting of ballots.  
3. Antagonisms and confrontations must be resolutely eradicated not only from our 
political community but also from all other sectors to achieve grand national 
reconciliation and unity. In this connection, I believe that Mr Kim Dae Jung 
(Dae-jung) should be amnestied and his civil rights restored, no matter what he 
has done in the past. At the same time, all those who are being detained in 
connection with the political situation should also be set free, except for those 
who have committed treason by repudiating the basic free and democratic order 
on which our survival and posterity hinge and a small number of people who 
have shaken the national foundations by committing homicide, bodily injury, 
arson or vandalism.  
4. Human dignity must be respected even more greatly and the basic rights of 
citizens should be promoted and protected to the maximum. I hope that the 
forthcoming constitutional amendments will include all the strengthened basic 
rights clauses being proposed by the Democratic Justice Party, including a 
drastic extension of Habeas Corpus.  
5. To promote the freedom of the press, the relevant systems and practices must be 
drastically improved. The Basic Press Law, which may have been well meant 
but has nonetheless been criticized by most journalists, should promptly be 
either extensively revised or abolished and replaced by a different law.  
6. Freedom and self-regulation must be guaranteed to the maximum in all other 
sectors also, because private initiative is the driving force behind diverse and 
balanced social development, which in turn fuels national progress. In spite of 
the forthcoming processes of amending the constitution, local councils should be 
elected and organized without any hitch according to schedule… Colleges and 
universities – the institutions of higher learning – must be made self-governing 
and educational autonomy in general must be expeditiously put into practice.  
7. A political climate conducive to dialogue and compromise must be created 
expeditiously, with healthy activities of political parties guaranteed. A political 
party should be a democratic organization that presents responsible demands and 
policies to mould and crystallize the political opinion of the people. The state 
should exert its utmost efforts to protect and nurture political parties, so long as 
they engage in sound activities and do not contravene such objectives.  
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8. Bold social reforms must be carried out to build a clean and honest society. In 
order that all citizens can lead a secure and happy life, crimes against life and 
property, such as hooliganism, robbery and theft, must be stamped out, and 
deep-seated irrationalities and improprieties that still linger in our society must 
be eradicated. Groundless rumours, along with regional autonomism [sic; 
parochialism] and black- and white-attitudes, should be banished forever to 
build a society in which mutual trust and love prevail… 
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